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Zusammenfassung
Public Key Infrastrukturen (PKI) dienen der Absicherung einer Vielzahl von An-
wendungen und Prozessen. Dazu geho¨ren zum Beispiel E-Mail-Kommunikation,
elektronischer Handel, Zugriﬀe auf Rechner und Netzwerke und digitale Iden-
tita¨ten fu¨r die Benutzung im E-Government oder im Gesundheitswesen.
Die verschiedenen PKI-basierten Anwendungen stellen unterschiedliche An-
forderungen. Diese werden bestimmt durch das gewu¨nschte Sicherheitsniveau,
die Anzahl der Teilnehmer, die Software, die Hardwaregera¨te, die Komplexita¨t
der Installation und durch viele andere Parameter.
Die vorliegende Arbeit konzentriert sich auf das Zertiﬁkatsmanagement in
einer PKI und schla¨gt verschiedene Lo¨sungen vor, um die oben genannten An-
forderungen auf ﬂexible Art und Weise zu erfu¨llen.
Um die mit dem Zertiﬁkatsmanagement zusammenha¨ngenden Probleme zu
lo¨sen, fu¨hren wir die Certiﬁcate Management Authority (CMA) ein. Die CMA
ist eine neue PKI-Komponente. Sie verwaltet Objekte, die von anderen PKI-
Komponenten erstellt werden. Diese sind Zertiﬁkate, Sperrlisten, PIN-Briefe,
PSEs, u.a.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden der Entwurf und die Implementierung der
CMA diskutiert. Die CMA benutzt Certiﬁcate Management Plugins. Diese Plug-
ins ko¨nnen wiederverwendet werden, um interoperable PKI-Lo¨sungen zu reali-
sieren. Die Sicherheit der CMA wird bewertet.
Die Kommunikation in einem Trust Center wird untersucht. Ein neues Kom-
munikationsprotokoll wird entworfen und implementiert. Es dient der Kommu-
nikation zwischen beliebigen Komponenten eines Trust Centers. Das Protokoll
unterstu¨tzt Sicherheitsmechanismen wie digitale Signaturen, Verschlu¨sselung und
das Vier-Augen-Prinzip. Es erlaubt visuelle Lesbarkeit der Nachrichten und die
Darstellung typischer Daten in einem Trust Center.
Eine wichtige Aufgabe der CMA ist die Verteilung von PKI-Informationen.
Dafu¨r werden typischerweise LDAP-Verzeichnisse eingesetzt. Es wird ein Leit-
faden fu¨r den optimalen Einsatz von LDAP-Verzeichnissen in einer PKI bereit-
gestellt. Die Anforderungen des deutschen Signaturgesetzes werden dabei beru¨ck-
sichtigt.
Zusa¨tzlich verwenden wir LDAP-Verzeichnisse fu¨r weitere PKI-Management-
funktionen. Eine dieser Funktionen ist der Besitznachweis fu¨r Verschlu¨sselungs-
v
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Schlu¨ssel. Wir realisieren den Besitznachweis, ohne Besta¨tigungsnachrichten ver-
wenden zu mu¨ssen. Daru¨ber hinaus schlagen wir ein Protokoll zur U¨bermittlung
von Software-PSEs an die Benutzer vor.
Abstract
A public key infrastructure (PKI) secures lots of applications and processes.
These are for example the electronic commerce, email communication, access
to computers and networks, or digital identities for use in e-Government or the
health care sector.
The various PKI based applications have diﬀerent requirements. These de-
pend on the security level, the number of participants, the software or hardware
devices, the complexity of the installation, and many other parameters. This
work focuses on the certiﬁcate management in a PKI and proposes various solu-
tions to meet these requirements in a ﬂexible way.
In order to deal with the problems related to certiﬁcate management we design
the certiﬁcate management authority (CMA). This authority is speciﬁed as a new
trust center component involved in organising the workﬂow and the tasks that
remain after the creation of a PKI product, like a certiﬁcate or a revocation list.
Its design and implementation is discussed. The certiﬁcate management plugins,
that the CMA is based on, can be (re)used to provide interoperable PKI solutions.
We also give a security analysis of the CMA.
The new authority requires to rethink the communication possibilities within
a trust center. A new protocol for communication inside a trust center is de-
signed and implemented. It addresses the problems of communication of arbitrary
trust center components. It enables human readability of the messages, security
mechanisms like digital signatures and encryption, it supports dual control, and
expresses typical data in a trust center.
One basic task of the CMA is the distribution and dissemination of PKI in-
formation. Typical solutions are based on LDAP directories. A best practice
guide for these directories regarding PKI purposes is given. We further concen-
trate on the German Signature Act and see how to meet the directory related
requirements in this context.
We will use the LDAP directories for other PKI management functions, too.
One function is the proof of possession for encryption keys. This scheme realises
the indirect method of the CMP messages, but without the need for any conﬁr-
mation messages. We propose a second scheme for delivering software personal
security environments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Public key infrastructures (PKIs) secure many aspects of modern communica-
tion. PKI products like certiﬁcates are the basis for enabling diﬀerent security
mechanisms. The TLS protocol [DA99] which is designed to secure internet
communication uses certiﬁcates. Certiﬁcates can be met also in cases like down-
loading or updating of software programs, signed applets, secure email [Ram04b],
virtual private networks, and many more other security solutions (see also Section
3.1). Commonly met proﬁles for certiﬁcates are the X.509 [IT97] and the PKIX
[HPFS02].
The typical design of a PKI consists of three components, namely the Cer-
tiﬁcation Authority (CA), the Registration Authority (RA), and the end-entity
(see [AF99, Sec. 1.2]). The ﬁrst two form the trust center which is a place where
entities can request a certiﬁcate as well as a personal security environment (PSE).
This design principle derives from the fact that the CA is usually oﬄine. There-
fore, registration is not located at the CA but to an extra authority. In addition,
the registration process may be distributed in diﬀerent registration oﬃces while
the CA is usually centralised.
This design however has some problems. Since the CA is oﬄine it is diﬃcult
to manage its products like certiﬁcates or certiﬁcate revocation lists. These are
transferred somehow from the CA to a system which is able to perform this on
behalf of the CA. But even if the CA is online the same management needs still
remain. There is no speciﬁcation available on such a system. In this work we
introduce the speciﬁcation for this system called certiﬁcate management authority
(CMA). We specify the requirements of this authority and see which tasks are
assigned to it.
In addition, CMA is used to provide a backend for revocation authorities or
systems that provide certiﬁcate status information, like OCSP [MAM+99]. OCSP
servers are online and an oﬄine CA cannot be used to provide the necessary
management of certiﬁcates and revocation information they require.
CMA also relieves the RA or diﬀerent registration oﬃces from managing the
CA products, which is a common practice today. This practice however, requires
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that the products of the CA are transferred to the RA, something which is be-
coming more diﬃcult if many registration oﬃces exist. On the RA side, special
software is installed, that administers the whole process. This requires special
conﬁguration as well as skilled personnel. The CMA oﬀers a technical alternative
solution to this process.
Moreover, CMA is used for realising business logic related to certiﬁcate man-
agement. Various organisations have diverse processes. A modular and ﬂexible
CMA is employed to implement and realise all these processes.
The design and implementation of the CMA will be presented. We will further
examine its security properties. This is important since CMA is part of a security
infrastructure. This is the PKI. In order to analyse the security of the PKI, both
the PKI as a whole and its components are evaluated. Therefore the security
requirements on the CMA in a certain context are identiﬁed and examined. This
context is the German Signature Act. The security requirements of the CMA
are expressed by certain security functions. We see how to to achieve and realise
these functions.
CMA processes certain data that other trust center components produce. This
data is transferred to the CMA in a ﬂexible and secure way. A communication
protocol among trust center components is needed that possesses these properties.
Most typical solutions are the PKCS#7 [RSA93] or the CMP [AFKM05] format.
PKCS#7 has the problem that it provides a coarse transport mechanism for
the data it encapsulates. It is a data container that does not have any mechanisms
to distinguish among them. Security operations like signature and encryption
are performed on this data. It can be used for any trust center component.
CMP on the contrary expects three entities in the PKI conﬁguration, namely the
RA, the CA, and the end-entity. Therefore it is not suited for communication
among arbitrary trust center components . In [Gut03, Sec. 5.2] Gutmann reports
problems on the CMP. These regard its older version speciﬁed in [AF99]. In the
newer version [AFKM05] some of these problems still exist.
In order to oﬀer an alternative to the existent solutions in which these prob-
lems do not appear, we specify a new protocol. This protocol is based on the XML
language and is used for the purposes of communication inside a trust center. The
protocol does not make any assumptions on the number of entities, components
or authorities in a trust center. It supports diverse PKI functions like certiﬁca-
tion or revocation. The data that can be transported is typical PKI products
like certiﬁcates, revocation lists, or personal security environments. But it can
be extended to other products as well. It has security mechanisms like digital
signature and encryption.
We further use the messages of the protocol as the input format to the cer-
tiﬁcate management plugins. These plugins deliver services related to certiﬁcate
management. They realise the tasks that are performed by the CMA. Due to their
pluggable nature a very ﬂexible mechanism to support certiﬁcate management is
enabled. Moreover, a library of those plugins can be created in order to provide
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the implementation of those plugins is shown. These plugins provide a solution
to the problem of supporting various use cases and tasks that are assigned to the
CMA.
Another important task in a PKI is the proof-of-possession (PoP) of private
keys. This mechanism is needed when an end-entity sends its public key for
certiﬁcation to a trust center. The trust center determines if the corresponding
private key exists, if it is in possession of the end-entity, and if the end-entity can
use it. In case of signature keys, a signed request to the trust center (for example
a PKCS#10 [RSA00] request) is suﬃcient. In case of encryption keys PoP is
performed either by revealing the private key to the trust center or decryption
of a value, that is usually the certiﬁcate. The ﬁrst method is practically never
used. The second method is used by most trust centers. It can be performed
directly or indirectly. The direct method requires that the decryption takes place
during registration by the physical presence of the key user. But this is not
always possible. The indirect method allows that the decryption takes place
after certiﬁcation. It requires that the end-entity sends an extra conﬁrmation
message to the trust center. In large scale installations this can be diﬃcult to
administer.
In order to provide a method for realising the indirect method, we employ the
LDAP directories. The scheme uses the properties of those directories, like access
control lists, schema updates, attributes, or secure communication over TLS. The
advantage of the protocol is that it does not require any extra messages to the
trust center and therefore a certiﬁcation request requires less time and iterations.
This scheme is used in a smart card based project in the University of Darmstadt.
We will further use the LDAP directories for managing another PKI function
that the CMA performs. This is the delivery of software based PSEs. One
solution to this problem is to hand it over to the end-entity at the trust center.
But this requires the entity’s physical presence. Moreover, it does not scale with
the number of participants. Another solution is to send it with email. But some
users may have a full mail box that cannot accept any mails. Others may have
a badly conﬁgured ﬁrewall that will reject the email. Our approach is to place
the PSE on the entity’s entry on the directory. Following this approach all the
above mentioned problems will be removed. Furthermore, this scheme has two
side-applications. The ﬁrst one regards usability since the software PSEs can be
installed and used automatically at the client side. Moreover, it enables a key
on demand service, in which the users are able to access their keys from various
computers whenever the need to use it.
Since publication and dissemination of PKI information is an important task
that the CMA performs, we concentrate on the LDAP directories as the core
component to achieve it. We see what are the best practices in LDAP directories
to be used within the PKI technology. We examine their possibilities and lim-
itations and propose the best current solutions. A planning guide for directory
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services will be given. We further analyse their use in a special context, that is
the German Signature Act. We see what are the requirements for the directory
and what features are needed in order to meet them. In order to realise all the
necessary functions we design and implement an LDAP API for supporting PKI.
This API supports publication of diverse PKI products and uses most of the
LDAP security features. It meets miscellaneous requirements that have already
been met in various PKI environments and installations.
The above described problems motivated this thesis and they constitute its
main focus. This work is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 we discuss public
key cryptography. A list of PKI-driven applications and the building blocks of
a PKI is given in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we motivate the existence of CMA
in a PKI and see what are the speciﬁcations of this component. We propose
a new protocol suited for communication inside a trust center among arbitrary
components in Chapter 5. A best practice guide for directory services and its
use in the qualiﬁed signature context is discussed in Chapter 6. Two LDAP
based schemes to support proof-of-possession for encryption keys and delivery of
software personal security environments are described in Chapter 7. In Chapter
8 we give the design and implementation of the CMA. In Chapter 9 we examine
the security properties of the CMA. Current installations of the CMA and its use
in a concrete PKI architecture are discussed in Chapter 10. We conclude this
work in Chapter 11 by giving a review of its contributions and possible future
developments.
Chapter 2
Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography was discovered by Diﬃe and Hellman in 1976 [DH76].
Until that point, security of communication was based on secrets exchanged
among the communicating parties. Moreover, the algorithms and techniques
used were undisclosed and secret. From that point of time open research on
cryptography has gained more interest. Especially, the new public key based
techniques gave the ability to successfully address two problems. One for the
key management and the other for providing digital signatures. The ﬁrst digital
signature scheme was invented in 1978. This is the RSA cryptosystem described
in [RSA78]. Since then, the techniques and problems in public key cryptography
have become more complex.
In the following we see which are the cryptography related security goals in
a modern communication system. We will further take a look at the building
blocks that are used to achieve them.
2.1 Security Goals
While designing a communication system, the security goals of this system must
be deﬁned. Examples of security goals are the integrity, conﬁdentiality, or authen-
ticity of the data. Once the security goals are identiﬁed a technical realisation of
those is needed. As we will see, PKI is a technology that can reach these security
goals with its techniques and standards.
2.1.1 Authentication
Authentication is the goal of identifying whether the information and data that
reach a receiver, originate from a certain source.
Authentication is needed for example when users try to login into their com-
puters. They have to provide some kind of information, that a computer pro-
gramm veriﬁes and if this is correct, it allows them to login.
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The typical authentication protocol between two parties requires that the one
party performs an action in order to authenticate itself or some data. The other
party veriﬁes this authentication information, and if veriﬁcation is successful it
is ensured for the authenticity of the other entity or origin of the data.
With public key cryptography there is the ability to provide strong authen-
tication. Strong authentication refers to the authentication that is derived with
the use of some private and secret information, namely the private key. The
technique used to achieve this is called digital signature. With a digital signature
the origin as well as the integrity of the data can be ensured.
2.1.2 Integrity
Integrity is needed in order to identify whether some piece of information has been
altered or not. This is important for example while uploading or downloading
a ﬁle on a server. With integrity check someone can be sure that the data has
not been altered, damaged, or corrupted during this transfer. This could be a
software download or the uploading of a paper on a conference server.
Digital signing of data oﬀers also integrity services. The employment of cryp-
tographic hash functions within the digital signature provides this kind of ser-
vices. Message Authentication Codes (MACs) can also be used in order to achieve
integrity of data.
2.1.3 Conﬁdentiality
Conﬁdentiality of data is the goal of keeping this data secret. This may be needed
during storing, archiving, or while sending this data to another user. For example
patient data must always be kept secret and only an authorised doctor is allowed
to see this data. Or the number of a credit card in an online transaction must be
sent encrypted. The technique used to achieve this goal is encryption.
Conﬁdentiality is the oldest security goal. The ﬁrst cryptographic mechanisms
and techniques were implementing some kind of encryption. Modern techniques
either use public key cryptography or symmetric schemes.
2.1.4 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation is when an action cannot be denied from the persons who per-
formed it. In addition non-repudiation of data is when the origin of the data
can be assigned to a certain entity. The technique to support this is the digital
signatures. Public key cryptography is the only technology that can reach this
security goal. In cases where the originality of a digital signature is questioned, a
non-reputable signature proves the identity of the entity who has calculated this
signature.
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Electronic signatures that are legally binding (equivalent to the handwritten
signatures) must always be non-reputable. Such signatures are for example sig-
natures that can be veriﬁed from a qualiﬁed certiﬁcate. As qualiﬁed certiﬁcate
we denote a certiﬁcate that is conform to a signature act. The Signature Act in
Germany [Leg01a] describes the properties of a qualiﬁed certiﬁcate.
Non-repudiation is the most debated security goal. It is said that it cannot be
technically achieved [Ell02]. However, a careful user as well as secure procedures,
both human and technical, as described for example in various signature acts
used in several countries can achieve this goal. Furthermore, it is argued that
since non-repudiation makes the users of the key responsible for its use, the users
may never want to possess such a key. This would have as a consequence that the
users will not use PKI because it is a non-repudiation enabling technology. But
it is in the interest of the users to have such a technology for their advantage. In
the electronic world where contracts or documents must be digitally signed, it is
extremely important for the users to be able to prove that they have signed the
contract or are the owner of a document. This is achieved by non-repudiation.
2.2 Public Key Cryptography
2.2.1 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures are used in order to provide authenticity and non-repudiation.
They are based on public key cryptography. When users want to calculate a
digital signature they do so by using their private key. In order to verify this
signature the corresponding public key is needed. The private key is known only
to the user that digitally signs, while the public key is known to everybody. This
public key is usually found inside a digital certiﬁcate like an X.509 certiﬁcate. The
notion and need of certiﬁcates was described in the work of Kohnfelder [Koh78]
in 1978.
The most prominent among all signatures algorithms is the RSA Algorithm.
RSA was discovered in 1978 from Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [RSA78]. Since
then RSA has become a de facto standard. Almost every security application
that uses public key cryptography is implementing this algorithm. In many cases
and in many products it is the exclusive algorithm to be used. Although other
algorithms and schemes exist, that are more eﬃcient than RSA, RSA survives the
competition. This is due to its wide spreading in security products, its simplicity,
and its security.
The security of RSA is related to the problem of factoring numbers. If these
numbers are not large enough RSA can be broken. In order to overcome this
problem the key size used in the algorithm is becoming larger as factoring ad-
vances. In the quantum computer era the factoring and the discrete logarithm
problem will be solved in polynomial time as proved by Shor in [Sho94]. This
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is a big threat for many cryptosystems including RSA. Alternatives are needed.
Public key infrastructures, both the trust center and clients, must be able to use
other schemes, too.
In the following we describe the RSA algorithm:
The RSA Algorithm
1. Find p and q, two large prime numbers.
2. Compute n = pq
3. Find e with 1 < e < (p− 1)(q − 1) = φ(n) such that gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1
4. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, ﬁnd d with 1 < d < φ(n) such
that ed ≡ 1 mod φ(n)
5. Output the pair (n, e) as the public key.
6. Keep d as the private key.
Using d Alice can now digitally sign (and decrypt) messages. Signing with
RSA will be discussed in Section 2.2.3 and encrypting in Section 2.2.5.
Other Algorithms
Apart from RSA other algorithms are used, in order to get digital signatures.
One is the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). DSA was published as a FIPS
under the name Digital Signature Standard [NT94]. Its security is associated to
the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The speciﬁcation for the algorithm can
be found in [NT94].
There is a variant of DSA on elliptic curves. It is called ECDSA. Its security is
related to the diﬃculty of the elliptic curve DLP (ECDLP). Since this problem is
considered more diﬃcult to solve than the DLP, the keys sizes in this cryptosystem
are smaller for the same level of security. This scheme is described thoroughly in
[JMV01].
2.2.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Hash functions have an arbitrary message as input and a message of ﬁxed length
as output. If they are also one-way they are called cryptographic hash functions.
If m ∈ {0, 1}∗, then the cryptographic hash function h is a function such that:
h(m) = s where s ∈ {0, 1}n, with n the ﬁxed length of the hash function
output. The one-way property is that from s it is diﬃcult to calculate m.
Usual lengths for the output of a cryptographic hash function are 128, 160,
192, 256 or 512. Most known and used functions are MD5 [Riv92], SHA1 [ErJ01]
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and RIPEMD-160 [DBP96]. New cryptanalytic attacks on MD5 show that this
function has become insecure [WFLY04], [WY05], [Kli05a], [Kli05b]. Attacks on
SHA1 have become easier [WYY05]. Therefore, the SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384 and SHA-512 variants (also known as SHA-2 family) should replace this hash
function in the near future. These are speciﬁed in [NT02].
Properties
A hash function that is used in cryptography must have the following properties:
• Pre-image resistance
This denotes that given the hash value h(m) of a message m, it is diﬃcult
to calculate m.
• Collision resistance
It denotes that it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd two messages m1 and m2 that their
hash values are the same.
• Second pre-image resistance
This denotes that given a ﬁxed message m1 it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd another
message m2 that has the same hash value.
Anderson extends the catalogue of requirements and properties for hash func-
tions in [And93]. The security of cryptographic hash functions is extremely im-
portant. If these functions become insecure the schemes using these functions
will become insecure, too. This includes the electronic signatures.
2.2.3 Calculating an Electronic Signature
Digital signature algorithms are not used in their physical form in order to pro-
duce an electronic signature. They are used in conjunction with cryptographic
hash functions. Firstly, a user hashes the message to be signed with a crypto-
graphic hash function. Afterwards the user digitally signs the hashed value by
using the private key of the signature algorithm. Veriﬁcation of the message is
performed by hashing the original message and comparing this value with the
value obtained by using the public key over the signed message.
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In the case of RSA this is the following:
• Signature Creation
1. Calculate the hash value h(m) from the message m.
2. Calculate the signature s = (h(m))d mod n with the private parameter
d.
• Signature Veriﬁcation
1. Calculate the value v = se mod n with the public parameters e and n.
2. Calculate the hash value h(m) from the original message m.
3. Compare v and h(m). If they are the same then the signature is
correct. Otherwise false.
In this example we have used the RSA cryptosystem in its initial form. In
practice in order to work with RSA based signatures the PKCS#1 [RSA02] stan-
dard is being used. This allows the encoding of the values used in the signature
process. One advantage of this is that greater interoperability is achieved. For
example the signatures have a ﬁxed length. Moreover, the signature scheme be-
comes more secure. For a brief discussion on the security properties gained and
the attacks they provide defence from see [RSA02].
Therefore RSA and other cryptosystems are not usually being used in their
initial pure mathematical form for creating an electronic signature. In addition
the hash functions they are used in conjunction with, aﬀect the signature scheme.
That is the RSA with the use of SHA1 is another signature scheme than RSA
with the use of MD5. These schemes have been assigned well known names or
aliases when they are used in various applications. For example ”SHA1withRSA”
is the alias for a PKCS#1 encoded RSA signature with SHA1 used as the hash
function. More standardised naming and addressing of the algorithms is used in
practice. This is the OID (Object Identiﬁer) referencing.
The OID is a global, unique sequence of numbers that identiﬁes an object.
Such an object can be any arbitrary object, in this case a signature algorithm.
For SHA1withRSA this identiﬁer has the value ”1.2.840.113549.1.1.5”. There-
fore, applications that are aware of this OID know the algorithm being used (for
example in a cryptographic protocol). In the previous example therefore, the
signer apart from the signature and the message, should also send the OID of the
algorithm used in order to enable veriﬁcation of the signature.
2.2.4 Message Authentication Codes
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) can be used in order to ensure the in-
tegrity of a message and in addition provide authenticity for this message. They
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use a symmetric secret key as a parameter. This key is called symmetric since it
can be used for encryption and decryption. Thus, the recipient of the message
possesses exactly the same key as the sender of the message. The ﬁrst needs it for
calculating the MAC value of a message and the second for verifying this MAC
value.
MACs cannot be used for signature purposes. This is because at least two
parties possess the same secret key. Therefore, it cannot be distinguished which
one has calculated the MAC value. In addition, veriﬁcation requires also that
the key will be revealed.
A typical application that uses MAC is the PKCS#12 container. PKCS#12,
deﬁned in [RSA99], oﬀers the possibility to store secrets and private information
(usually private keys) in a special container. It has security mechanisms to pro-
vide a secure store and speciﬁes a standard format for providing interoperability
among applications. PKCS#12 oﬀers two modes for integrity of information and
two for privacy. These modes can be combined and therefore four mechanisms
exist in total. One integrity mode is based on a password. This mode uses a MAC
algorithm. The password is used in order to calculate the symmetric key for the
MAC algorithm. The algorithm that is used in this standard is the HMAC.
HMAC is described in [KBC97]. This MAC algorithm is based on hash func-
tions. Other MAC algorithms that are widely used are the CBC-MACs. These
are based on symmetric block algorithms operating in the CBC (Cipher Block
Chaining) mode. Another MAC function is the UMAC described in [BHK+99].
2.2.5 Encryption
Public key cryptography is also used for encryption. For encrypting a message,
the sender must know the public key of the recipient. This key is used in order
to encrypt a message. Then the message can be sent over a possibly insecure
channel. The recipient is using the private key for decrypting the message. In
the case of RSA this is as follows:
• Encryption
1. Encrypt the message m with the public key of the recipient e. That is
c = me mod n. Send c to the recipient.
• Decryption
1. Decrypt c by using the private key d. That is m = cd mod n.
The RSA cryptosystem can be used for encryption and digital signing. As
in the case of digital signing, the RSA cryptosystem is not being used in its raw
form. The PKCS#1 encoding of the messages is employed for the encryption
process. That provides also defence against certain attacks [RSA02].
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In most cases public key encryption is used only for small messages. This is
because it is slow in comparison to secret key techniques. Such techniques are
the Triple-DES (3-DES) or the AES algorithms. Public key encryption in this
case may be employed for encrypting a secret key that will be used in the rest of
the communication for encrypting the data. This is met for example in the TLS
[DA99] protocol.
2.3 Further Reading
We have brieﬂy visited the cryptographic building blocks we will use in the rest
of this work. For more information, details and security analysis see [Buc01] and
[Sma03]. For a work covering many cryptosystems and cryptographic techniques
see [MvOV97].
Chapter 3
Public Key Infrastructures
Public key infrastructures are used for providing security services in lots of ap-
plications. The PKI is a technical realisation of diﬀerent aspects of public key
cryptography like being able to sign, verify signatures, encrypt, or decrypt. It is
an infrastructure in which public key based cryptography can be operated.
PKI is an infrastructure. This means that it needs certain protocols, building
components, software and hardware programs, and techniques that are commonly
accepted in order to operate and function properly and securely. We will see the
services that a PKI oﬀers, the entities it consists of, and what are the responsi-
bilities of each entity. We will also present the most typical PKI products like
X.509 certiﬁcates. We will give the notion of a trust center, and see its operating
considerations. But ﬁrst we will take a look at some PKI enabled applications
and see where PKI can be employed in order to provide security solutions.
3.1 Applications
A PKI is the technical realisation of an infrastructure in which public key cryptog-
raphy can be operated. Many schemes require the use of public key cryptography,
like digital signatures. There are a lot of applications that are based on these
schemes. Legally binding signatures for example are using digital signatures.
Therefore, a PKI enables these applications. In the following we see some of
these PKI enabled applications.
3.1.1 Network Security
The network traﬃc and communication on the internet can be secured with the
help of a PKI. Particularly the conﬁdentiality, authenticity, and integrity of the
information are important. The technology that is used to perform this is the
SSL and TLS protocol.
The TLS protocol, is a protocol that secures the communication of two parties
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by enabling them to authenticate to each other. Moreover, it encrypts the data
and traﬃc between them. The speciﬁcation of the protocol can be found in
[DA99]. TLS is the successor of the SSL protocol which provides almost the
same security services. Further these protocols can be used in a variety of other
protocols like HTTP [Res00] or LDAP [HMW00]. For more on SSL and TLS see
[Eck04, Chap. 12.5] and [Res01].
Actually, these protocols make possible a family of applications. We brieﬂy
visit two of them:
E-Business
Most of the web-based electronic commerce requires the use of a secure tech-
nology. For example a web-site selling some products must identify itself as the
correct seller. Moreover, when the clients must pay for an item, they have to pro-
vide some private information like their name or address. These must be secured
for conﬁdentiality. This is also needed if the payment is done electronically. In
this case the credit card numbers or other banking information must not be sent
in clear. All these can be achieved by TLS.
Secure Examination Registration
Another case where TLS can be used is for secure sign up for an examination over
the internet. In this case the students must be sure that they send their applica-
tion to the correct examination authority. Likewise, the examination authority
must know the identity of the student and be sure that exactly this student is
signing up for an examination. The server and client authentication mechanisms
of TLS can provide these mechanisms.
3.1.2 Document Archiving
Document archiving and especially long-term archiving is another application of
digital signatures and PKI. Long-term archiving of documents is usually needed
in government administration, medical documents, or adminstration documents,
for example in the corporate environment.
In the federal state of Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen) in Germany about 130
millions of paper pages are used for purposes of state administration every year.1
These must be archived for 5 up to 30 years. After this period, about 3% to
5% of these documents will be permanently archived. The processes, procedures
and workﬂows in the administration are being digitised and the documents are
transferred to an electronic form. But the traditional signatures on the document
must also be digitised. Therefore electronic signatures are employed.
1http://www.izn.niedersachsen.de/master/C5252172 N5505837 L20 D0 I3654280.
html (date of access 28.10.2005).
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A project was initiated in Germany for addressing the problem of long-term
archiving of electronically signed documents. This is the ”ArchiSig” project.2
One problem related to long-term security of digital signatures is that the cryp-
tographic primitives may become insecure. Another is the possible lack of in-
formation needed to verify such signatures after a long time. In [BPRS02] the
technical aspects of these points are being discussed in the context of the Ger-
man Signature Act [Leg01a]. In [BvdHH+02] a prototype implementation of a
PKI in the health care sector is presented. This PKI will provide the necessary
infrastructure, in order to support electronic signatures for the electronic records
of the patients.
3.1.3 Code Signing
This is one of the PKI enabled applications that standard users are often con-
fronted with. The goal of code signing is that the users can verify the source of
the code and install programs only from trusted parties.
A software manufacturer must digitally sign the software that it distributes.
When the software reaches the user, in the form of an installation CD or as
software download or update from the internet, the user must ﬁrst verify the
signature of the software. Only if the signature is valid the user should install
this software. In the Windows operating system there is the possibility to digitally
sign the Windows installer packages. For further reading on software download
code signing for Windows see [FFW99, Chap. 4]. In some Linux systems the
whole distributions, or updates, or patches can also be digitally signed.
Some special form of code signing can also be met in applets. Applets are
Java programs that run in a Java enabled browser. The binary distributions can
be signed in order to access resources on the client system. A typical example
is the reading and writing of ﬁles in the client ﬁlesystem. While an unsigned
applet is not allowed to perform such operations, a signed applet may be. Other
examples are the establishing of connections to the internet or communicating
with external ports (for example the serial or parallel port).
Another application of the code signing can be located in WebStart [SUNb].
WebStart is a technology that allows to write and distribute applications over
the network. A client connects to the internet and downloads the WebStart
application. After that the application runs locally on the client machine (and
not in the browser like in the case of applets). In addition it has a ﬂexible update
mechanism. The client always checks for a newer version on the host (where the
WebStart application can be located). As long as the application remains the
same, the client can be run locally without accessing the network. But as soon as
the application is updated, the client can also be updated with the newer version.
This enables an easy adding of new features or ﬁxing bugs in the program.
2http://www.archisig.de/ (date of access 09.02.2006).
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A WebStart application must be digitally signed if it needs to access restricted
resources to the client system. Most WebStart applications available, do require
such an authorisation and therefore they are usually signed. An example for such
an application is the Card Manager. This is an application that communicates
with a smart card in order to perform certain functions with it. This application
has been developed in the Technical University of Darmstadt for the purposes of
administrating the student card.3
3.1.4 Secure Email
With secure email the possibility to send signed and encrypted messages is de-
noted. Many email clients support secure email. Typical applications of this is
the sending of encrypted mails containing sensitive data (for example parts of
source code or a system’s speciﬁcations) in the corporate environment. Another
application is the authenticated communication between communicating parties.
A concrete example is that of students sending a signed email to the university’s
secretary in order to declare a change in their address or ask for some kind of
certiﬁcation.
S/MIME is the most widely deployed standard to provide security in email.
It is speciﬁed in [Ram04b]. Its current version is the 3.1. S/MIME is based on
X.509 certiﬁcates as this is speciﬁed in [Ram04a]. This standard can also be
used for other purposes like securing electronic data interchanged (IDE) which
denotes the data exchanged among diﬀerent corporations and institutions. For
more on S/MIME and related security mail standards see [FFW99, Chapt. 5].
Apart from S/MIME, Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) and PGP can be used to
provide security services for emails.
But other applications can be driven from email security. Email security
can be used against unsolicited commercial e-mail (SPAM). Only messages that
contain a valid signature may appear in a person’s incoming mailbox.
3.1.5 VPN
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are networks that operate over public networks
but enable security mechanisms for the communication inside this network. VPNs
can be built with the help of IPSec [KA98]. IPSec addresses the problem of
providing security at the IP (Internet Protocol) level. The sixth version of the
IP (IPv6) speciﬁes two diﬀerent security mechanisms that must be supported
[DH98]. This means that security mechanisms are very important for the internet
communication and therefore they are part of its speciﬁcation.
A typical application of VPN networks is for securing connections from one
network to another. This could be a LAN or a Wireless LAN. Another application
3It can be downloaded from http://www.tu-darmstadt.de/hrz/chipkarte/
dokumentation/cardmanager/ (date of access 09.02.2006).
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is the secure connections for intra-organisation purposes like that of connecting
remote branches. For inter-organisation purposes VPN connections may also be
employed.
Usually a PKI is needed for the authentication parts of the VPN connection.
The clients can authenticate themselves using strong authentication with the use
of public key technology. The users possess an X.509 certiﬁcate that enables
veriﬁcation of their signatures. PKI based authentication oﬀers more security
than the more simple variants. For more on this see also [Car02, Chap. 11].
3.1.6 Filesystem Encryption
The ﬁlesystem of a computer can also be encrypted with the use of PKI technol-
ogy. Usually, in this case, a symmetric key is encrypted with a public key. With
the symmetric key the ﬁlesystem encryption is achieved. This is a hybrid scheme
in order to use the best properties of each technology. The public key encryption
for key management and the symmetric encryption for speed.
In most of the standard operating systems a ﬁlesystem encryption scheme
exists. In Windows OS this is the Encrypting File System (EFS) scheme. EFS
oﬀers the possibility to encrypt and decrypt portions of the ﬁlesystem. The details
as well as an analysis of the EFS can be found in [FNG03]. Similar schemes exist
for other operating systems. A survey on ﬁle systems that use cryptography is
given in [WDZ03]. The authors also discuss and compare the performance of some
of those systems. In [JCB03] the design and implementation of an encrypted ﬁle
system suited for NAS (Network Attached Storage) is presented.
3.1.7 Login
The login into a computer system can also be secured with the use of certiﬁcates.
Many variants of secure login use smart cards. This application has attracted
attention lately, especially in the corporate environments. But also in the uni-
versity context is of great importance in order for the students to login at the
computer labs.
A smart card based login system was implemented from Microsoft at their
Windows 2000 Server product. This is called Smart Card Logon and was imple-
mented for authentication and login purposes at a Windows operating system.
Windows XP Professional support this feature, too. At the moment this solution
supports only domain and not local accounts. In the TU Darmstadt the Novell
Client is used for providing login services to the computers found all over the
university campus. This system also uses smart cards. It requires a PKCS#11
[RSA04] library for communicating with the card.
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3.1.8 Electronic Voting
Digital certiﬁcates and PKI can also be used for electronic voting. The voting
process can be performed from the distance without requiring that the voters must
visit special voting centers. Simple digital signatures as well as blind signatures
[Cha82] (to ensure the anonymity of the voter) are employed to implement the
voting schemes. But other techniques exist, too.
A project regarding electronic voting in Austria is using PKI technology to
enable these services to the citizens. A detailed description of the project’s goals,
but also technical issues can be found in the internet site of the project.4 The
proposed carrier for the keys is a smart card which is already in use in Austria
in the form of a citizen card.
3.1.9 Measuring Data Exchange
Measuring data from machines and services must be further processed in several
cases. For example in the case of power supply providers, the consumption of the
consumers must be measured and a bill must be sent to them afterwards. The
authenticity and integrity of this data is of great importance. Since this data is
usually in electronic form, digital signatures can be employed to provider these
security services.
A description of a project, called SELMA, dealing with this problem can be
found in [DHIR05]. Digital signatures and X.509 certiﬁcates are employed in
this project in order to realise a secure electronic measuring data exchange. A
digital signature is calculated from the measuring machine over the raw measuring
data. In the next steps this data is processed only after a successful signature
veriﬁcation and a new signature is calculated after every processing step. Lastly,
the billing information is sent to the end-user also in a signed electronic form.
For more information on this project see [DHIR05].
3.1.10 Citizen Card
Various e-Government projects are based on digital identities stored on smart
cards. Many European countries issue or plan to issue citizen cards. In [CWP04]
a report on the Belgian citizen card can be found. In addition, signature acts
in many countries require certain devices to be used as the secure store for the
keys as well as the secure place where the signature calculation will be performed.
Such devices are smart cards among others.
4http://www.e-voting.at (date of access 13.04.2005).
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3.1.11 Electronic Tax Declaration
In Germany the tax declaration can be performed electronically. The framework
on which this is performed is called ELSTER. ELSTER requires that all decla-
rations must be sent digitally signed to the authorities. The authorities provide
a special programm (which can be downloaded from their web site) with which
all tax declaration data can be signed and transmitted to them. This programm
is called ElsterOnlineManager (EOM).
EOM is working with smart cards able to calculate digital signatures. This
digital signature replaces the handwritten signature and has the same value. At
the moment not all federal states in Germany support the digital signing and
transmission of the tax declarations. The EOM will be substituted with a newer
system in 2006. For more on this system visit the ELSTER site.5 In the federal
states of Hesse (Hessen) and Berlin tax account related data can be retrieved
online.
3.1.12 Virtual Post Room
This is another project in the German e-Government planning. The main idea of
the project is to develop a central communication gateway in order for citizen to
securely communicate with the German authorities. Not only citizens but other
authorities and corporate institutions can communicate using this gateway. The
data that is exchanged between those communicating parties is of private nature
and it is encrypted. In addition it is digitally signed to identify the person who
send this data. PKI delivers its services in this case, too. The certiﬁcates needed
to perform the above must be qualiﬁed certiﬁcates according to the German
Signature Act [Leg01a]. A description of this project as well as its security
concepts can be found in [MM05].
3.1.13 Paperless Work Certiﬁcations
Lots of certiﬁcations must be issued during a person’s professional life. This
could be a certiﬁcation containing salary information or a certiﬁcation regarding
employment or pension issues. At the moment about 60 million of these certiﬁ-
cations are issued in Germany every year. Almost all of them are in paper form.
The administration of this information is quite diﬃcult to achieve.
With the JobCard6 project in Germany, it is planned that all employees will
receive a smart card. This card will contain a qualiﬁed digital certiﬁcate. With
this certiﬁcate the digital signatures of the users can be veriﬁed in order to au-
thenticate themselves. Afterwards, they can request a certiﬁcation regarding
their employment. The whole process is digitised, compact, secure, and not time
5http://www.elster.de (date of access 13.04.2005).
6http://www.itsg.de/download/BroschuereJobcard.pdf (date of access 13.04.2005).
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consuming. More applications are planned. The beginning of the project was
announced for 2006 but considerations whether it should be combined with the
health insurance card have delayed the project.
3.1.14 Health Care Sector
The health card is another PKI enabled project. This card will substitute the
currently existing health insurance card in Germany. This card will hold all
previous data needed in the health care system. Apart from this, it can also
be used for the electronic issuing of prescriptions. These prescriptions must be
secured with digital signatures and encryption. Moreover, the doctors will be
able to access patient data by authenticating themselves. In [Cha99] a discussion
on the advantages and disadvantages of the introduction of a smart card in the
health care sector are discussed.
3.1.15 Electronic Measurements
Electronic measurements from devices like scales require monitoring. This is
important since involving parties should be able to examine the correctness of
the measurement, because transportation and billing of the goods is associated
to the values measured from the machines. In order to achieve monitoring of the
measurements, special controlled machines are usually used. These are controlled
from the corresponding measurement oﬃce authority. PKI can be used instead
to secure the data itself for authenticity and integrity. A description of such a
process can be found in [WRL+06]. Such a system is already in use from the
Schenk Process GmbH company located in Darmstadt. This process is patent
pending.7
3.1.16 Electronic Workﬂows
Various workﬂows in organisations and companies are digitised in order to achieve
paperless administration, faster procedures, high availability, and other features.
The security of the workﬂow is important because design goals like conﬁdentiality
or authenticity exist. In traditional workﬂows these goals are achieved by hand-
written signatures, policies, and various access control mechanisms. When these
workﬂows are digitised, PKI is employed for achieving these goals. In [FKL+06]
it is shown how to transfer traditional workﬂows in a university to electronic ones,
what are the security requirements and how to address them with the use of PKI.
The prototype implementation of a complex workﬂow, that is the appointment
to a professorship, is given.
7European Patent: EP 1 450 144 A2.
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3.2 Public Key Infrastructure
The goal of a public key infrastructure is to enable certain security services and
achieve security goals by deploying the public key technology. The applications
given above, are enabled through the installation of a PKI.
Like any technical infrastructure PKI has speciﬁcations in order for the users
to be able to use it. Moreover, it bases its services upon products. We will
examine what are the speciﬁcations of PKI and its products.
3.2.1 The Infrastructure
A PKI is a software and hardware based infrastructure. Once it is installed,
its services can be used either from the hosting organisation or other external
organisations. This means that it is not necessary to build and install such an
infrastructure whenever its services are needed. The most typical example is
the use of SSL. Although most of the organisations that are working on banking
or e-commerce operate their web services over SSL, they do not have a PKI
installation. Instead they are using PKI services from external organisations.
PKI is mostly a commercial product. There are very few open source and
free available PKI solutions. One is based on OpenSSL [Ope05]. This PKI is a
minimal one. It provides only the basic functionalities. Another project is the
OpenCA [Lab05]. This project oﬀers more functionality. It takes about two weeks
to install it for two software engineers according to [FMS+05]. Both projects
cannot be used in their status today in order to address complicated problems
that appear in a PKI. The complexity of a PKI software scales with the options
available. For operational reasons mainly, but also security considerations, PKI
services are usually distributed. This is a common practice in almost every large
scale infrastructure independent of its type. We see how the services in a PKI
are distributed.
3.2.2 Registration
The purpose of registration is to obtain an entity’s data, verify them, and initiate
the certiﬁcation process. This data will be used later for binding an entity to a
public key.
The ﬁrst task of registration is to obtain the data. This can be done for
example by obtaining it directly from the entity. This usually requires the entity’s
physical presence at the registration oﬃce, if this data are not already known.
Another way to obtain this data is by an electronic database that already contains
it. The data is then extracted and used.
The second task is to ensure that this data is correct and valid. That is to
identify and authenticate the entity. Failing to do so will be a major risk in the
22 3. Public Key Infrastructures
security of the whole infrastructure.8 One way to achieve a correct identiﬁcation
is by checking an oﬃcial document like an identiﬁcation card or a passport. If
the data is obtained from an electronic database, then unauthorised changes in
this database must be restricted. In addition, a mechanism to ensure that this
database is the one that contains this information should also be present.
The authority responsible for the registration is called the registration au-
thority (RA). After a successful registration, the certiﬁcation follows.
3.2.3 Certiﬁcation
Certiﬁcation is the process of binding an entity to a public key. The data identi-
fying the entity comes from the registration process. The public key is provided
by the entity or it is created during registration or certiﬁcation. In the last case
the private key must be delivered to the end-entity.
The binding of the entity’s identity and its public key is realised by using a
digital certiﬁcate. This certiﬁcate contains at least these two values. It is elec-
tronically signed by an authority in order to state that the information it contains
is correct and has been examined by this authority. Therefore an application that
trusts this authority trusts the information contained in the certiﬁcate. That is
that a public key belongs to a certain entity. Moreover, since the certiﬁcate is
signed, the integrity of the data that it contains is achieved. Responsible for the
signing of the certiﬁcate is the certiﬁcation authority (CA).
Special security mechanisms are applied to the CA. This is because of the
importance of the task the CA is assigned with and the security considerations
associated with it. Special protection is needed for example for the private key
that the CA uses in order to sign the certiﬁcates.
3.2.4 Revocation
Revocation is the action of revoking a certiﬁcate and cancelling therefore its
validity. This is usually initiated from the entity that is using this certiﬁcate.
The revocation information must be available for the PKI entities. For achieving
this, a known position where such information can be obtained must be provided.
This can be realised in the form of a list that contains all revoked certiﬁcates and
it is located in an LDAP directory. It may also be in the form of a positive or
negative answer upon a question whether this certiﬁcate is valid or not.
The online certiﬁcate status protocol (OCSP) oﬀers such services. OCSP is
deﬁned in [MAM+99]. It is a protocol that allows clients (OCSP clients) to query
a server (OCSP server) and get signed responses about the status of a certiﬁcate,
that is whether it is revoked or not.
8This has already happened. For a discussion on the security risks see http://www.
microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-017.mspx (date of access 14.11.2005).
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All these methods must be protected for authenticity and integrity. Therefore,
electronic signatures are employed in these methods, too.
3.2.5 Distribution
All public products and information of a PKI must be publicly available for all
users. The most commonly used mechanism to achieve this is to publish such
information on a public directory. This is usually an LDAP directory [HM02].
From this directory this information can be accessed from all PKI participants.
Private information may also have to be sent to end-entities. This is met
for example when the private keys are created in the CA. Secure and reliable
mechanisms are needed in this case.
3.2.6 Miscellaneous Tasks
There are other miscellaneous services and tasks in a PKI. Some of them are
related for example to validation. A server performs validity operations for a cer-
tiﬁcate on behalf of a client that chooses to delegate this task to the server. This
includes veriﬁcation of the certiﬁcate’s signature, locating the certiﬁcation path
to the higher level CA, as well as evaluation of revocation information. A spec-
iﬁcation for such services is the XML Key Management Speciﬁcation (XKMS).
But other services exist or will appear in the future
3.2.7 The RA-CA Model
In order to realise the core services that a PKI oﬀers the RA-CA model has
been introduced. The end-entity is a third component. This is the one using
the PKI services. A description of each component can be found in [AFKM05,
Sec. 3]. Many other speciﬁcations employ this design. This is for example the
proﬁle speciﬁcation of certiﬁcates and revocation lists [HPFS02]. Also in [HP01,
Chap. 5] the same design is used.
The RA is responsible for the registration. It veriﬁes the data of the entity
and creates a request for certiﬁcation to the CA. Additionally, it may produce
revocation requests for certiﬁcates, either initiated by itself or the end-entity. It
can be distributed in the form of local registration authorities (LRA) in order to
meet certain operational needs inside organisations. The requests are gathered
from every registration oﬃce and they are sent to the CA. See Chapter 5 for a
discussion on the possible ways for transferring messages between RA and CA.
The CA is dealing with the certiﬁcation. The data that comes from the RA
is used to create a certiﬁcate. Additionally the CA may also sign revocation
lists. It is usually centralised and special protection mechanisms are applied
to it. The certiﬁcates and revocation information are extracted from the CA
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and are disseminated to the end-entities. The RA or human administrators are
responsible for this.
Alternatives to this design have been proposed in [FS03, Chap. 19]. Accord-
ing to this design the RA is actually a subordinate CA to the root CA. This
design however is not discussed in details. Often, the presence or absence of
certain components is debated among PKI practitioners. Reasoning for the ex-
istence and necessity of an RA can be found in [AFKM05]. The work at hand
is about introducing a new authority and component in the infrastructure. This
is the CMA. The CMA completes the RA-CA model where this cannot provide
satisfactory solutions (see Section 4.1). Other authorities and components have
already been proposed. One is the key authority [WLK04]. It is responsible for
administrating the private keys of the infrastructure. Another is the decryption
authority described in [Bao00]. It is involved in decrypting messages for the users.
The validation authority (VA) exists also. The VA is responsible for providing
statements whether a certiﬁcate is valid or not. Actually, the veriﬁcation and
validation steps are delegated from the end-user to this authority.
3.2.8 End-entities
End-entities are the ones who are using the PKI services. They possess a certiﬁ-
cate. By possessing a certiﬁcate they can use PKI driven applications like secure
email, VPN and many more. They interact with the RA in order to request and
get a certiﬁcate. The more transparent and easy for those entities the use of
certiﬁcates is, the greater the acceptance of the infrastructure will be.
End-entities can be physical persons and machines. In the case of SSL server
authentication the end-entity is the web services hosting computer. In the case
of qualiﬁed electronic signatures the end-entity is always a physical person.
3.3 PKI products
3.3.1 X.509 Certiﬁcates
The certiﬁcates are the most prominent among the PKI products. Without cer-
tiﬁcates the whole PKI would be infeasible. They are signed documents that
certify that a public key belongs to a certain entity. Certiﬁcates provide a prac-
tical realisation of public key cryptography. The were ﬁrst introduced in the
work of Kohnfelder [Koh78]. The X.509 certiﬁcates are the certiﬁcates used in
the PKI applications we have seen so far. The got their name from the X.509
speciﬁcation [IT97]. The speciﬁcation mostly used for purposes of internet com-
munication today is the [HPFS02]. It speciﬁes the format as well as the processing
of certiﬁcates. In Figure 3.1 we see an X.509 certiﬁcate.
An X.509 certiﬁcate has three parts. The TBSCertiﬁcate (To Be Signed
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Figure 3.1: An X.509 Certiﬁcate
Certiﬁcate), the algorithm that is used to sign this part, and the signature over the
TBSCertiﬁcate. Thus, all information inside the TBS part is protected against
changes and it can be authenticated. The CA signs this part.
Inside the TBS part of the certiﬁcate the name of the owning entity can be
found as well as its public key. Further information are related to the validity
period of the certiﬁcate, or its serial number, a unique number among other
certiﬁcates issued from the same CA. The name of the CA can also be found. In
order to address other needs, a certiﬁcate may contain extensions. One extension
for example denotes whether this certiﬁcate belongs to a CA or not. Another
extension shows which is the usage of this certiﬁcate. More extensions exist.
A certiﬁcate is used for verifying signatures calculated with the private key
corresponding to the public key contained in the certiﬁcate. The signature on the
certiﬁcate itself must be veriﬁed, too, as well as the signature of the certiﬁcate
that is used for verifying this signature. This process continues until a trusted
(usually self-signed) certiﬁcate is found. The signature on this certiﬁcate can be
veriﬁed with the public key contained in the certiﬁcate itself. Another step in
this veriﬁcation process is to examine whether this certiﬁcate is revoked or not.
This is often done be examining the certiﬁcate revocation lists (CRL). In case
of encryption the same veriﬁcation procedures must be performed. In this case
the public key is extracted from the certiﬁcate in order to encrypt data for the
certiﬁcate’s owner.
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3.3.2 Certiﬁcate Revocation Lists
Certiﬁcates have limited validity in time. But in some cases it is desired to end
the validity of a certiﬁcate before its expected one. One reason for that could
be a change in the aﬃliation of the certiﬁcate’s owner or a supposed compromise
of the private key. Exactly this action, ending a certiﬁcate’s validity before its
expiration, is the revocation. This revocation information must be known to
every PKI participant. For addressing this problem the certiﬁcate revocation
lists have been introduced. They are also contained in the X.509 speciﬁcation.
X.509 CRLs are signed documents containing a list of revoked certiﬁcates.
They resemble the certiﬁcate structure with a TBS ﬁeld, the signature algorithm,
and the signature. They contain ﬁelds like the number of the CRL, the issuer,
the time of issuance, or the time when a newer CRL will be available. The
revoked certiﬁcates are represented in the CRL by their serial number. Other
information regarding revoked certiﬁcates like the revocation time or the reason
for the revocation may be present. Figure 3.2 shows an X.509 CRL.
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Figure 3.2: An X.509 Certiﬁcate Revocation List
3.3.3 Attribute Certiﬁcates
Attribute certiﬁcates (AC) in comparison to X.509 certiﬁcates are rather used
for authorisation than authentication. Although authorisation based on X.509
certiﬁcates is possible, it may sometimes be diﬃcult to achieve. See [FH02] for
reasoning on this. This document is also the speciﬁcation of attribute certiﬁcates.
Infrastructures based on attribute certiﬁcates are called Privilege Manage-
ment Infrastructures. For the design of such an infrastructure see [BB04]. The
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authors discuss various designs for a PMI and they show the diﬀerences between
a PKI and a PMI. An overview of the X.509 PMI can be found in [Cha03].
3.3.4 Personal Security Environments
Personal security environment (PSE) denotes a device which contains private keys
and certiﬁcates. The use of a PSE is mandatory for an end-entity in the PKI.
The private key that corresponds to the public key contained in the certiﬁcate is
found in such a device.
Special countermeasures and security properties must be applied to the PSEs.
The secrets contained inside must be protected for integrity and conﬁdentiality.
That is, it is not possible to change or read the private key. The PSEs can be
found in two forms. Either in hardware allowing a more secure environment or
in software that allows more ﬂexibility and platform independency.
Hardware-Based Tokens
The most known hardware based PSEs are the smart cards. For a brief intro-
duction on cryptographic smart card see [NM96]. Smart cards are small portable
cards in the size of a standard credit card. They have a cryptographic processor
(that is able to perform big number arithmetic) and an operating system for the
management of the resources on the card.
In security applications they are used as a secure place from which the private
key is not allowed to leave. Therefore, all operations that require use of the
private key like signature or decryption are performed in the smart card. This
is the general principle of hardware based PSEs. They provide a secure storage
for the key and they perform cryptographic operations. In many cases the key
creation takes place on the card. In the other cases the keys must be securely
transferred to the card.
Other hardware based PSEs are the hardware security modules (HSM). These
are dedicated stand alone hardware devices. They can be in the form of a PCI
card. They are used for creating and storing private keys as well as for performing
cryptographic operations. In comparison to smart cards they are not portable
but they are faster.
Software-Based Tokens
PSEs based on software are considered less secure than the ones based on hard-
ware. However, they are more portable, they allow an easy backup and they are
more platform independent. This means that they can be easily used in various
operating systems. They do not have some of the drawbacks met in smart cards.
These are the need for special hardware (smart cards can be operated only with
a special card reader) or the presence of complicated interfaces that resolve the
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communication with the smart card (like PKCS#11 [RSA04], PC/SC [Wor], or
CT-API [DFTT05]).
The most typical software based PSE is the PKCS#12 format. This format
allows private keys and secrets to be stored in a secure way on software. For
example this could be a ﬁle (also called a PKCS#12 ﬁle) that contains a key pair
and a certiﬁcate. This ﬁle can be transported on a ﬂoppy disc or a USB disc and
its format is supported by various clients like email programs and browsers. It is
the most common way to store private keys within a PKI that uses software PSEs.
It has diverse mechanisms for integrity and conﬁdentiality. Another format for
storing private keys is the Java KeyStore. This is a proprietary way to store keys
in a format that can be used inside the Java programming language. There are
two types. The JKS that is using weak protection algorithms and the JCEKS
that is using stronger ones.
3.3.5 Further Reading
For further reading regarding PKIs we refer the reader to [AL99], [HP01], and
[Aus01].
3.4 Trust Center
With PKI the whole infrastructure based on public key is denoted. Everything
regarding this infrastructure, namely its services, participants, applications and
products is referred to as PKI. The whole infrastructure is based on trusting
someone for assigning certiﬁcates to entities. This part of the infrastructure is
called the trust center (TC).
The trust center in a PKI is at a minimum the place where the certiﬁcation
takes place. At this point the binding between the entity’s name and public key
is done. Trust among PKI participants and this instance must be established.
Therefore, the name trust center is derived from this relationship of trust. The
trust center as a term is used mostly in Germany. In other countries CA and
trust center are used as synonyms. For more on the trust center deﬁnition and
tasks see [FHK95].
But a trust center is more than the certiﬁcation authority. It is the registration
authority and the public components of the trust center like the directory or the
OCSP servers. All these instances are operated from an organisation in a secure
manner as part of implementing and enabling a PKI. The certiﬁcate management
authority is also part of the trust center. It is responsible for the communication
of the trust center with the end-entities or the PKI applications. We propose the
use of CMA in every trust center since its presence has several advantages. In
Chapter 10 we see the deployment of CMA in current trust center installations.
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In most cases the trust center is located at one geographical position. This is
usually a secure location. It is possible however that distributed local registration
authorities (LRAs) exist, since registration is often desired to be distributed.
The necessary level of security for a trust center depends on its purposes. One
case is a trust center installed for securing email traﬃc in an organisation. This
trust center can be located in a secure room somewhere inside the organisation
where only few people are allowed to enter. This level of security may be in this
case acceptable, since the applications planned do not require extra measures to
be taken. The CA may be even online, allowing people to receive certiﬁcates on
demand.
This trust center setup and conﬁguration will deﬁnitely be altered for a more
secure installation. For example a trust center that issues qualiﬁed certiﬁcates
has more security mechanisms applied to it. We have presented two extreme
examples. Most trust center installations lie somewhere in between.
3.4.1 Environment Oriented Installations
Trust center installations do not have similarities. One reason for this is that they
have to address diﬀerent security needs. Another one is organisational issues
since diﬀerent organisations have diﬀerent procedures. Moreover, the type of
the planned applications inﬂuences the trust center installation. The scale of
the PKI also plays a role. Therefore, diﬀerent demands and speciﬁcations for
diﬀerent trust centers exist.
Usually the security aspects of a trust center signiﬁcantly aﬀect it. Diﬀerent
requirements may appear, like special signature creation entities, human admin-
istration, or even a security evaluation of the software and hardware according
to security criteria. Other special demands are related to the registration. Is
it distributed? How is the entities’ data obtained? Special requirements are
also related to the tasks of the CMA. Is an acceptance receipt from the cer-
tiﬁcate holder required? How is the delivery of personal security environments
performed? Many more requirements exist.
These requirements are critical for the deployment of a trust center. This
deployment will become more diﬃcult if new adjustments are needed. The devel-
opment of new features will be time consuming as well as the installation, which
in addition is error-prone if many features are newly implemented. As a result
the PKI will become expensive. These facts will prohibit wide deployment of
PKI services.
Therefore, a ﬂexible trust center software must be adaptable to the envi-
ronment. Due to this environment dependency the trust center software often
needs changes, updates, and new developments. A modular trust center design
addresses these requirements easier. It allows its services to be distributed and
supports diﬀerent mechanisms (like security, access control, etc.) to be applied to
each component. The CMA has a plugin based design. The plugins are compo-
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nents that can be added, removed, or replaced by other components that provide
diﬀerent functionality. The core functionality remains the same and therefore no
new mistakes or security leaks are introduced in the existent software. This is
very important in the case of an evaluation of the software. The components
that are already evaluated do not need to be re-evaluated and only the newly
developed parts go through the evaluation process.
3.4.2 Virtual Hosting
Usually one trust center installation regards exactly one organisation. For exam-
ple a company that needs certiﬁcation services installs a trust center for providing
these services. Considerations may exist however for the installation of a trust
center. These considerations can be for example of ﬁnancial nature. In this case,
this company can outsource its certiﬁcation services.
A trust center that oﬀers such services hosts the trust center of other or-
ganisations. One solution is to install an entirely new software or duplicate an
existent one. This requires that this software is written or modiﬁed. In addition
it probably requires a new hardware infrastructure to be installed for supporting
the new software. Moreover, new rooms and personnel may have to be organised,
too. This approach is time and resources consuming, error-prone, and diﬃcult to
manage and implement. A better approach is the virtual hosting.
In the virtual hosting conﬁguration diﬀerent trust centers are being hosted
in one installation. This means that by using the same rooms, human resources,
hardware and software, multiple trust centers and their services are operated in
exactly one instance. Therefore, many trust centers are being virtually hosted in
one installation.
Virtual hosting can be found inside an organisation, too. For example, in the
Technical University of Darmstadt there are two virtually hosted trust centers
in one installation. The ﬁrst virtual host is responsible for certifying the servers
of the university. It certiﬁes keys stored in software tokens and entities that
are machines. On the contrary, the second host certiﬁes keys found in hardware
and entities that are physical persons. More virtual hosts can be installed. For
example a third host can provide certiﬁcation for the physical entities and keys
that are stored in software. The virtual hosting conﬁguration therefore oﬀers
great ﬂexibility in organising the certiﬁcate management tasks in a trust center.
Chapter 4
Certiﬁcate Management
Authority
We present the certiﬁcate management authority (CMA). The CMA is a new
PKI component. Tasks related to certiﬁcate management like certiﬁcate delivery
or publication are assigned to this component. We see the reasons for introducing
a new authority in the PKI environment. We deﬁne the CMA and specify its
requirements. These will be used for designing it. The concrete tasks that the
CMA performs are presented. The considerations associated to the use of the
CMA are discussed.
4.1 Motivation for the CMA
The goal of this Thesis is to design and implement a ﬂexible, eﬃcient, and secure
certiﬁcate management authority.
The main reason for the presence of CMA are certain operational diﬃculties
and security considerations that appear in a PKI. Particularly since oﬄine CAs
are often employed for security reasons, the CMA helps to extract the CA prod-
ucts and to process them further. It also relieves the registration oﬃces from
tasks related to certiﬁcate management. It oﬀers services to OCSP servers or
other instances by organising the necessary information workﬂow for their cer-
tiﬁcate stores. It enables realisation of various use cases about certiﬁcates and
oﬀers solutions in a virtual hosting conﬁguration.
4.1.1 Oﬄine CA
It is often desired that a CA is oﬄine. This is due to security considerations. An
oﬄine system is much more diﬃcult to attack than a system which is connected
to a network. Even if complex mechanisms are used to prevent such attacks the
possibility exists and is greater than in an oﬄine system.
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The extraction of the products of an oﬄine CA cannot be automated and
manual interaction is needed. Moreover, special rules apply to the visits at the
CA. These may include the presence of two or more persons at the same time, only
daily visits and other mechanisms, too. Other tasks like directly publishing the
certiﬁcates on an externally available LDAP directory are impossible. Automatic
delivery of the products to the end-entity cannot be performed and this task is
somehow assigned to the human administrators. Therefore, if the CA is oﬄine
operational diﬃculties exist.
In order to avoid these problems a CA may have to be online. But this solution
contains security risks. This is because an online system is more vulnerable to
attacks than an oﬄine system. If the certiﬁcate management of an oﬄine CA
is easy to achieve, then oﬄine CAs would be easier and more often employed.
Therefore a higher security level would be achieved.
All tasks related to certiﬁcate management are gathered in the CMA. The
CMA is responsible for managing the products of the CA, which is oﬄine. If
the CA is online, the CMA can still provide the same services. In the rest of
this work we will see ways to extract and transfer the CA products and how to
perform a ﬂexible and eﬃcient certiﬁcate management.
4.1.2 Decentralized RA
In many PKI environments the registration of the users is not done in a central
registration authority but in various registration oﬃces. This is a distributed
registration process. Nevertheless, keeping all the services that a PKI is providing
distributed could lead to a PKI which is very diﬃcult to administer and use. An
example for this is the case of every registration oﬃce publishing the certiﬁcates
to each own internet directory. PKI clients would have diﬃculties in locating
certiﬁcates. Many tasks would be repeated for every directory like the publishing
of a CRL. Many administrators would have to be trained for performing these
tasks. This publishing process would be more error-prone than an automated
technical solution. Every oﬃce would have to operate and administer its own
directory. But more problems and operational diﬃculties are associated to such
a solution.
The CMA oﬀers a technical approach to these problems. All certiﬁcate man-
agement tasks, or at least most of them, that must be performed by the diﬀerent
registration authorities can be assigned to the CMA. Therefore, lots of prob-
lems regarding certiﬁcate management that appear due to distributed or local
registration authorities, can be solved by the presence of a CMA.
4.1.3 Revocation and Certiﬁcate Status Information
The most common mechanism to provide certiﬁcate status information is the
OCSP [MAM+99]. Others may appear or exist already. These mechanisms re-
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quire a backend from which they can retrieve all information they need for their
correct functioning. The CMA is used for organising the information ﬂow for this
backend and is responsible for maintaining it. Such maintenance functions are
updates or the synchronisation with other resources.
OCSP servers require information about all certiﬁcates that a CA is issuing.
It is important that every newly issued certiﬁcate becomes known to the OCSP
server immediately. A persistent data store is required for this task. This can be a
database, an LDAP directory, or some other mechanism. The CMA is responsible
for maintaining this backend. This is a diﬃcult task for a CA which is oﬄine. In
this case an administrator must extract the PKI products and update the OCSP
server. But there are lots of security risks. For example the administrator may
never publish the certiﬁcate to the backend. This process has also scalability
problems. As the number of certiﬁcates increases the task of an administrator
becomes more diﬃcult. Even if the CA is online, an automatic update of the
backend store may still be impossible due to a restricted network conﬁguration.
CRLs or other revocation information are also maintained from the CMA to the
backend. In certain environments, it may be desired that the newest revocation
information reaches certain clients as soon as this is issued. For the same reasons
as in the OCSP case, this task is delegated to the CMA.
The revocation authority also operates with the presence of a similar backend.
This is an authority that issues CRLs on behalf of a CA. This authority needs
an update mechanism for the newly issued certiﬁcates from the CA that it is
working for, in order to accept revocations for them. The backend that this
authority uses could be the same as that of the OCSP. The CMA would also
control the information ﬂow in this case. Therefore the same information can
be used for the proper functioning of other trust center components. The CMA
could also be used as a revocation authority itself.
4.1.4 Virtual Hosting
Several problems exist in the virtual hosting conﬁguration. In this trust center
conﬁguration, one CA installation hosts various virtual CAs. Those diﬀerent CAs
may have various policies, processes, and workﬂows. For example, one virtual CA
produces software based tokens (like PKCS#12) only, while another virtual CA
produces hardware based tokens. These products have diﬀerent management
procedures. The software based tokens may be sent with an email, something
that cannot be done in the case of smart cards. All those processes and diﬀerent
requirements can be mapped to certain procedures in the CMA. The CMA can
serve a big number of those virtual CAs and realise their certiﬁcate management
workﬂow.
A mechanism to distinguish among the products of diﬀerent virtual CAs is
needed. By this, the product of each CA will be processed as this is scheduled
for this CA. In the virtual hosting conﬁguration such a mechanism is required.
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The CMA removes this task from an administrator and processes the products
according to the needs of the correct CA. If this would be resolved manually many
mistakes would be done. While the number of virtual CAs increases, this task is
becoming even more diﬃcult. The administrator must ensure that a product is
processed as desired. Also some of the remaining tasks will be the same among
the diﬀerent virtual CAs. Therefore every CA will have to perform the same
task. Alternatively these tasks could be performed only once by the CMA.
4.1.5 Realisation of Business Logic
After the creation of a PKI product by a CA, there are lots of diﬀerent tasks
remaining for this product. The way these are performed may vary. For example
delivery of the certiﬁcates can be done per email, downloaded from an LDAP
server, an HTTP or an FTP server, or even just be picked up from the registration
oﬃce. The CMA is responsible for realising all these mechanisms. Diﬀerent
trust center installations require diﬀerent tasks in order to realise the intended
applications with the certiﬁcates. For example the certiﬁcate may have to be
published encrypted to a directory in order to achieve proof-of-possession as this
is described in [KLW04a]. In other cases it may have to be published only after
an activation.
Possible system updates (for example to realise a new mechanism) will aﬀect
only the CMA and not the CA. Such updates will happen, because the above
mentioned tasks are subject to changes. The reason for this is that the technolo-
gies change or new protocols and mechanisms appear. In cases where the CA
system is evaluated a re-evaluation will be avoided. A modular and conﬁgurable
design at the side of the CMA is required in order to meet the special needs of
every environment.
4.2 Certiﬁcate Management Authority
A lot of tasks must be performed as soon as a certiﬁcate or a CRL is issued by
the CA. It is the duty of the CMA to encapsulate all these tasks and provide a
technical and reliable solution. This solution must adapt to new requirements
and changes, since the tasks related to certiﬁcate management are also subject
to changes.
4.2.1 CMA Deﬁnition
In this subsection we give the deﬁnitions of the components we are using in our
PKI design. The components are the issuer and the CMA.
Deﬁnition The Issuer is a system that issues certiﬁcates, revocation lists, and
personal security environments and creates passwords and PINs.
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Usually the issuer is a certiﬁcation authority (CA). Its basic task is to sign
certiﬁcates. The private key of this issuer is kept secret and very well protected.
In addition it is not possible to use it without proper authorisation. This is
achieved through many technical mechanisms. One of them for example is that
the issuer is completely oﬄine. Another possibility is that the use of the private
key requires dual-control. With dual-control we mean that in order to activate the
signing key, two human operators are needed. Human processes and policies are
perhaps required, too, for protecting this key. For example a special procedure
may has to be held for the presence of the administrators in the room where the
CA is located.
Other issuers may exist as well. One is for example the revocation authority,
an authority employed with the task of issuing CRLs. The revocation author-
ity may be online in order to provide the best possible freshness of revocation
information.
In every PKI environment an issuer is present. In such an environment cer-
tiﬁcates and CRLs are produced and therefore at least one CA must be present.
This CA is the issuer. Through use of its private key it certiﬁes PKI products by
signing them. For accomplishing this task high security is required and lots of
technical considerations are taken into account. Apart from this, it can become
a very time consuming task as the number of requests increases. The tasks that
follow the signing of the products, are delegated to the CMA.
Deﬁnition The certiﬁcate management authority or CMA is a PKI operating
component assigned with the task of managing and administrating products of
issuers on their behalf.
The tasks that are associated with certiﬁcate management are assigned to
the CMA. The services that this component oﬀers are performed securely only
by this component. The CMA is an authority. An authority is an instance that
has certain rights to perform tasks which are accepted by other entities only if
they are performed by this instance. Moreover, the delegation of tasks of the
issuer to the CMA, make the CMA also an authority. This is because the issuer
is an authority itself since it issues certiﬁcates, CRLs, and other products. The
CMA is dealing with certiﬁcates, CRLs, smart cards, software tokens, PIN letters,
and other cryptographic related products.
This deﬁnition of the CMA is quite general. In the following we will give the
requirements and tasks of the CMA.
4.2.2 Requirements
Security
The CMA is a PKI component and part of a security infrastructure. Therefore,
security is an important factor for its design and implementation. Security has
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several aspects in the case of the CMA. One is the transfer of the products
from the issuers. For transferring the products from the CA system one or more
administrators are required, if we assume that the CA is oﬄine. In the online case
this may be automated. The products of the CA are placed inside a container.
The data in this container are secured to remain authentic, unaltered, and secret.
Therefore input to the CMA are messages with a special syntax. These messages
are used for communication purposes inside a trust center.
Another security aspect is the functioning of the component itself. This means
that the design and installation of the CMA are secure. This includes the use of
secure protocols. When LDAP or HTTP are used as protocols, the more secure
variants, namely LDAPS and HTTPS are deployed. Moreover techniques like
dual-control are employed. In this technique, two administrators are needed in
order to operate the component. We discuss the security requirements of the
CMA in more details in Chapter 9.
Virtual Hosting
The CMA is able to work for many issuers. This requires only one CMA in-
stallation with the ability for hosting diﬀerent issuers. The component is able
to deliver its services to many CAs without requiring new installation. It is in
position to meet the special needs of the issuers. The tasks that the CMA has
to fulﬁl diﬀer among the various virtual hosts. The CMA is able to realise their
requirements. The whole management of the products from the CA system is
undertaken by the CMA. The CMA is pre-conﬁgured to accomplish certain tasks
for every virtual host.
Conﬁgurability
The CMA does not make any assumptions on the kind of services it oﬀers. It is
able to be conﬁgured to perform certiﬁcate management tasks of an issuer, in a
given time. A minimum set of tasks is deﬁned for the CMA. After that, every
issuer decides which of these tasks are important for its functioning, how they
must be performed and at which time. An example of this is the following. One
issuer issues certiﬁcates and corresponding PKCS#12 ﬁles. It requires that the
certiﬁcate and the PKCS#12 ﬁle must be sent with an email to the end-user.
Afterwards the certiﬁcate must be published on an LDAP directory. Another
issuer which is working with hardware based tokens (like smart cards) requires
that the certiﬁcate will be published on the directory only after the user has
accepted the certiﬁcate and smart card. Although the core functions are the
same (LDAP Publishing), the way and time this is done diﬀers among issuers.
For achieving great ﬂexibility the CMA is conﬁgurable for performing these tasks.
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Flexibility
CMA oﬀers a big variety of core functionalities that are important in certiﬁcate
management. In Section 4.2.3 we will see which are its core tasks. Tasks that are
related to certiﬁcate management fall into the CMA’s area of responsibility and
therefore the CMA is able to implement them as soon as this is required. For
example one mechanism for disseminating PKI information is LDAP. Another
mechanism could be the certiﬁcate store proposed by Gutmann [Gut00], [Gut06].
For a general discussion on available mechanism see [HP01, Chap. 9] and [AL99,
Chap. 11]. While only the ﬁrst mechanism is implemented and used, if the second
one is also needed then it is able to be implemented and integrated into the CMA.
Some of the tasks regarding certiﬁcate management are also automated. A
ﬂexible mechanism to meet all diﬀerent requirements as well as the new ones that
will occur is present. Flexibility is also needed in the cryptographic algorithms.
Some algorithms may become insecure and must be exchanged. Bigger key sizes
will also be required. As the state of the art in cryptography advances the CMA
is adjustable to these changes. Moreover the CMA is able to be integrated into
existent workﬂows and procedures that are already established in an organisation.
Scalability
The CMA is able to operate for small, medium, and large scaled infrastructures.
It is in position to handle diﬀerent loads and adapt to the load requirements of dif-
ferent environments. Special interest has the case of large-scaled infrastructures.
Such infrastructures are built for example in the case of citizen cards.
Availability
Tasks like providing the backend for OCSP services are assigned to the CMA
and therefore availability is another requirement. The CMA is always online in
order to achieve this. The services of the CMA are always available. In case of
failure the CMA is able to continue with the processing of a request. The issuers
delegate their certiﬁcate management tasks to the CMA which is in position to
accomplish them in a correct and standard conform way.
Standards Conformity
The CMA conforms to the PKI standards. This includes its products and its
services. Lack of interoperability will hamper the use and acceptance of a PKI.
All duties of the CMA use the proposed standards from diﬀerent standardisation
organisations. But this is needed also for the products of the issuers. These con-
form to speciﬁcations like [IT97] and [HPFS02]. In addition the CMA supports
the PKCS#7 or CMP messages as its input format. Issuers that export their
38 4. Certificate Management Authority
products to the CMA according to the above mentioned formats can then be
supported and therefore the CMA can operate for any issuer.
4.2.3 Tasks
In this subsection we present the concrete tasks that are assigned to the CMA.
These are mostly standard tasks that every trust center supports. For an overview
of these tasks see general PKI descriptions like [AL99] and [HP01].
Archiving
The ﬁrst task of the CMA is to archive certiﬁcates. For this purpose a persistent
store like a database is needed. Upon request these certiﬁcates can be retrieved
from the CMA without requiring any interaction with the certiﬁcation instance.
In addition, CMA can archive personal security environments. Therefore key
backup can be accomplished. If due to security reasons this is not acceptable
(CMA is online), the key backup must take place either at the certiﬁcation in-
stance, or at a backup component, or at the client side. But if it is desired that
the backup takes place in the CMA, this function is supported.
Delivery
An important step in the certiﬁcation process is the delivery of certiﬁcates and
PSEs to the end-entities. Responsible for this is the CMA. The mechanisms that
can be implemented diﬀer among various conﬁgurations. This can be done by
email, the physical presence of the end-entity, or by placing the certiﬁcate in a
well known place like a corporate directory.
Publishing
The certiﬁcates and CRLs that are issued in a PKI are published in a public di-
rectory. This is needed to enable the PKI participants to access public keys (for
example for encrypting messages or verifying signatures) and revocation informa-
tion. The publication is therefore a necessary management step for a certiﬁcate
or a CRL. The CMA is responsible for realising it.
Certiﬁcate publication has several requirements. The publication place is an
LDAP directory or an HTTP server. CRLs must be published as soon as possible.
Some certiﬁcates are not allowed to be publicly available due to restrictions.
Special mechanisms are present that distinguish between certiﬁcates that are
publicly available and those that are not. These two types of certiﬁcate will be
handled diﬀerently. Such restrictions may be found for example in the German
Signature Act [Leg01a].
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Certiﬁcate Status Information Backend
OCSP servers as well as revocation authorities need a persistent store from which
they will obtain the information that they need to function properly. Moreover,
this information must be available to them as soon as possible. The CMA oﬀers
these services in an eﬃcient and secure way. This backend is a database or an
LDAP directory. Both can be secured with SSL to provide a high level of security.
The CMA can update the backend in an automated way as soon as the products
are extracted from the issuers. As the number of requests and the number of
issuers in a system increases, so the complexity increases too.
In order to notify the OCSP or the revocation authority for a new certiﬁcate
or revocation, a notiﬁcation mechanism is employed. This is done by sending
a special request to the OCSP or the revocation authority. Alternatively this
can be performed on demand. This means that every time the OCSP server for
example is queried for a certiﬁcate that it does not have in its cache, it queries
the backend for obtaining the new information. But other mechanisms may have
to be implemented, too.
Renewal Notiﬁcation
Certiﬁcates and CRLs expire after a certain period of time. If a certiﬁcate or a
CRL is about to expire, the CMA sends notiﬁcation messages either to an ad-
ministrator, the end-entity, or the registration oﬃce. This is combined with the
archiving task of the CMA. The CMA possesses all information about the certiﬁ-
cates and CRLs issued from diﬀerent issuers. Therefore, the renewal notiﬁcations
can be placed in the CMA tasks. Furthermore, renewal notiﬁcations are totally
automated, which leads to a more ﬂexible PKI product management.
CRL Management
Another task for the CMA is to provide CRL and revocation management mech-
anisms. Apart from notiﬁcations about the renewal of the CRL, another task is
the notiﬁcation of the end-entities with newer certiﬁcate revocation information.
In [MR00] McDaniel and Rubin propose a mechanism called Revocation On De-
mand (ROD). This mechanism delivers a CRL to the clients as soon as this is
issued. This scheme is suited for the corporate environment. Such a mechanism
is implemented in the CMA. The CMA also functions as a revocation author-
ity itself. In this case the CMA is an issuer itself and therefore new security
requirements occur that its design addresses.
Miscellaneous Tasks
CMA is in the position to perform more tasks than the ones already described.
The above tasks deﬁne the minimum set of functions that the CMA implements.
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But more tasks may have to be assigned to the CMA. For example one task could
be an automated backup of the whole directory where the certiﬁcates are located.
Another task can be to oﬀer some kind of validation services. The implementation
and design of CMA must be well prepared to meet future requirement in a ﬂexible
way.
4.2.4 Considerations
The presence of the CMA introduces extra complexity into the PKI. The reason
for this is that the CMA is a new PKI component that does not exist in current
trust center conﬁgurations. We analyse this extra complexity and see what are
the main considerations that arise from the presence of the CMA. We further see
how its design addresses these considerations and how the beneﬁts gained by its
presence outweigh the introduced drawbacks.
The CMA is a software component. It can additionally use extra hardware
components (like card readers, smart cards, or HSMs). Therefore it needs one
or more extra machines on which it can run. This increases the costs for the
setup of the PKI. Moreover it increases the complexity for the administration
and maintenance of the trust center machines. Therefore it is diﬃcult to create
a ”thin” trust center setup.
The CMA can be operated on the same machine like the RA. It can also
be run on the CA machine if the CA is online. In these two cases the above
mentioned problems do not exist. If the CMA runs on an exclusive machine, it
reduces the workload from the other machines. In a large-scaled infrastructure
this is a signiﬁcant beneﬁt. In a small-scaled infrastructure it is a minor gain.
Therefore the CMA produces extra workload in small-scaled infrastructures and
only if it cannot be combined with the other trust centers components.
The CMA also introduces new developments to the other components. For
example the CA extracts its products in a format known to the CMA or does not
perform certain tasks anymore. The new developments increase the cost for the
establishment of a PKI.
The various PKI components are often required to adjust to new developments
(for example to realise a new protocol). In the case of the introduction of the
CMA the new developments are mostly limited to the communication. Therefore
they are not expected to be signiﬁcant and the cost is kept small. In addition
they have to be performed only once.
The new component introduces additional complexity to the trust center op-
erators. They have to be trained for operating the new component. This includes
tasks like starting or stopping it, evaluating the logs, transferring input ﬁles (in
an oﬄine setup for example), or extracting its products.
While the operators need to interact with a new component they do not need
to administrate the products of the CA. This is performed by the CMA. The
only task of the operators is to transfer the CA products to the CMA, which
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is programmed to manage them according to the needs of every CA. In a trust
center without a CMA, the operators manage the CA products. This requires also
special training for the operators and often visits to the CA. Technical diﬃculties
and security risks exist in this case (see also Section 4.1).
The CMA issues new security considerations. Firstly, because it is a new link
in the security chain and if it is weak the whole security is endangered. Secondly,
because it manages ”sensitive” products, namely the certiﬁcates and revocation
information issued by an issuer. Thirdly, due to the fact that the CMA in a
usual setup is online, it is more open to attacks. Lastly, a secure communication
channel with the other components is needed.
The presence of the CMA increases however the security in a trust center.
This is because it enables the CA to be oﬄine in an easy way (see Section 4.1.1).
It is possible to evaluate its security as a technical component. Such an evaluation
is found in Chapter 9. The secure communication with the other components is
addressed in Chapter 5.
The CMA causes additional communication costs with the other trust center
components. This requires a suﬃcient and secure protocol to be used. Moreover
more messages are produced to serve the communication among the components.
As the number of requests in a trust center increase so the number of exchanged
messages is increasing, too.
The communication of the CMA with the new components is addressed in
Chapter 5. The speciﬁcation of a protocol can be found there. The protocol
is scalable and can be used in oﬄine communication. If the components have
network connection with each other there is the possibility to automate the com-
munication. If the CMA is not present, the interaction with the PKI end-entities
is done by the CA operators. In this case a communication channel between the
operators and the end-entities is established. This requires also communication
costs. In the case of the CMA, this channel is transparent to the operators.

Chapter 5
Communication in a Trust Center
The CMA is a new PKI component. Its purpose is to manage and adminis-
trate the products of issuers which are CAs or other certiﬁcation or revocation
instances. Therefore a means of communication with these CAs is needed. More-
over, other components (like the RA) are sending messages and data to the CMA.
In order to address this situation, the communication possibilities of those compo-
nents with the newly introduced CMA are examined and analysed. This Chapter
is addressing this problem, namely how to communicate in an eﬃcient and secure
way with the CMA. Parts of it have been presented at the Third International
Workshop for Applied PKI (IWAP 2004) [KLW+04b].
5.1 Introduction
Trust center software has to provide a great variety of services each carried out by
complex processes like registration, key generation, certiﬁcation, personalisation
of personal security environments, key backup, and many more. Each service has
diﬀerent requirements that are posed by the PKI environment. The requirements
may alter when the trust center has to adapt to diﬀerent situations. A common
technique in software engineering to meet the demands of an adaptive software
is to break it up into components, each covering certain operational aspects.
These components can then be distributed according to the needs of the special
environment. Furthermore, certain components can be replaced to reﬂect changes
in the environment. A component based approach to complex processes requires
that the components are able to communicate to each other. Therefore a proper
mechanism that is able to resolve all communication requirements is needed.
Furthermore, this communication is a grand issue to the overall security of the
trust center. Moreover, some of the components may be oﬄine (like the CA), a
fact that makes the communication even more diﬃcult.
The type of communication among parties without access to the internet or
any kind of network communication is called ”sneakernet”. The sneakernet is
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met often in operational public key infrastructures. This is because some compo-
nents are oﬄine. In these cases the communication is done manually by humans
with the help of a ﬂoppy disc, USB token, CD, or another portable media. The
sneakernet communication has the disadvantage that it can not be automated.
Such communication requires a format that will describe the messages that are
exchanged among the oﬄine and the other components. Moreover, this format
must be able to transfer the necessary data. If such a format does not exist,
the diﬀerent components are not able to communicate and the data cannot be
described fully. In the case of the oﬄine CA these messages must also be se-
cured while entering or exiting the CA. The security considerations are integrity,
authenticity, and conﬁdentiality among others. For specifying such a suitable for-
mat a protocol is needed. A protocol that addresses the security requirements,
is eﬃcient, compact, and portable.
We propose the Intra Trustcenter Protocol (ITP), a ﬂexible and secure man-
agement protocol which is well suited for the communication among arbitrary
trust center components. The ITP takes a look into an area which current stan-
dards (like PKCS#7, CMP, or XKMS) do not address, namely the communica-
tion among arbitrary components within a trust center. We see which are the
already existing protocols and discuss their properties. The proposed protocol
provides a realistic solution to the sneakernet problem. We list the requirements
for intra-trustcenter communication which serve as design criteria for our pro-
tocol. Moreover, we motivate the use of XML for specifying the syntax of our
protocol, since XML is a well accepted means for specifying data structures.
XML comes with sophisticated security mechanisms which we employ in order
to guarantee integrity, authenticity, and conﬁdentiality. We can further use these
mechanisms to enforce operational security constraints like roles or dual control.
Furthermore, the syntax and details of the protocol are given. We present two
case studies for the use of ITP derived from applications that can be met in some
PKI environments. The protocol is analysed regarding its ﬂexibility and security
along with its deployment considerations. We also give an outlook on further
developments of the protocol.
5.2 Certiﬁcate and Certiﬁcation Protocols
The existing proposals and standards concerning certiﬁcate and certiﬁcation man-
agement can be divided into three groups.
The ﬁrst group consists of two standards. The ”Cryptographic Message Syn-
tax Standard” or PKCS#7 [RSA93] and the ”Certiﬁcation Request Syntax Stan-
dard” or PKCS#10 [RSA00]. They were developed by RSA Laboratories and
describe message formats in ASN.1 [IT02]. PKCS#10 is only suitable for an
end-entity to provide a to be certiﬁed public key to a trust center and thus is
not general enough for intra-trustcenter communication. PKCS#7 comes in two
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modes: In the more general one it can be used as a container for transporting
arbitrary data in a secure way. This can also be employed within a trust center.
This mode does not consider the transported content. All data is placed inside
a container and the protocol does not oﬀer any possibility to further express and
describe them. For achieving this, internal representations are stored in the con-
tainer. These representations are mostly proprietary. In the special enrollment
mode it is only usable for delivering certiﬁcates and certiﬁcate revocation lists
and thus not general enough.
The second group contains two protocol standards published by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF). These are the CMP [AFKM05] and the CMC
[MLSW00] speciﬁcations. They, in turn, are based on the CRMF [Sch05] and
CMS [Hou99] formats which play a similar role as PKCS#10 and PKCS#7,
respectively. They are all speciﬁed in ASN.1. These protocols focus on scenarios
where communication takes place among an end-entity, a certiﬁcation authority,
and optionally a registration authority. Thus, they cannot be employed for the
communication among arbitrary components. Gutmann discusses these protocols
in [Gut03] and chooses CMP instead of CMC [Gut03, Sec. 3.3] for building a PKI
architecture. This paper considers the older version of CMP [AF99]. It identiﬁes
however in [Gut03, Sec. 5.2] common problems when CMP is used.
A rather new development is the ”XML Key Management Speciﬁcation”
[W3C01] which was proposed by the W3C and arose from the need for a key
management protocol for the XML signature [W3C02b] and encryption [W3C02a]
standards. It is not appropriate for intra-trustcenter communication since it fo-
cuses on the communication between end-entities and trust centers.
Only the CMP and PKCS#7 speciﬁcations can be actually considered related
work to our protocol, since they can be used for the purpose of communication
inside a trust center. However, as we already pointed out there are some consid-
erations for using these protocols inside the trust center and our approach oﬀers
an alternative to these two speciﬁcations.
5.3 Protocol Criteria
This section focuses on the properties that a communication protocol among trust
center components has. The criteria that apply to the protocol itself (how it is)
are named, along with a discussion on the motivation behind them.
5.3.1 Design Criteria
We see what are the criteria that apply to a protocol for intra-trustcenter com-
munication. This list is partly based on the design goals of other protocols (e.g
[AFKM05], [W3C01]) and partly on what we have encountered while setting up
trust centers for diﬀerent projects.
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1. Generality The protocol is able to handle all kind of data which may be
passed among trust center components. It does not put any restrictions
upon the number and type of components the trust center is composed
of. The protocol allows to express the data in a structured manner when
possible (i.e. not just binary). Signatures will still be binary data.
As the security and ﬂexibility mechanisms of the protocol apply to all mes-
sages, all possible messages are presentable within the protocol. In order
to be able to apply various mechanisms, like encryption, to diﬀerent parts
of the message this is well structured.
2. Extensibility The protocol allows to be extended by new messages, data
types, or components.
This is necessary to be able to meet future requirements, like new trust
center products or special request types.
3. Independency The protocol is independent from the structure and work-
ﬂow of the trust center. This includes the independence of any means of
transportation, including transport media, online versus oﬄine transport,
security, and protection issues.
This is to meet all possible connection types for the trust center components
and all policies which might be applied.
4. Automation The protocol supports the automation of the processes in a
trust center.
The trust center may automate some processes. The protocol does not
hinder this. This includes especially the authentication mechanisms.
5. Scalability The protocol scales with the size of the public key infrastructure,
the security level, and the complexity of the trust center installation.
Diﬀerent trust centers diﬀer in complexity, size, and security level. In ad-
dition these parameters may change during the lifetime of a trust center.
The protocol deals with these facts.
6. Traceability The protocol allows the tracing of messages, applications, and
products. The messages are human readable where possible. Encrypted
parts are binary data.
As trust centers are highly security sensitive applications there will be much
auditing and quality insurance means applied to them. The protocol sup-
ports this. Additionally this eases the debugging or the error search.
7. Security The protocol messages (or parts of it) are able to be secured (i.e.
authentic, unaltered, and secret). Additionally the protocol supports com-
mon authorisation techniques (e.g. dual control, delegation). It is possible
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to achieve this with any cryptographic algorithm or data structure, re-
garding both the communicated data and the protection of the protocol
messages itself.
As the intra-trustcenter communication is a major issue in the security of
the whole trust center the protocol supports all means for protecting this
communication. As the ﬁeld of cryptography develops, the protocol is able
to adjust the means of protection to the current state of the art.
5.4 Why to Use XML?
XML is ideal for describing structured data. Applications using XML can deﬁne
a special syntax in order to describe the data that should be used inside the ap-
plication. For example a special tag <X509Certificate> can describe an X.509
certiﬁcate while the tag <revocationPassword> describes the revocation pass-
word that an end-user would like to use. This ﬂexible data format is perfectly
suited for deﬁning the structures of ITP.
This data format is in addition portable. Data described in XML can be
exchanged among applications which are XML aware. Almost all programming
languages support XML. Introducing document type deﬁnition (DTD) or XML
schema, the tags and structure of the XML document are constrained to the rules
applied from the DTD or schema. This can be used to avoid errors in the XML
structure.
XML documents can be read from humans as well as they can be parsed
and understood from computers. They are both human and machine read-
able. This is a signiﬁcant property of an XML document in cases where humans
should examine the correctness of data. For example the subject distinguished
name (DN) that should be placed in the certiﬁcate can be such data. This
can be described in the <subjectDN> tag (e.g. <subjectDN>CN=Alice PKIUser,
O=MyOrg, C=DE</subjectDN>). While a machine can examine whether this tag
contains correct data it cannot examine whether the name Alice PKIUser really
exists. A human administrator on the contrary can examine the credentials of
the entity and decide whether such a value for this tag is valid or not.
XML supports also digital signatures [W3C02b] and encryption [W3C02a].
Moreover it supports diﬀerent cryptographic mechanisms (like RSA, DSA, or
ECDSA [BWKKW05]) providing therefore security related to diﬀerent mathe-
matical problems (factoring and discrete logarithm problem). Another possibility
that the signature framework has to oﬀer is that XML structures can be multiply
signed from one, two or more diﬀerent entities (this can include also physical
persons) as well as ability to sign certain portions of the whole structure. For
example in the case of dual control the presence of two signatures is required.
Lastly, by using XML the use of ASN.1 structures for exchanging such mes-
sages is prevented. Applications can avoid the step of implementing these spe-
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cial and in several cases complicated structures just to serve the communication
among trust center components. The description of the ITP messages in XML is
quite simple to implement and use.
5.5 The ITP Protocol
ITP consists of XML messages exchanged among components inside the trust
center. The syntax of an ITP message is found in Listing 5.1.
<itpMessage version="1.1" id="123456789">
<sender >Registration </sender >
<recipient >Certification </recipient >
<application id="12345678">
<profile id="ProfileId">
<element1Name type="binary">
<value id="0">MiXAbc +...</value>
</element1Name >
<element2Name >
<value id="0">12345</value>
</element2Name >
<!-- ... more elements -->
</profile >
<ds:Signature >
<!-- signature elements ... -->
</ds:Signature >
<!-- ... more signatures -->
</application >
<!-- ..... more applications -->
<ds:Signature >
<!-- signature elements ... -->
</ds:Signature >
<!-- ..... more signatures -->
</itpMessage >
Listing 5.1: Syntax of an ITP message
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5.5.1 Application
The most signiﬁcant element is an <application> which encapsulates all data
that is exchanged among the various components. An <application> represents
a request for a trust center component to deliver a certain service.1 Every com-
ponent can form an <application> and send it to any other component. The
basic mechanism is the following: In order to execute a certain task, one or more
structures of type <application> are generated. Each <application> is routed
from component to component. Each component performs its tasks as these are
deﬁned by the type of <application>. Afterwards this component creates a new
<application> and sends it to the next component. This new <application>
is based on the older one by adding, changing, or removing parts of it. Thus, an
<application> contains the pieces of data needed to accomplish a task as well
as it determines how this data are processed. The syntax of an <application>
is found in Listing 5.1.
An <application> mandatorily has the attribute id which uniquely identi-
ﬁes it. If the same application travels among diﬀerent components this id always
remains unchanged. By this traceability of applications can be achieved. Fur-
thermore, replay of already processed applications can be prevented. This feature
is important since a trust center may have to guarantee that certain services are
carried out at most once per request (e.g. a request for just one certiﬁcate should
under no circumstances lead to more than one certiﬁcate being issued).
The tag <profile> determines by its unique attribute id the kind of applica-
tion. The most basic ones concern issuing certiﬁcates and processing revocations,
but others may be added as well. It is also possible to provide <profile>-ids for
proprietary communication purposes inside the trust center. This could be done
for example for communicating meta-information within the trust center.
The <profile> also deﬁnes, how the applications are processed and which
components are involved at which stage of procession. An example for this is
whether a key-pair will be created in the trust center or it will be provided by the
end-entity. In the ﬁrst case it deﬁnes whether some kind of key backup should
be performed. In the second case it deﬁnes the necessary proof-of-possession
data. Every component interprets the <profile>-ids and performs its services
according to them. This mechanism enables ITP to transport arbitrary requests.
Within the <profile>-tag the pieces of data are included. Most prominent
among them are certiﬁcates and CRLs. Apart from this other data can be met
like passwords, end-entity data, or trust center functional data. For example this
could be the last and ﬁrst name of a person for an application to the registration
component or the subject DN for an application to the certiﬁcation component.
In any case a way to express this data is needed. This is a special XML tag that
1We have chosen the name <application> instead of <request> since every request is
actually a form (like an application form). From this form every component extracts information
that it needs and ﬁlls the form with the information it produces.
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describes each of them. The usual data that is exchanged among the components
possesses its own tag. It is possible however to deﬁne new tags that represent
data which is needed for an application to be complete.
Every tag has an attribute called type. This attribute denotes the type of the
tag. There are two possible values at the moment for this attribute: binary for
binary objects like certiﬁcates or CRLs and boolean for objects that get values
true or false. Such an object is a ﬁeld describing whether a certiﬁcate should be
published or not. If the attribute is missing the expected type is a string of letters.
Inside the tag the subordinate tag value is contained. This holds the value of the
encapsulating tag. It has an id attribute to uniquely identify the diﬀerent values
that the encapsulating tag can get. For example, if two certiﬁcates are contained
in the application, then the certiﬁcate tag contains two value tags. The ﬁrst one
with the id set to ’0’ and the second one with the id set to ’1’.
5.5.2 Application Signature
An <application> may contain one or more elements <ds:Signature> of type
enveloped signature according to the XML signature standard as described in
[W3C02b]). These signatures are calculated over the <application> by the last
component which altered its content. By this, the changes are authorised. The
destination component which imports the application may verify the signature
of the application. In addition, it is possible for components to sign certain
portions of an <application>. XML signatures allow signing of a given path
inside an XML structure. This gives a component the ability to sign only the
data it creates and actually is responsible for. In addition there is the possibility
to calculate and append more that one signature over an <application>. This
<application> can travel among the trust center components, which they verify
the signature only over data that they need to operate. Furthermore dual control
can be enabled with two participants (trust center administrators for example)
signing the XML structure and appending afterwards both signatures at the
<application>.
We see that with the use of XML signatures, as well as the ability to deﬁne a
new <application> and express all possible data inside a trust center we achieve
two goals of ITP. These are security and ﬂexibility.
5.5.3 ItpMessage
The element that is root of every ITP message is the <itpMessage>. Two at-
tributes are contained in an <itpMessage> element. The ﬁrst one is the version
attribute to denote the version of ITP in use. Current version is ”1.1”. The sec-
ond one is the id attribute. The id attribute holds a number which is unique for
each message. Therefore each component can recognise whether it has already
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processed this message or not. In addition an <itpMessage> must contain the
<sender> and <recipient> elements.
The <sender> element is used for describing the component that sends the
<application>. This can be an IP address or even a symbolic name known inside
the trust center. Name resolving based on an IP address is for example useful
in an environment in which the trust center components operate on diﬀerent
hosts. If this is based on the symbolic name, it can be used in cases in which the
components are found in the same host. The same rules apply to the <recipient>
element. This is used to hold information about the component to which the ITP
message is destined for.
Another possibility is to use the DN of the certiﬁcate assigned to every entity
if all components possess such a certiﬁcate. This is very likely to happen since
the various components may have to sign an application. The DN is used in
this case only for naming purposes and not for locating the correct certiﬁcate for
verifying signatures. Therefore, including the serial number of the certiﬁcate is
not necessary. The information for locating a certiﬁcate is contained in the XML
signature ﬁelds. This overcomes the CMP problem of pure DN-based identiﬁca-
tion described in [Gut03, Sec. 5.2]. The problem in this case is that the correct
certiﬁcate cannot be located if a DN is assigned to more than one certiﬁcate (the
same entity holding multiple keys). This problem does not appear in the XML
signatures employed in ITP since they contain information that help verifying a
signature, like the certiﬁcate itself.
Inside the trust center a peer-to-peer communication may exist, where every
component communicates with any other component. For example, the CA
should be able to receive messages from diﬀerent RAs, send messages to a backup
component as well as to the CMA. We see that this protocol is ﬂexible in the
addressing of arbitrary peers and the problem of deﬁning the source and the
destination of the messages is solved.
An <itpMessage> is a container for <application> elements. Inside an
<itpMessage> one or more <application> elements are contained. For example
the registration component sends three certiﬁcation requests of one user at the
same time. One can be a request for an encryption key-pair, the second for a
signature, and the third for a non-repudiation. In this case it could envelope
three <application> elements inside the <itpMessage>. A new <application>
(see also Subsection 5.6.1) can be deﬁned, which represents exactly this use case
and therefore only one <application> is needed, demonstrating the ﬂexibility of
the proposed scheme. A complete ITP message can be seen in Listing 5.1.
An <itpMessage> can also be secured with an XML signature. The same
properties as in the signing of an <application> element apply in this case.
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5.6 Case Studies
In order to demonstrate the use of the protocol we construct two scenarios. Both
scenarios are taken from applications that are met in a PKI environment.
5.6.1 A Typical Application
This scenario consists of a Registration and a Certiﬁcation component (which
is oﬄine) as well as the CMA. All components have multi-client capability and
they can operate for diﬀerent virtually hosted CAs. In addition, two trust center
administrators (operators) must sign all incoming requests to the oﬄine Certiﬁ-
cation component.
Alice, who belongs to organisation A, wants to get three certiﬁcates. One that
can be used for encryption, one for digital signature, and one for non-repudiation.
In addition she provides a revocation password to be used in case of revocation.
She also wants her certiﬁcates to be publicly available.
Alice makes a certiﬁcation request to the Registration component. This com-
ponent examines the credentials of Alice. It checks that they are valid and sends
a message to the Certiﬁcation component for the special certiﬁcation request
(known to the system with the id “MultiCert”). This message contains the sub-
ject DN for the certiﬁcate, the virtual CA that should sign the certiﬁcates, the
hash value of the revocation password, information whether the certiﬁcates should
be published or not and the e-mail address of Alice. It then writes the message
that has one application and signs the application to provide authenticity. Lastly,
two trust center operators sing the message too, in order to be accepted from the
Certiﬁcation component. The message can be seen in Listing 5.2. This message
is written on a portable media and is manually transported to the Certiﬁcation
component (since it is oﬄine) by the two operators.
<itpMessage version="1.1" id="20040202164445">
<sender >Registration </sender >
<recipient >Certification </recipient >
<application id="20040202164832">
<profile id="MultiCert">
<clientName >
<value id="0">Host A</value>
</clientName >
<subjectDN >
<value id="0">
CN=Alice ,OU=OrgUnitName ,O=OrgName ,C=DE
</value>
</subjectDN >
<revocationPassword type="binary">
<value id="0">7c4a8 ... 8941c</value>
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</revocationPassword >
<email>
<value id="0">alice@orgunitname.orgname.de</value>
</email>
<publiclyAvailable type="boolean">
<value id="0">true</value>
</publiclyAvailable >
</profile >
<ds:Signature >
<!-- signature of the Registration -->
</ds:Signature >
<ds:Signature >
<!-- signature of the first operator -->
</ds:Signature >
<ds:Signature >
<!-- signature of the second operator -->
</ds:Signature >
</application >
</itpMessage >
Listing 5.2: Registration to Certiﬁcation message
The Certiﬁcation component imports the message, veriﬁes the signatures of
the operators over the application and logs their identities with the subject DN
of each operator certiﬁcate.2 It then veriﬁes the signature of the Registration
component, creates all three certiﬁcates (signed with the key of the appropriate
virtual CA) and changes and adds information to the application into a new
message to the CMA. It also signs the application to provide authenticity and
integrity of the data. The key used for signing should not be the same as the
one used for signing the certiﬁcates. In addition, the signatures in the messages
exchanged among components are operational signatures without any special
properties. The message (seen in Listing 5.3) is transferred to the CMA.
<itpMessage version="1.1" id="20040202170134">
<sender >Certification </sender >
<recipient >CMA</recipient >
<application id="20040202164832">
<profile id="MultiCert">
<clientName >
<value id="0">Host A</value>
</clientName >
<userCertificate type="binary">
<value id="0">
Base64 encoded certificate
</value>
2Such a requirement may appear when it comes to evaluation of the Certiﬁcation component.
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<value id="1">
Base64 encoded certificate
</value>
<value id="2">
Base64 encoded certificate
</value>
</userCertificate >
<revocationPassword type="binary">
<value id="0">7c4a8 ... 8941c</value>
</revocationPassword >
<email>
<value id="0">alice@orgunitname.orgname.de</value>
</email>
<publiclyAvailable type="boolean">
<value id="0">true</value>
</publiclyAvailable >
</profile >
<ds:Signature >
<!-- signature of the Certification -->
</ds:Signature >
</application >
</itpMessage >
Listing 5.3: Certiﬁcation to CMA message
Lastly, the CMA veriﬁes the signature. Afterwards it examines whether the
certiﬁcates should be published or not (speciﬁed in the <publiclyAvailable>
tag), it publishes them and sends Alice a notiﬁcation by e-mail with the certiﬁ-
cates attached.
In this scenario two messages were created. One from Registration to Certi-
ﬁcation and one from Certiﬁcation to CMA. Both refer to the same application.
Therefore the id of the application must remain the same. Another remark is
that the <subjectDN> ﬁeld of the ﬁrst message is missing in the second message.
This ﬁeld is of great importance for the Certiﬁcation component, since if this ﬁeld
is missing it cannot issue the certiﬁcates, but of no importance for the CMA. In
addition the subject’s DN is now contained in the certiﬁcates.
5.6.2 A Case Study for Qualiﬁed Certiﬁcates
We present a special application of the ITP in the case of the German Signa-
ture Act [Leg01a]. According to §3.1 of the corresponding Ordinance [Leg01b] a
qualiﬁed certiﬁcate may be published on a directory only if its user has accepted
it. With directory a mechanism to have the certiﬁcates veriﬁable and available is
denoted. This can be done for example with an OCSP server [MAM+99] and an
LDAP server [HM02] respectively. The certiﬁcate may optionally be available,
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meaning that the users decide whether their certiﬁcates will be public or not.
The users must then notify the trust center whether they want their certiﬁcates
to be published or not. For increasing the level of security an activation password
may have to be provided from the users in order to activate their certiﬁcates.
Therefore two requirements exist. The ﬁrst one is that the certiﬁcate cannot
be automatically published. This can be done only after its user has accepted
it. The second one is that this certiﬁcate may not be available, namely it cannot
be downloaded. In order to implement these special requirements the ITP can
be employed. An ITP message can be sent to the CMA component containing
information about the certiﬁcate that must be published, whether it must become
known only to the OCSP or also to the LDAP directory, as well as an activation
password. An example message can be seen in Listing 5.4.
<itpMessage version="1.1" id="20060809174556">
<sender >Admin</sender >
<recipient >CMA</recipient >
<application id="20050303174542">
<profile id="Activation">
<clientName >
<value id="0">Host A</value>
</clientName >
<certificateSerialNumber >
<value id="0">10245</value>
</certificateSerialNumber >
<issuerDN >
<value id="0">
CN=MyCA ,OU=OrgUnitName ,O=OrgName ,C=DE
</value>
</issuerDN >
<activationPassword type="binary">
<value id="0">7c4a8 ... 8941</value>
</activationPassword >
<publiclyAvailable type="boolean">
<value id="0">true</value>
</publiclyAvailable >
</profile >
<ds:Signature >
<!-- signature of the first operator -->
</ds:Signature >
<ds:Signature >
<!-- signature of the second operator -->
</ds:Signature >
</application >
</itpMessage >
Listing 5.4: Activation message to CMA
56 5. Communication in a Trust Center
ITP is suited in this case study since it allows one trust center entity (the
administrators) to send a message to another entity (the CMA). In addition
all important information are contained inside an ITP message. Moreover, the
request can be examined from the administrator for correctness. Since the data
is human readable, the administrator can check whether the certiﬁcate about to
be published is the correct one or not. One mechanism to realise this use case is
having the administrators publish the certiﬁcate on the LDAP server themselves.
But this action is error-prone and may violate security requirements. Other
mechanisms to notify the CMA can be implemented. This requires their design
and implementation. ITP oﬀers the possibility to directly send messages to the
CMA, it is already established, and it can be reused by diﬀerent trust centers.
5.7 Analysis of ITP
ITP aims at a secure and ﬂexible protocol for the communication among trust
center components. The mechanisms of ITP meet these two goals.
5.7.1 Flexibility
ITP messages can travel among all trust center components. The sender and
recipient tags of a message solve the addressing problem. Every component can
set these tags according to the desired ﬂow of information. In addition, the
number of the operating components can vary without aﬀecting the protocol
itself.
All kind of data inside the trust center can be transported with ITP. Both
binary data (like the X.509 certiﬁcate) and simple text can be sent with an ITP
message.
There is the possibility to deﬁne new tags and applications. Therefore, ITP
is able to meet new requirements in the trust center communication. This may
occur in cases where the communicated data or the services that the trust center
oﬀers change.
ITP messages are XML messages and thus can be sent with various mecha-
nisms. These may include HTTP(S), TCP/IP, email, or a ﬂoppy disc. In ad-
dition, the messages themselves are portable among applications since they are
described in XML. Moreover they can be read by humans as well as machines.
The messages and applications can be tracked. Every message and application
has a unique id. This enables the components or the administrators to keep a
history of past messages or applications. In addition, the ﬂow of information
inside the trust center can be tracked. This is especially useful in cases where
auditing or special logging is required.
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5.7.2 Security
ITP oﬀers integrity, authenticity, and conﬁdentiality to the communication of the
trust center’s components. It further supports authorisation mechanisms.
Parts of the messages can be encrypted for providing conﬁdentiality. Candi-
dates for such an action may be values like the private key of an end-entity, the
revocation or activation password, or personal data of the end-users.
It is possible to calculate a signature over a message, an application, or certain
data inside an application. Therefore authenticity as well as integrity for these
values is provided.
ITP messages may be signed from one or more components or administrators.
This enables dual or multi control. This kind of control is met very often in high
security trust centers.
5.7.3 Deploying ITP
ITP, as described here, can be used by trust centers which seek a method for
arranging their information ﬂow inside the trust center. This is independent
of the number and nature of components and services as well as the kind of
information communicated among them. This is a signiﬁcant step, since the
communication among arbitrary trust center components with the requirements
mentioned in Section 5.3 is diﬃcult to achieve and existent solutions do not
provide this functionality (instead of, most of them are standardised). At the
moment ITP can be used only for intra-trustcenter speciﬁc implementations. A
newer version of ITP is needed that speciﬁes the ITP messages, in order for them
to describe most of the tasks inside a trust center in a standardised way that will
enable interoperability of diﬀerent implementations. In Chapter 8 we see that
ITP is used for communicating messages between a CA and the CMA. Moreover,
we see its use for exchanging messages needed in the CMA workﬂow. The ITP
messages will provide the necessary communication means among the so called
certiﬁcate management plugins also presented in Chapter 8.
5.8 Future Work
We proposed ITP, an XML-based protocol for intra-trustcenter communication.
We introduced the design criteria of the protocol, argued on their usefulness and
reasoned that these criteria have been met. We speciﬁed the 1.1 version of ITP
along with examples extracted from real scenarios.
The ITP protocol can still be used as a proprietary solution. The next goal
is to design and implement ITP version 2.0, a fully-ﬂedged protocol with ex-
tended functionality and strictly deﬁned rules and structure (work towards a
standardised version). The use of criticality ﬂags for the various tags of the pro-
tocol messages should be investigated. Towards this direction considerations on
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whether all messages should default to non-critical or which actions should be
taken if a criticality rule is violated should be made. A mechanism for error
handling should also be integrated in the protocol with clearly deﬁned exceptions
(like signature veriﬁcation failed or application has already been processed) and
exception identiﬁers. In addition a more advanced signing policy mechanism can
be integrated. With this mechanism it can be regulated whether components
are allowed to change data from the initial application and therefore destroy the
original signature and its validity. Special care should be taken on examining the
trade-oﬀs between simplicity and extended functionality.
Chapter 6
Directory Services
Basic task of the CMA and certiﬁcate management is the publication of certiﬁ-
cates and revocation lists. This is needed for supporting the PKI users to locate
certiﬁcates for encrypting messages or verifying signatures. Certiﬁcate publish-
ing is a diﬃcult task because there are many possible realisations for diﬀerent
installations. Moreover a successful planning for directory services provides a suc-
cessful support for PKI tasks like certiﬁcate searching or revocation information
retrieval. This Chapter discusses the possible solutions for eﬀective and ﬂexible
certiﬁcate management as far as publishing concerning. Parts of this Chapter
have been published in [KLW05].
We see what the purpose of directory services in a PKI is. We discuss the
possible solutions for supporting such a service. We further concentrate on the
LDAP based services and see how they can be used to successfully publish PKI
information. We provide a guide for public key infrastructure designers and
administrators when planning for directory services with LDAP. We analyse the
available mechanisms and propose a best practice guide for their use in PKI. We
then take a look into the German Signature Act and Ordinance and examine
the parts related to directory services. Finally, we translate those to the LDAP
directories practices.
6.1 What Are Directory Services Good for?
In a PKI there is the need that public information like the certiﬁcates or the
CRLs are publicly available. For example, in order to verify a signature on a
document the certiﬁcate of the signature originator is needed. The certiﬁcate of
the CA that has issued the user certiﬁcate is also needed. If these are publicly
available then their retrieval is easy. In the encryption case, especially when
the certiﬁcates have not been exchanged in previous communication, the target
certiﬁcate must be located and downloaded in order to encrypt a message.
Apart from the certiﬁcates also revocation information is needed for checking
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whether a certiﬁcate has been revoked or not. In contrast to certiﬁcates that may
have been exchanged between communication partners, CRLs are issued by the
CA and therefore it is diﬃcult that all users will get one CRL as soon as this is
ready.1 In addition, certiﬁcates are longer valid than CRLs. A typical validity
period for a certiﬁcate is one year and for a CRL several hours.
The services for making the PKI products publicly available is often called
directory services. This is because a kind of directory is being used to store
such information. The interface to this directory is known to various clients and
thus, they can locate and download the information they need. The most typical
solution for providing such directory services in a PKI is based on the LDAP
protocol [HM02]. Other solutions exist, too.
6.1.1 Possible Solutions
There are diﬀerent solutions for supporting the directory services in a PKI. We
brieﬂy see their properties as well as the advantages and disadvantages of each
approach. One solution for providing directory services is by employing an X.500
directory.
X.500 Directories
These directories derive from the X.500 speciﬁcation [IT01]. It is a client-server
protocol with which the clients can access information stored on the server. This
information is arranged hierarchically. X.500 requires a full OSI protocol stack
and therefore the more lightweight version of it, called LDAP, was speciﬁed.
LDAP runs over TCP/IP. Today, LDAP is being commonly used, especially on
the client side. On the server side X.500 based directories may exist with an
LDAP front end (gateway).
X.500 has a very good support for publishing X.509 certiﬁcates and CRLs.
Actually, these directories and the X.509 certiﬁcates are related to each other
since the very ﬁrst application planned with the certiﬁcates was the secure access
to such directories. It allows diﬀerent mechanisms like special certiﬁcate matching
rules or returning of matched values. These mechanisms were missing in LDAP.
However, newer speciﬁcations allow such possibilities in LDAP. But this results
into a more complex LDAP protocol. For a study on considerations about using
LDAP for supporting PKI and diﬀerences to X.500 see [Cha03].
1In some cases however this may be desired. In [MR00] the authors propose the revocation
on demand. This is practically a CRL push service. In this scheme a CRL is sent to a client
as soon as it is issued. In [FFW99, Chap. 3] the same scheme is discussed as a solution to the
revocation management and distribution problem.
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DNS
The storing of certiﬁcates and revocation information in the DNS is speciﬁed in
[Jos06]. The basic idea of this scheme is to store the certiﬁcate and CRL in a
special resource record called CERT. This scheme supports also PGP and SPKI2
certiﬁcates.
A further discussion on the DNS certiﬁcate publishing is given in [Jos01].
Moreover, it contains a performance analysis of the protocols as well as the dif-
ference between them. It further discusses security considerations for DNS.
Web Servers, HTTP, FTP
Web servers can also be used for disseminating PKI information. The certiﬁcates
and the CRLs are placed on the web server and then they are accessed over
HTTP. The certiﬁcate or CRL is saved in this case as a ﬁle, preferably with
the ”.cer” and ”.crl” extension respectively, and placed somewhere on the server.
After that it can be downloaded from any client with such capabilities. In this
case a very usable feature is that typical browsers can install the certiﬁcates and
CRLs in their internal store by visiting the corresponding link.
The same principle applies to the FTP transfer. In this case the PKI infor-
mation is placed on an FTP server. The same naming is proposed. Both HTTP
and FTP ways to transfer certiﬁcates are speciﬁed in [HH99]. This document also
describes the MIME types for certiﬁcates and CRLs which are ”application/pkix-
cert” and ”application/pkix-crl”, respectively.
But this solution does not support the search for certiﬁcates. It is just being
used for transferring the PKI information. Gutmann proposes a relational data-
base as certiﬁcate store in [Gut00]. This would allow more dynamic access of
information as well as search functions. This work has also been speciﬁed as an
RFC in [Gut06]. It provides a more general approach for searching and fetching
certiﬁcates over HTTP. This approach enables the searching and retrieving of
certiﬁcates (X.509 and PGP) and CRLs.
Evaluation
X.500 in contrast to LDAP is heavyweight. LDAP is more easily deployed both
at the server and the client side. This is because LDAP simpliﬁes many of
the X.500 features. Although this causes LDAP to lose some functionality, new
developments in the LDAP protocol preserve the features of X.500 that support
PKI. Therefore LDAP is preferred than X.500.
LDAP allows more features than DNS. These are for example support for
more security protocols, for more complicated searches, or for granular access
control [Jos01].
2Very few infrastructure deploy such certiﬁcates.
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The publishing of certiﬁcates and CRLs on web or FTP servers has the draw-
back that it does not allow certiﬁcate searching. Therefore this solution is rarely
employed. When it is employed it is used for the installation of certiﬁcates and
CRLs.
The access of certiﬁcate stores via HTTP does not allow the full LDAP certiﬁ-
cate searching possibilities. For example it does not allow to search for a certiﬁ-
cate according to its keyUsage. If the certiﬁcate store that is used is a database,
then the namespace for storing the certiﬁcate attributes is proprietary while in
LDAP it is standardised. An LDAP server can also be used as a certiﬁcate store.
6.2 LDAP and PKI
LDAP directories are used to hold certiﬁcates and CRLs in order to provide dis-
semination of PKI information. Many organisations already operate LDAP di-
rectories. One of them is Bundesnetzagentur,3 the authority responsible for the
German root CA, according to §3 of the German Signature Act4 [Leg01a]. Bun-
desnetzagentur uses an LDAP directory to provide public availability for qualiﬁed
certiﬁcates as §2.12.b SigG requires. A report for using Microsoft’s Active Di-
rectory, which supports LDAP, along with PKI in the corporate environment for
300.000 users is found in [GSB+04].
Typical clients (like email clients) already have LDAP interfaces to retrieve
CRLs and certiﬁcates. Nevertheless, the way that LDAP behaves in some cases,
complicates its support to PKI. Chadwick [Cha03] makes an in-depth study on
this behaviour. Gutmann [Gut00] suggests that a relational database is a better
solution than LDAP as far as storing of certiﬁcates and CRLs concerning.
Here we concentrate on the use of LDAP. We will show that LDAP, if it is
operated properly, oﬀers solutions regarding directory services that have many
advantages. Moreover LDAP is a commonly used standard for supporting such
services. Many PKI clients as well as PKI practitioners already employ LDAP
directories.
6.2.1 Storing Certiﬁcates
In LDAP a problem is how to successfully publish certiﬁcates. One question is
what is the best schema (see [WCHK97, Sec. 3] for the deﬁnition) choice. One
aspect of this is about whether there is support for a user that possesses more
than one certiﬁcate. Another aspect is about the presence of mandatory steps
3The complete name is Bundesnetzagentur fu¨r Elektrizita¨t, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post
und Eisenbahnen. It is the former RegTP which stands for Regulierungsbeho¨rde fu¨r Telekom-
munikation und Post.
4We abbreviate the German Signature Act as SigG from the German term which is Sig-
naturgesetz.
6.2. LDAP and PKI 63
(that will reduce ﬂexibility) or collisions with the schema already used. This
question is answered both for user and CA certiﬁcates. Second question is how
to successfully arrange the information to enable clients to search for the correct
certiﬁcate.
User Certiﬁcates
Information is hierarchically organised in an LDAP directory. In Figure 6.1 we
can see the entry of the user CN=Alice, O=Org, C=DE, DC=MyOrg, DC=DE. The
values between the commas are called relative distinguished names (RDN) and
the whole value is called a distinguished name (DN). Every entry has a relative
distinguished name. By moving from this entry to the root, and concatenat-
ing the relative distinguished name of every entry that is met, the distinguished
name for this entry is built. Relative distinguished names are usually of the
form attribute=value but they can also be multi-valued and presented like
attribute1=value1 + attribute2=value2. This representation gives the abil-
ity to create unique RDNs among siblings in the directory. For example, in the
case of certiﬁcates the issuer name and the serial number together form a unique
representation [HPFS02, Sec. 4.1.2.2]. This representation could be used on the
LDAP to create these unique entries in the form of a multi-valued RDN.
dc=MyOrg,dc=de
c=DE
o=Orgo=OrgCA
cn=MyCA cn=Alice
objectClass: top
objectClass: pkiCA
objectClass:cRLDistributionPoint
cn: MyCA
certificateRevocationList: MII…..X
cACertificate: MII…..=
objectClass: top
objectClass: person
objectClass: pkiUser
sn: Alice
cn: Alice
userCertificate: MII..1…..=
userCertificate: MII..2…..=
userCertificate: MII..3…..=
cert3cert2cert1
Figure 6.1: Entries on LDAP for a CA and an end-entity
Every entry on the LDAP has attributes and every attribute has one value,
or more in case of not single-valued attributes (see [WCHK97] for details). All
entries have an attribute called objectClass. This attribute describes the type of
the entry on the LDAP. Based on the values of the objectClass attribute, the
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entry can have diﬀerent properties. New properties can be applied to the entry
by extending the values of the object class. In Figure 6.1 the attributes for an
end-user and a CA entry are shown. Usually, but not necessarily, the subject
distinguished name contained in the entry’s certiﬁcate matches the distinguished
name of the entry in the directory. In the end-user entry the person object class
as well as the pkiUser object class are present. The ﬁrst one gives the entry the
ability to hold attributes like the surname or the telephone number. The second
one enables the entry to hold the userCertiﬁcate attribute which represents the
X.509 certiﬁcate for this entry. The userCertiﬁcate attribute holds the certiﬁcate
in its binary form in the directory.
The schema choice is important in the case of certiﬁcate publishing. The
solution should not make any assumptions on the current status of the directory
as well as it should not be planned to support only PKI. LDAP directories can
also be used to hold information that is not related to PKI. One choice in order
to store a certiﬁcate on an entry is to use the strongAuthenticationUser object
class [Wah97]. The drawback with this approach is that this object class requires
that a certiﬁcate is present on the entry and therefore it cannot be used in cases
where the entry does not possess any certiﬁcates (for example, the certiﬁcate is
removed from the directory after its revocation). In addition, this object class
refers to the X.509 strong authentication mechanism and it should not be used
just as a certiﬁcate container. To overcome these problems the pkiUser object
class [BHR99] can be used. This attribute allows but does not require that the
userCertiﬁcate attribute is present. Therefore the previous drawback does not
apply in this case. Lastly, the inetOrgPerson object class allows the certiﬁcate to
be published on the entry too. This object class may be used when the directory
is not only used to support PKI but other organisational procedures and data.
CA Certiﬁcates
The object classes used to enable publishing of CA certiﬁcates diﬀer from the ones
for end-users. There are two choices. The ﬁrst one is the certiﬁcationAuthority
[Wah97] and the second one is the pkiCA [BHR99]. The certiﬁcationAuthor-
ity mandates that a CRL, the CA certiﬁcate as well as an authority revocation
list5 (ARL) [IT97] must be published on the directory. But very few CAs is-
sue ARLs or the CA represented on this node may decide not to issue CRLs
itself. Therefore, this object class is not the best choice. The more ﬂexible
pkiCA [BHR99] solves these problems. This object class allows, but does not
mandates, CRLs, ARLs, and CA certiﬁcates to be published. The CA certiﬁ-
cate is represented by the caCertiﬁcate attribute, the X.509 CA certiﬁcate in its
binary encoded form. Lastly, both object classes allow the crossCertiﬁcatePair
attribute. This attribute represents the forward and reverse (or issuedToThisCA
5A list associated with revocation information for CA certiﬁcates only.
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and issuedByThisCA) cross-certiﬁcate pair for cross certiﬁcation purposes.
Certiﬁcate Search
Certiﬁcates are stored in LDAP as binary objects at the entry of their corre-
sponding entity. Therefore locating the correct certiﬁcate requires by a client
to know this entry. This happens by an email search or by knowing the distin-
guished name. Then the client downloads the certiﬁcate, parses it, and lastly
examines whether this is the one it searches for or not. This process however,
delegates the certiﬁcate search to some kind of side-information search, in fact
some information related to the owner of the certiﬁcate and not the certiﬁcate
itself.
A solution to this problem is to publish information related to the certiﬁcate
directly on the directory. This will enable the direct search for this data. There
was a work in progress in the IETF [IET] that speciﬁed such meta-data that are
published together with the certiﬁcate. This work is easy to implement, since
the attributes can be extracted from the certiﬁcate and published along with it.
This simpliﬁes the search for certiﬁcates with special attributes, since now on the
node the properties of the certiﬁcates (like serial number, subject DN etc.) are
held as attributes of the node.
Another work in progress in IETF [CL] speciﬁes special matching rules on the
directory to locate the correct certiﬁcates. This work is more extensive than the
ﬁrst one but more diﬃcult to implement. This implementation must take place
at the side of the LDAP vendors and clients. A third solution is the component
matching. This is deﬁned in [Leg04]. In this scheme a client searches for a cer-
tiﬁcate by one or more of its ASN.1 components (like the serial number or the
subjectDN). The LDAP server tries to match a certiﬁcate by describing the cer-
tiﬁcate in its ASN.1 representation and matching the two ASN.1 representations,
namely the one from the client and the one from its internal store. In this case
the certiﬁcate meta-data do not need to be stored as attributes on the entry of
the certiﬁcate. More details on the component matching for use in PKI as well
as its implementation in OpenLDAP [Ope04] can be found in [LCZ05].
The ﬁrst work also proposes that every certiﬁcate has its own entry subordi-
nate to the user entry (for a simple and not detailed draw of this idea, see Figure
6.1). This can help solving the following problem. When a user owns more than
one certiﬁcate, this is arranged in LDAP with a multi-valued attribute, namely
the userCertiﬁcate. A problem with this approach arises if someone wants to
locate only one speciﬁc certiﬁcate for this user. Then, one must download all
certiﬁcates and ﬁnd out the correct one by searching for the correct certiﬁcate
locally. But if every certiﬁcate has its own entry then this problem does not occur
anymore. A more generic solution to this problem is a new standard from IETF
[CM04] which deﬁnes a method, that enables matching of the values (and not of
the attributes which is common in LDAP) with a special ﬁlter associated only
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with the values. Current practice should orient on the subentries solution since
most LDAP servers and clients do not support the special matching rules and re-
turning of matched values. Long term planning however, should incorporate the
most generic solutions which are on the other hand vendor and client dependent.
Similar solutions can be applied to CA certiﬁcates.
All solutions discussed here, should be used carefully with regard to reliability
of the information contained on the LDAP server. This information is not signed
information and it could have been manipulated from an attacker. Every client
must verify the signature on the certiﬁcate and CRL to ensure the security of the
data. Nevertheless, LDAP has a number of security features which can be turned
on to guarantee that no unauthorised changes occur in the directory. It can then
also meet certain requirements of the Signature Act and Signature Ordinance
[Leg01b].
6.2.2 Security
Various security mechanisms can be applied to LDAP directories. They address
diﬀerent problems and cover many security aspects of an online electronic system.
These attractive security features make LDAP directories a perfect candidate for
the directory services in the SigG context. First of all they allow diﬀerent means
of authentication. One is the simple authentication with password. Another
possibility is to combine it with SASL [Mye97] for a digest based authentication.
For a description see [WAHM00]. Lastly, typical TLS client authentication is also
possible.
TLS [DA99] can also be used for securing the network traﬃc to the LDAP
server. The server authentication is a necessary step in this protocol, and there-
fore the LDAP server must authenticate itself to the clients. TLS can be used to
avoid that the passwords will travel in clear in the simple password authentica-
tion. For more on this scheme see [HMW00].
Apart from the authentication and conﬁdentiality mechanisms, access control
mechanisms are applied to LDAP. The directory administrator can set access
control lists (ACLs), in order to allow certain actions to deﬁnite individuals and
special parts of the directory. This scheme allows granular controls concerning
persons, actions, and data in the directory. An application of the ACL possibil-
ities could be that a revocation authority is able to publish only CRLs on the
directory, while the certiﬁcation authority (CA) only certiﬁcates. In [Cha00] and
[Gre02, Chap. 5] more on the security of LDAP directories can be found.
There are several cases, in which these security mechanisms are applied. For
example, in order to avoid that an unauthorised user replaces a revocation list
with an older one, or just removes a certiﬁcate. Although certiﬁcates and CRLs
are signed information and therefore their correctness can be proved, the integrity
of the data on the directory is very important in order to prevent such a misuse.
In addition, using the TLS mechanism of LDAP, the server can authenticate itself.
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Thus, the publishing client can check whether it publishes the information on the
correct server. This ensures that the certiﬁcates and revocation information are
published in the correct place, where the clients are expecting this information
to be published.
6.2.3 Storing CRLs
CRLs are stored in a special LDAP attribute called certiﬁcateRevocationList de-
ﬁned in [BHR99]. There are three object classes that allow this attribute, namely
the certiﬁcationAuthority from [Wah97], the pkiCA and the cRLDistributionPoint
deﬁned in [BHR99]. The ﬁrst one cannot be used when indirect CRLs [HPFS02,
Sec. 5] are used, since the entry on the directory is not a CA at all and no CA
certiﬁcate must be present. The other two object classes allow the certiﬁcateRe-
vocationList attribute without mandating this or other attributes. In addition the
cRLDistributionPoint object class mandates the commonName attribute which
gives the ability to build an entry on the LDAP with the CN node. The best
choice is a hybrid solution where both object classes are present (not necessar-
ily on the same entry). The pkiCA is then used to publish the CA and cross
certiﬁcates and the cRLDistributionPoint to publish any revocation information.
In case of indirect CRLs the cRLDistributionPoint object class is the only
suitable choice. In this case the CRL issuer is not the issuer of the certiﬁcate
and the keyUsage on its certiﬁcate is for CRL signing. This CRL issuer does not
possess any CA certiﬁcate and the pkiCA object class as a choice would be just
wrong, since it denotes a certiﬁcation authority. In the case of the German root
authority the CRLs issued are indirect ones. This is an implication of the special
validity model of the SigG. For more on this validity model see [Bau99].
In an X.509 certiﬁcate there is the possibility to state inside the certiﬁcate
where to ﬁnd revocation information about it. This is arranged in a special
extension called cRLDistributionPoints [HPFS02, Sec. 4.2.1.14]. In this extension
the place where clients can locate the CRL related to this certiﬁcate is provided.
This can be an LDAP URL and/or an HTTP URL, among others, which implies
also the mechanism used to obtain the CRL. Use of this extension is recommended
since it simpliﬁes the revocation information management. The LDAP URL for
searching the CRL of the CA entry in Figure 6.1, according to the format deﬁned
in [HS97], is:
ldap://hostname:389/CN=MyCA,O=OrgCA,C=DE,DC=MyOrg,DC=DE?
certificateRevocationList?base?objectClass=cRLDistributionPoint
The value of this LDAP URL notiﬁes the client to do the following:
1. Connect to the LDAP server running on host hostname.
2. Connect to the port 389 on this host.
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3. Go to the entry CN=MyCA,O=OrgCA,C=DE,DC=MyOrg,DC=DE.
4. Search only this entry (base search) whether it contains the objectClass
cRLDistributionPoint.
5. If the search matches, retrieve the certiﬁcateRevocationList attribute and
therefore download the CRL.
Delta CRLs can be published in the LDAP directory, too. The corresponding
attribute is the deltaRevocationList and an additional object class that can hold
this attribute is the deltaCRL [BHR99]. The cRLDistributionPoint object class
can also hold delta CRLs. However, the way this information is arranged in the
LDAP directory creates some management problems.
Every time a delta CRL is issued a full CRL must be issued, too. This is done
in order to enable clients, that cannot handle delta CRLs, to have the freshest
revocation information. This was a mandatory step in the deprecated PKIX
speciﬁcation for X.509 certiﬁcates [HFPS99]. This suggests that the newer CRL
replaces the base CRL (it is typical that the newer CRL just overwrites the older
one in the directory). This is not a problem if the clients already have the base
CRL in their cache. But new clients (or even clients which were oﬄine when the
base CRL was placed in the directory) have to work with complete CRLs until
they have the chance to locate a base CRL in the directory. To overcome this,
the newer CRL must be just added to the directory and not replace the older
one. In this case however, the clients must download all CRLs in order to ﬁnd
the base CRL.
In the newer PKIX speciﬁcation [HPFS02], when a delta CRL is published, it
is mandatory that the corresponding base CRL must be found in the directory.
The new speciﬁcation allows also to combine the delta CRLs with a full CRL that
is newer than the base CRL. Therefore a client does not need to locate a base
CRL anymore. In this case it is suﬃcient if only two full CRLs can be located on
the directory. The base CRL and the latest full CRL. A client can use both. But
in both cases (especially as far as the older speciﬁcation concerning) an LDAP
mechanism to distinguish between the diﬀerent CRLs is needed. This can be
done by using the matching of returned values [CM04] and special search ﬁlters
[CL] or component matching. For CRLs, a similar approach to the one about
certiﬁcates that are stored in subordinate entries has also been proposed at the
IETF [IET]. This work supports easy searching for CRLs on the directory.
6.2.4 Naming Plan
In order to arrange the information eﬀectively in the hierarchical manner of an
LDAP directory there is a proposal in RFC 2377 [GHSW98]. This RFC proposes
the use of the domain component attribute for the root of the directory. Domain
names are unique and hierarchical. Therefore they can be used in order to provide
6.3. Directories and the German Signature Act 69
unique names in the LDAP model. In [KWG+98] the appropriate object classes
for realising this proposal can be found. In the Active Directory of Microsoft, the
use of domain names as the root of the directory is mandatory [Gre02, Chap. 6].
Active Directory must be installed and conﬁgured properly in order to use the
integrated CA shipped with Windows 2000 Server.
6.2.5 Other Uses of LDAP
LDAP directories can be used for other purposes, too. Many organisations al-
ready operate LDAP directories to administrate and manage their information.
A common LDAP use is for central authentication purposes in UNIX systems.
In [KLW04a] it is shown that LDAP directories can be used for providing proof-
of-possession for encryption keys as well as delivery of software personal security
environments (PSE). Two other applications are derived from those schemes.
One is the activation of certiﬁcates. With the term activation we denote the
action to make the certiﬁcates publicly available. The other application is the
private key on demand, in which the users can locate and download their PSEs
whenever they want to use it. Guida et al. [GSB+04] have used the Active Di-
rectory for the registration purposes inside the PKI, in order to extract identity
information for the issuing of certiﬁcates. In [LKWB05] an LDAP directory is
used for automating registration. An extension of this scheme is in [LKWB06]
to be found.
6.3 Directories and the German Signature Act
Qualiﬁed certiﬁcates must be veriﬁable and optionally available. The term veriﬁ-
able implies that a mechanism to determine whether this certiﬁcate exists as well
as to obtain information about its status is present. The term available implies
that the certiﬁcate itself is located in a position where everybody can ﬁnd and
download it. Every Certiﬁcation Service Provider (CSP) therefore, must pro-
vide a directory service where certiﬁcates and associated revocation information
is located. One complete technical solution to this consists of an OCSP server
[MAM+99] to keep the certiﬁcates veriﬁable and an LDAP server to have the
certiﬁcates available.6
OCSP servers give signed answers to a client’s query about the status of the
certiﬁcate. There are three possible answers. The ﬁrst one is good, meaning that
the certiﬁcate is not revoked. The second one is revoked, meaning that the cer-
tiﬁcate is revoked and the third unknown, meaning that the certiﬁcate does not
exist for this OCSP server (it is unknown to it). Therefore OCSP can be used to
give information about the status of a certiﬁcate. The special extension CertHash
has been speciﬁed by the ISIS-MTT speciﬁcation [TT], in order to include also
6This is the current practice at the German root CA.
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an existence evidence of the queried certiﬁcate. This extension holds the hashed
value of the certiﬁcate the clients want to verify. With this OCSP conﬁguration
the OCSP meets the veriﬁable requirement. According to §15.2.2.b SigV, the
veriﬁcation of a qualiﬁed signature requires also a proof of existence for the qual-
iﬁed certiﬁcate, as well as information about its status, at the signature creation
time. Further we show how LDAP can be used in the SigG context, according
to its special requirements, for providing availability of qualiﬁed certiﬁcates. But
more mechanisms can also be employed in parallel. A candidate for example
is the HTTP store as described in [Gut06]. The above discussion demonstrates
that any technical requirements are outside the scope of SigG. This is because
the standards and techniques used to satisfy the law are subject to changes.
According to §3.1 SigV, no certiﬁcate must be published before its user is
identiﬁed and accepts his qualiﬁed certiﬁcate. This means that compliant certi-
ﬁcation service providers must wait for an activation of the certiﬁcate from its
user. A typical certiﬁcation process in the corporate or institutional environment
usually automates the publishing of certiﬁcates. This automation however, must
not be performed in the SigG context. Complying implementations must enable
an activation mechanism for the publishing of certiﬁcates. Only after the user
has accepted his certiﬁcate all signatures that he has calculated, even those be-
fore the acceptance, are considered in eﬀect. When a certiﬁcate is activated, it
should be veriﬁable and if its user requires it, also available. This implies that
a certiﬁcate upon activation must become unconditionally known to the OCSP
but conditionally be published on the LDAP server. Conforming CSPs must dis-
tinguish between certiﬁcates that must be kept public and those which must not
and have the proper mechanism to resolve this.
The above is also discussed in §5.2 SigV. The key owner must explicitly accept
his secure signature creation entity and conﬁrm this to the CSP. Then it is the
CSP’s task to publish the certiﬁcate in order to keep the certiﬁcates publicly
available and veriﬁable by the public (§2.12.b SigG). After the conﬁrmation from
the user, the CSP is obliged to keep the certiﬁcate on the directory for at least
ﬁve years after its expiration year (§4 SigV). In the case of accredited CSPs this
time window is thirty years after the certiﬁcate expiration.
Compliant publishing components should therefore call only add functions to
the directory but never delete functions. In LDAP this is translated to calling add
requests and never call delete or modify requests (for the deﬁnition see [WHK97]).
This gives the ability to the developer to ensure correct function and compliance
to the directives. If any remove action must be performed (for example after the
thirty years), then this should be done manually with the help of special clients.
The presence of a special monitoring mechanism is required. This mechanism
will inform the administrator of his actions. For example, this mechanism will
ﬁrst fetch the certiﬁcate from the LDAP before the delete request, show this to
the administrator, who must check whether this is the correct certiﬁcate or not,
and delete it after the administrator’s acknowledgement.
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Moreover, a special mechanism should exist that notiﬁes an administrator in
case of a failed operation. If an intended LDAP operation is not successful, the
system must notify the administrator for the problem. The problem must be
explicitly stated, in order to give the administrator a clear view of which step
was not performed. Then, an out-of-band mechanism should be used to perform
the unsuccessful step. This out-of-band mechanism must have the same security
properties as the regular one. Apart from this, a regular backup of the data on the
directory must be performed, for example by creating backup ﬁles of the whole
directory. This can be done with the help of the LDAP data interchange format
(LDIF) [Goo00]. LDIF is a text format that describes the data on an LDAP
directory. The importance of the data persistence in the directory is depicted
also in §15.3 SigV. The certiﬁcate presence as well as revocation information
related to it must have a continuous state in the directory. In addition, in the
case of an accidental error or serious system crash, the status of the directory can
be retrieved as it was before this event.
According to §7.2 SigV, if a certiﬁcate is revoked this information must be
published in the directory. In the LDAP case this is done by storing the CRL.
As in the case of certiﬁcates, it must be ensured that the CRL publication was
successful and if not, special countermeasures must be taken. For publishing a
CRL the activation mechanism is not needed. In this case it is very important
that as soon as the CRL is produced from the CA,7 this CRL is also published
in the directory without any delay. Another diﬀerence is that in the CRL case
a modify request is usually called, in order to replace the existent CRL in the
directory. There is no need to keep all CRLs in the directory since the newest CRL
contains revocation information of the previous CRLs within the same scope. If
delta CRLs are used however, at least a full base CRL that can be combined with
them should be found in the directory and should not be deleted.
The access control mechanism of the LDAP is useful, in order to distinguish
between a CRL and a certiﬁcate publishing. The ACLs in the directory can
be conﬁgured so that a special certiﬁcate publishing user is only allowed to add
certiﬁcates (namely the userCertiﬁcate attribute) and in a special path in the
directory. Another user, the CRL user, can publish only CRLs (namely the
certiﬁcateRevocationList attribute). The other security mechanisms must be
used, too. The TLS connection guarantees the identity of the LDAP server
and the client authentication ensures the identity of the user publishing data on
the LDAP. Then, no unauthorised actions on the LDAP can be performed (like
removing certiﬁcates or replacing CRLs) and moreover, publication is done only
in the correct directory.
7Or a revocation authority since the CRLs used in the SigG context are indirect CRLs.
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6.4 Conclusion
We analysed the LDAP directories and their use in PKI. LDAP is a reliable
technical solution to address the PKI information dissemination problems. We
took a look especially in the SigG environment. We discussed a planning for
LDAP, in order to meet the special SigG requirements associated with the public
availability of certiﬁcates and revocation information. A careful planning for
LDAP, provides a successful support to PKI as well as to other organisational
procedures.
A future work in this direction is to design and implement an LDAP PKI
client for management of certiﬁcates, CRLs, and software PSEs. A new standard
is speciﬁed in [MSNP04] which deﬁnes a synchronisation method of an LDAP
client with the LDAP directory. This technique may be employed for automati-
cally downloading new CRLs and updating certiﬁcates of users which are already
installed locally.
Chapter 7
PKI Management Schemes
There are certiﬁcates management tasks that are necessary in every PKI. Re-
sponsible for realising them is the certiﬁcate management authority. For some
of those tasks current solutions do not provide satisfactory solutions. In order
to provide a ﬂexible and eﬃcient CMA we take a look at two tasks. The ﬁrst
one is the proof-of-possession. The second one is the secure delivery of software
personal security environments. Parts of this Chapter have been published in
[KLW04a].
We present a method for extending the functionality of LDAP servers from
their typical use as a public directory in public key infrastructures. In this method
the LDAP servers are used for administrating infrastructure processes. One ap-
plication of this method is a scheme for providing proof-of-possession, especially
in the case of encryption keys. Another one is the secure delivery of software
personal security environments. We see what are the diﬀerences to the current
situation and other protocols. We discuss their implementation, their advantages,
and the usability gains through their deployment in a PKI.
7.1 Introduction
The task of the RA is to register an end-entity in the PKI by examining its
credentials. This entity may either already possess a key pair or not. In the ﬁrst
case, the public key is provided by the entity to the RA during registration and
forwarded to the CA that issues the certiﬁcate. In the second case, the key pair
is produced by the CA and, together with the issued certiﬁcate, is delivered to
the entity. In either case, the CA has to guarantee that ﬁnally the certiﬁcate is
issued to the entity that owns the corresponding private key.
The problem that arises in the ﬁrst case is for the CA to determine whether
this entity does really own the corresponding private key or not. Therefore, the
entity must provide a Proof-of-Possession (PoP) for this private key. In several
certiﬁcation request syntaxes special ﬁelds are reserved for this purpose. An
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important issue with PoP is the number of messages needed for accomplishing
it. While for signature keys the straightforward solution is to provide a signature
which can be veriﬁed by the RA or the CA, for encryption keys such a solution
does not exist. One good solution in terms of number of messages is the indirect
scheme where the issued certiﬁcate is encrypted with the included public key and
thus can only be read by the intended recipient. We provide an easy and eﬃcient
variant of this scheme using a directory based on the lightweight directory access
protocol (LDAP) [HM02]. Furthermore, it can be extended to tightly link the
PoP to the registration procedure. Moreover, a successful PoP is necessary for
activation of the certiﬁcate. Whether or when this activation will take place is
under full control of the end-entity.
In the second case, in which the key pair is generated in the trust center,
the problem is to securely deliver the private key to the registered and identiﬁed
entity. A commonly used standard for software personal security environments
(PSE) is PKCS#12 [RSA99]. Usually, such PSEs are either handed out face to
face or sent by e-mail. For automated certiﬁcation processes in which manage-
ment should be simple, the solution of physical presence cannot be used since it
hampers the automated process and requires human administration. PKCS#12
has inherent mechanisms to ensure privacy and integrity. Therefore, it can be
sent with an e-mail. However, this is not a good solution. This is because the
e-mail may be intercepted by a third party which can try to extract the keys
(in a password protected PKCS#12 ﬁle this may be easy for a weak password).
Moreover, the e-mail may never reach the recipient due to an incorrectly conﬁg-
ured spam ﬁlter or a mailbox which has reach its capacity limit. We suggest a
scheme based on an LDAP directory to ensure that only the legitimate recipient
will receive his PSE without any eavesdropping from a third party.
7.2 Certiﬁcation Request Messages and PoP
Common practice for the registration of end-entities in a PKI environment are
special certiﬁcation request message syntaxes. Several speciﬁcations address this
problem.
The most commonly used one is the PKCS#10 [RSA00]. It deﬁnes a syntax in
which entities can provide information needed for creating a certiﬁcate from the
CA. Furthermore, it enables them to include other data that can be used during
and after the certiﬁcation process. This syntax requires the message to be secured
with a digital signature. Among other purposes, this is done in order to provide
a PoP for the corresponding private key, since the signature can be veriﬁed by
the receiving party (RA or CA). However, this syntax does not consider keys
used for encryption only. Such keys may have to be treated diﬀerently due to
limitations of the cryptosystem (for example it cannot be used for signing) or
diﬀerent security requirements.
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Another speciﬁcation is the Certiﬁcate Request Message Format (CRMF)
[Sch05]. While handling signature keys identically to PKCS#10, it provides
three methods for PoP of encryption keys. The ﬁrst is to reveal the private key
to the CA. The second one, called direct method, requires exchange of challenge-
response messages and thus needs extra messages. The third one, the indirect
method, is to encrypt the issued certiﬁcate with the contained public key and have
the end-entity to send the decrypted certiﬁcate back in a conﬁrmation message
and by this demonstrate ownership of the corresponding private key.
Similar proposals can be found in Certiﬁcate Management Protocol (CMP)
[AFKM05]. Special care about encryption keys is taken also in Certiﬁcate Man-
agement Messages over CMS (CMC) [MLSW00]. CMC speciﬁes a mechanism
for PoP which requires more than a single-round trip1 and therefore complicates
the process. Lastly, XKMS [W3C01] considers the PoP problem exclusively for
signature keys. For a discussion on PoP see also [ANL03].
The above proposals do not provide satisfactory solutions in cases where the
end-entity does not want to reveal its key or the certiﬁcation process management
should be kept minimal and simple.
PoP is of great importance in the case of encryption keys. A certiﬁcate con-
taining a public key for which the corresponding private key is not owned by
the intended end-entity or does not exist at all is actually unusable. Any mes-
sage encrypted with this public key cannot be decrypted by the end-entity. This
scenario can become extremely dangerous in cases where the original message is
destroyed2 and only the encrypted message exists. Therefore, no one should be
able to use a certiﬁcate containing encryption keys without prior acknowledge-
ment of its owner.
To solve the PoP problem we propose a scheme similar to the indirect method
described above, in which an end-entity is an authenticated user of an LDAP
directory, where he can download and activate his certiﬁcate from. But in order
to do so, he must decrypt a secret (implicit use of his private key), decrypt the
certiﬁcate and then put it back on the LDAP server. Thus, we can avoid extra
conﬁrmation messages to the CA.
7.3 Providing PoP with LDAP
We present a scheme for providing PoP for encryption keys using an LDAP
directory.
In this scheme the CA is accepting a certiﬁcation request for encryption keys.
At this point the CA assumes that the private key exists and issues the certiﬁcate.
After that, it creates an entry on the LDAP directory. For this entry the cer-
1A request which is done from the end-entity, processed from the CA, and returned to the
end-entity.
2This is a typical function of many encryption clients.
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tiﬁcate is encrypted with the public key that it contains and its encrypted form
is stored in the attribute encryptedUserCertiﬁcate (see Section 7.4). Secondly,
the CA randomly chooses an LDAP user password. Its hashed value is placed
in the entry’s attribute userPassword for the simple authentication procedure of
the LDAP. It also encrypts the password using the entity’s public key and puts it
in the special attribute encryptedUserPassword. At this point even the user itself
does not know his password, since only its hash value and an encrypted version
is found on the directory.
We have introduced a new object class called pkiUserManagement (see Section
7.4) which can hold the above described attributes. Figure 6.1 shows an example
of such an LDAP entry along with its attributes.
The end-entity, that owns the corresponding private key, does the following:
First, it downloads the encrypted password and certiﬁcate and decrypts them
with its private key. Now it can use the password to bind to the directory as an
authenticated user and write the decrypted certiﬁcate in its entry. With this the
PoP is completed and, simultaneously, the certiﬁcate is activated enabling other
entities to use it. For an end-entity that does not own the private key, both the
certiﬁcate and the password will remain encrypted in the directory and cannot be
used. The communication between the authenticated user and the LDAP server
must be secured with SASL or TLS to avoid transmitting the password in clear.
Since the user has to decrypt data, an extra check should be made whether
this data is what it is supposed to be, namely a password and a certiﬁcate. This
should be done in order to avoid that the certiﬁcate holder decrypts a previously
encrypted message with this key3 and places it on the LDAP. An attacker could
capture such old encrypted messages and place them on the directory (provided
that it can gain write access to it) in order to realise this. The check for the
password is not necessary because the password will not be revealed and it will
only be compared with the one found on the LDAP directory. The check for the
certiﬁcate is the veriﬁcation of its signature.
One step that the CA must perform is to force the LDAP directory, by proper
access control lists (ACLs), to accept write requests only for authenticated users
and only for the userCertiﬁcate attribute of their own entry. This enforces that
exclusively authenticated users can place their certiﬁcate only on their own entry
in the directory. In addition, these ACLs must be conﬁgured in such a way
that the user password (although hashed) is not visible to other users. This will
eliminate the possibility of dictionary attacks on the password performed by any
end-user.
An optional variant of this scheme, which can link both identity and PoP
information more tightly together, is the following: The encrypted password
(when decrypted) is only the half of the real password4 used by the user to
3This key may have already been used for encryption purposes in the past.
4Which is found hashed to the directory.
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authenticate to the LDAP directory. The other half of the password is provided
to the user during registration. This half works as a shared-secret between the
CA and the end-user. The user, in order to authenticate to the directory, has to
combine the two passwords.
A second variant is to have the shared-secret function as the (complete) pass-
word for the user to authenticate to the directory. PoP will follow with decryption
of the certiﬁcate without having to decrypt the password. In this case the ability
to authenticate to the directory is disconnected from the PoP. Similar is the case
in which the user already possesses its LDAP password.
CAs can realise this scheme diﬀerently based on their policies. For example, if
after three days the certiﬁcate is still encrypted in the directory, the user is deleted
from the directory leaving him no possibility to use this certiﬁcate. Alternatively,
after decryption of the certiﬁcate the user password is deleted in order for the
user to be unable to authenticate to the directory.
7.4 Schema Deﬁnitions
We provide the schema deﬁnitions for the objectClass and attributes deﬁned for
supporting the PoP with LDAP.
Object Class
( 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.2.2.1.6 NAME ’pkiUserManagement’ SUP top
AUXILIARY MAY ( userEncryptedPassword $ userEncryptedCertiﬁcate ) )
Attributes
( 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.2.2.1.7 NAME ’userEncryptedPassword’
EQUALITY octetStringMatch
SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 SINGLE-VALUE )
( 1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.2.2.1.8 NAME ’userEncryptedCertiﬁcate’
EQUALITY octetStringMatch
SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 SINGLE-VALUE )
7.5 Methods Overview
We discuss the characteristics and properties of the certiﬁcation request messages
presented in Section 7.2 and our proposed LDAP based solution. PKCS#10
and XKMS do not support PoP for encryption keys (Encryption Key Support,
EKS) and we will not discuss them further in this section. CMC and the LDAP
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CRMF CMP CMC Proposed Solution
EKS + + + +
DM + + - -
PKR - - + +
SRT - - - +
Table 7.1: Comparison of the schemes
based proposal specify only one possible method to provide PoP, while CRMF
and CMP oﬀer three diﬀerent ones (Diﬀerent Methods, DM). Nevertheless, the
last ones propose revealing the private key (Private Key Revealing, PKR) as
a solution. Furthermore, CMC requires more than a single-round trip where all
other methods do not. But CMP and CRMF require that a conﬁrmation message
should be sent to the CA. Our proposed method does not require those (Single
Round Trip, SRT). In Table 7.1 we can see an overview of these characteristics.
7.6 Secure Delivery of Software PSEs
A variation of the above scheme can be used for delivering software PSEs (usually
in the PKCS#12 format). In this scenario the PKCS#12 structure is placed in
the userPKCS12 [Smi00] attribute of the LDAP entry. The connections done
to the directory must be secured with TLS. If a user can authenticate to the
directory, then he has the ability to download its own PSE. But in order to
authenticate, he needs a password provided during registration. Therefore only
the intended user can access his PSE.
To enforce this, the CA has to choose special ACLs. Only the authenticated
users must have read access to the userPKCS12 attribute of their own entry, while
all others should have no privileges at all. Downloading the PSE is performed
with integrity and conﬁdentiality due to the TLS connection.
We have implemented both schemes to provide a proof of concept. We have
used the OpenLDAP [Ope04] directory since it gives the possibility to create
ﬂexible ACLs and supports TLS and SASL. We have used JNDI [SUNa] at the
CA and client side for the LDAP interfaces. Moreover, the PoP scheme has been
used in the Technical University of Darmstadt. In this PKI environment the
students receive a pre-keyed card. In order to get and activate their certiﬁcates
they have to provide the LDAP based PoP. Moreover, if a card was not sent to
the correct student, the wrong recipient will not get a valid certiﬁcate for this
card. The incorrect recipient must also know the LDAP data (like the password)
of the correct student for using the card.
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7.7 Usability Issues
These two basic applications for user management with LDAP enhances the us-
ability of the PKI. In the PoP case it is easier for a human user to decrypt a
value than to provide his private key or to engage himself in challenge-response
procedures. Decrypting data like the certiﬁcate or the password is the intended
use of the decryption key and is already implemented in common client soft-
ware. Furthermore, most existent client software supports LDAP for searching
and downloading certiﬁcates of others. These features can easily be extended and
combined to fetch the encrypted data from the directory, decrypt it, and store
the certiﬁcate back. Particularly, the last action can be totally transparent to
the end-entity.
Also, fetching a PSE from the directory is essentially the same as looking
up certiﬁcates of others. Thus, no extra development is required for the client
software. The usability is increased by the fact, that the client can transparently
download the PKCS#12 ﬁle and integrate the contained private key at the client
side.5 Instead, if the user has received his PSE by e-mail or ﬂoppy disc, he would
have to install it somehow manually. Furthermore, only the LDAP connection has
to be conﬁgured at the client and nothing else. Depending on the CA’s policy, also
the following strategy may be chosen: The software PSE remains on the directory
to serve as backup. In this case the users are not required to permanently store
the PSE locally. They can access it from everywhere and anytime. Herewith a
key on demand service is realised. Backup is also supported.
7.8 Overview
We have presented two schemes for providing proof-of-possession and secure de-
livery of personal security environments. Both schemes use an LDAP directory
which is already integrated in most PKIs, it is ideal for user management, it has
suﬃcient security features, and many existent clients have already LDAP inter-
faces which can be extended. We have integrated the PoP solution into the PKI
installation at the University of Darmstadt. The current schemes are extended
in [LKWB05] for supporting, registration, certiﬁcate revocation, and certiﬁcate
renewal.
5Probably asking for an extra password for its internal database.

Chapter 8
CMA Design and
Implementation
In Chapter 4 the speciﬁcations for the CMA have been given. We use these
speciﬁcations for designing and implementing the CMA. We see the design of
the CMA as a software component, the types of request that are possible to be
processed as well as the certiﬁcate management protocols that it uses like the
PKCS#7 or the ITP. The tasks of the CMA regarding certiﬁcate management
are explained in details. For realising these tasks the certiﬁcate management
plugins have been developed. Their speciﬁcation, design, implementation, and
the beneﬁts of this approach are discussed. Moreover we take a look at the design
of the CMA for supporting diﬀerent input formats, virtual hosting, and LDAP
directories related functions like publishing of certiﬁcates and CRLs. We discuss
the technologies that are used for implementing the CMA and ﬁnally see whether
the CMA design goals have been met.
8.1 Design
We see the design of the CMA. First we give an overview of the main design
principle. Afterwards we provide more details about the messages that the CMA
is able to process. These messages are the input to the CMA. They carry diﬀerent
kinds of request. We discuss details about the types of request that exist in a
trust center and the CMA is able to handle.
8.1.1 Overview
The CMA is designed as a software daemon. In Figure 8.1 we see a UML activity
diagram of the daemon workﬂow.
The CMA daemon is a program that runs in the background and delivers
certain services. It can be started as a system service or as a stand-alone appli-
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Figure 8.1: Activity diagram of the daemon workﬂow
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cation. For delivering its services it must be triggered with special inputs which
we call requests. These requests are created by an issuer. As soon as a valid
request is sent to the CMA, it is processed according to the workﬂow deﬁned for
this type of request.
There is a start up phase and a running phase. The start up phase performs
all necessary initialisations for the correct functioning of the application. These
are the initialisation of the database connections, reading of the conﬁguration
ﬁles, initialisation of the logging and of other miscellaneous tasks. If any failure
occurs this is logged and the operator of the CMA is informed with a console
output or by monitoring the log ﬁles.
After start up the CMA runs as a daemon. It runs in the background as
an application that waits for delivering certain services. In order to do so the
daemon performs a regular polling. The polling time is between three and ﬁve
seconds. This time is conﬁgurable.
The design allows diﬀerent polling variants. The one that is used in most
cases is ﬁlesystem polling. Another polling mechanism is over a database. One
could think of more polling mechanisms based on LDAP directories or events like
the insertion of a smart card into a card reader.
In the case of the ﬁlesystem polling, the daemon checks one (or more) ﬁlesys-
tem directories for new ﬁles. These ﬁlesystem directories are located at the same
machine in which the CMA daemon is running. If these ﬁles match the expected
format (PKCS#7 or ITP) they will be imported. The input ﬁles are tested for
integrity and authenticity. Afterwards the daemon extracts all necessary data
from these ﬁles. These ﬁles contain requests that are processed by the CMA.
The ﬁrst task of the daemon is to identify for which virtual host the request
is destined for. If it is destined for a known host, then it imports it, otherwise it
discards it. When a request is imported, the daemon checks its type. There are
diﬀerent types of request like certiﬁcation, revocation, or certiﬁcation with key
generation. Other requests exist, too. For more on the requests see Subsection
8.1.3. Depending on the type of request a predeﬁned set of steps are performed
by the CMA. This set of steps realises the management tasks required by the
issuer of this request.
The processing steps of a request to the CMA are conﬁgurable. This is
arranged in special conﬁguration ﬁles. The request reaches a plugin component
(or simply plugin) which is the ﬁrst processing step. This component delivers a
special service. When the component has delivered its services for this request,
the request is moved to the next plugin component. This continues until a request
has been processed by every plugin.
The set of services that these plugins oﬀer together for each request is exactly
the way that the CMA processes this request. This means that the realisation
of the CMA’s services is done through many pluggable components. The col-
laboration of all components fulﬁls the task of the CMA for one issuer and one
request.
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8.1.2 Input
The CMA accepts two input formats. One is the PKCS#7 format and the other
is the ITP format.
Before the data is transferred to the CMA, it is encoded to the corresponding
format and stored in a ﬁle. This ﬁle is placed in a ﬁlesystem directory. This is
found on the same machine as the CMA instance is running. The CMA daemon
polls this directory regularly in order to examine whether new input ﬁles exist.
If a new ﬁle is found it determines its type (PKCS#7 or ITP) and uses the
corresponding importer for reading the ﬁle, extracting the data, and storing it
in a database as a new request that will be processed. From the moment the
request is stored in the database the daemon processes this request further.
Both formats allow the contained data to be signed and encrypted. The
diﬀerent possibilities that the two formats oﬀer are shown in Chapter 5.
The ﬁrst task after reading a ﬁle is to verify the digital signature that protects
its content. Every format has its own security mechanisms. In the PKCS#7
messages the data is contained in a SignedData structure. The CMA veriﬁes the
signature over the data (see [RSA93] for more details). This data is raw binary
data. In the case of ITP messages, an enveloped signature is veriﬁed over the
data contained in an <application> element. If the daemon fails to verify a
signature over the input data, it will discard the input.
8.1.3 Requests
There are diﬀerent types of request in a trust center. The type of request is
decided in the RA, since this is the initiator of all requests. The RA sends a
request to the CA or KA. When they ﬁnish processing the request, this request is
forwarded to the CMA. The RA can also send the request directly to the CMA.
In Table 8.1 the requests that the CMA processes are found. These are:
• CRTRequest is a plain certiﬁcation request in which the keys are generated
at the side of the end-entity. They are not generated in the trust center.
The entity sends its public key to the trust center and the trust center issues
a certiﬁcate for this public key. A PoP is performed in this case.
• P12Request is a request in which the keys are generated by the trust center
and they are stored according to the PKCS#12 format. Therefore they are
stored in software. No PoP is needed in this case.
In this request the keys are generated by the trust center. This is a logical
assumption for keys that are generated in software and many PKIs operate
this way.1 In this request the PKCS#12 ﬁle is sent to the CMA in order to
deliver it to the user. It is named after the PKCS#12 standard [RSA99].
1For example the RBG CA of the TUD is operating like that. See also https://cert-ra.
rbg.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/ (date of access 28.12.2005).
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Request Type Description
CRTRequest Certiﬁcation
Request for certiﬁcation of
a public key that has been
created at the client side.
P12Request Certiﬁcation
Request for key generation
in the trust center and cer-
tiﬁcation of the public key.
The key pair is stored in
software (PKCS#12).
P11Request Certiﬁcation
Request for key generation
in the trust center and cer-
tiﬁcation of the public key.
The key pair is stored in a
smart card.
CombiRequest Certiﬁcation
Request for generation of
more than one key pair for
one entity and certiﬁcation
of the public keys. The keys
are generated in the trust
center.
CRLRequest Revocation
Request for revocation of
one certiﬁcate.
CRLRenewalRequest Revocation
Request for renewing a CRL
without revoking any cer-
tiﬁcate.
DeltaCRLRequest Revocation
Request for revocation of
one certiﬁcate and issuance
of a Delta-CRL.
CRLCombiRequest Revocation
Request for revocation of
more than one certiﬁcate.
ActivationRequest Certiﬁcation
Request for activating a cer-
tiﬁcate.
Table 8.1: Types of request
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• P11Request is a request about keys that are generated by the trust center
and are stored in a smart card. The key generation itself can take place in
software or in hardware. In this request information about the smart card
is sent to the CMA. It is named after the PKCS#11 standard [RSA04] that
deﬁnes a protocol for communicating with smart cards.
• CombiRequest is a request in which one entity receives more than one cer-
tiﬁcate. This is meaningful especially when the certiﬁcates are for diﬀerent
purposes. The number of certiﬁcates for one entity varies. Usually it is
either two or three. In the case of two certiﬁcates, one certiﬁcate is used
for encryption and the other one for digital signatures, while in the case of
three certiﬁcates, the third certiﬁcate is used for non-repudiation purposes.
However, these certiﬁcates may have other uses.
• CRLRequest is a revocation request. In this request a CRL is issued. This
CRL contains the same number of revoked certiﬁcates as the previous CRL
with the addition of a newly revoked certiﬁcate. This request contains
additional data about this certiﬁcate.
• CRLRenewalRequest is a request for renewing a CRL without revoking any
certiﬁcate. This CRL contains the same certiﬁcates as the previous one,
but the nextUpdate and thisUpdate values of the CRL are diﬀerent. This
request is created when the CRL expiration date has been reached and
therefore the older CRL is renewed but no additional certiﬁcate has been
revoked.
• DeltaCRLRequest is a request for the issuance of a Delta-CRL. Only one
certiﬁcate is revoked. The Delta-CRL contains the previously revoked cer-
tiﬁcates (from the previous Delta-CRL) and the newly revoked one.
• CRLCombiRequest is a revocation request for more than one certiﬁcate.
Every revoked certiﬁcate is listed with its serial number and issuer DN.
Only one CRL is issued that contains the previously revoked certiﬁcates
and the newly revoked ones.
• ActivationRequest is a request to activate a certiﬁcate. This requests con-
tains the certiﬁcate to be activated or the serial number and the issuer of
this certiﬁcate. It may additionally contain an activation password.
We take a look at two requests and compare them. These are the P12Request
and the P11Request. We see their diﬀerences in three categories. The ﬁrst one
is about whether keys are transferred or not, the second category is about the
accompanying data, and the third is about the delivery to the end-user.
In the P12Request the keys are generated in the trust center. In this request
the PKCS#12 ﬁle is sent to the CMA in order to deliver it to the user. This ﬁle
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contains a key pair. In the case of the P11Request which is a hardware based
request the keys are found in the card only. They are created by the user, or the
trust center, or the card manufacturer. Thus, no keys are sent to the CMA in
this request.
In the P12Request the password that protects the ﬁle can be sent within the
request. This may be needed for example by the CMA in order to print it on
paper that will be sent to the user as a letter. In the P11Request the PIN of the
card can be sent, the PUK,2 or even none of them if this is not necessary.
In the P11Request the delivery of the card is done by the physical presence
of the entity in the trust center. The card can also be sent by post to its user.
In both cases the CMA needs data to prepare the delivery. In the ﬁrst case it
needs the entity’s name for printing it on a letter for enabling sorting of the
card. In the second case it additionally needs the postal address of the entity to
prepare a letter that will be used in the shipping of the card. In the P12Request
the PKCS#12 ﬁle can be sent by email and only the email address is needed.
Another way to deliver it to the user is by using the scheme proposed in Section
7.6. In this case the entry of the user on the LDAP directory must be sent to the
CMA. This information may also be contained in the certiﬁcate of the user.
The two requests require diﬀerent handling. Therefore we distinguish these
two requests and their further processing. Among the other requests similar
diﬀerences exist. These requests are the ones that the CMA processes.
Depending on the type of request the CMA provides the required services.
These depend on the certiﬁcate management needs of each virtual hosted issuer
in each installation. The challenge for the CMA is to be able to deliver all
necessary services for each request as well as for each trust center installation.
8.2 CMA Services
For every request that comes from an issuer, the CMA delivers its services. These
depend on the type of the request and the issuer. Every issuer has customised
requests as well as services. Therefore the CMA realises diverse certiﬁcate man-
agement tasks for every installation. The following are the services of the CMA.
8.2.1 Certiﬁcate Archiving
Certiﬁcate archiving is the storing of the certiﬁcates in a persistent store like
a ﬁlesystem or a database. Through archiving, access to a certiﬁcate can be
achieved at any time. The suited place for this is the CMA and not the CA,
since access to the CA is usually limited.
2This is a second PIN that unblocks the card, in case the ﬁrst PIN has been locked due to
wrong entries.
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Apart from this, certiﬁcate archiving enables certain trust center tasks. One
of them is to support certiﬁcate renewal. If a certiﬁcate has expired, then the
RA can read the persistent store, ﬁnd the certiﬁcate, extract the public key
and initiate a re-certiﬁcation request for this key. Another task is to support
certiﬁcate activation. The activation process locates the correct certiﬁcate and
initiates an activation request for this certiﬁcate.
Through certiﬁcate archiving other tasks are also enabled. Such a task is the
sorting of certiﬁcates according to their expiration date. After that the CMA can
send notiﬁcations to their end-users about the expiration. In addition, archiving
of a certiﬁcate can be associated with the archiving of side-information regarding
the certiﬁcate itself. For example, if a revocation password is needed in order to
revoke a certiﬁcate, this could be stored (possibly hashed) in the persistent store,
too.
8.2.2 Key Backup
Key backup can be delegated to the CMA. This is because the access to the CA
is sometimes limited and the CMA is more accessible. The installation of an
extra authority, like the Backup Authority, requires more communication costs.
Moreover operational considerations may be present, like the existence and main-
taining of a new instance.
There are environments in which no key backup takes place. These are for
example PKIs that are operating in the SigG context. But in other cases this
is a mandatory process. Such a case is when there are keys that are used for
encryption.
If the private key is created at the client side, the users are responsible for
its archival. They may decide to deliver the private key to the trust center
to delegate its archival. If the private key is created in the trust center, then
usually the backup takes place in software devices like PKCS#12 structures.
The authority that has created the key, usually the CA, stores the key in the
PKCS#12 format. This is placed in a request towards the CMA.
The CMA extracts the PKCS#12 data and persistently stores them either
in a database or in the ﬁlesystem. The PKCS#12 data is either protected by a
password or a public key as deﬁned in the corresponding speciﬁcation. Usually
the password encryption is used. Either the password is known to the users (they
may have chosen it in the beginning of the registration) or it is created in the
trust center and becomes known to them (for example with a letter). In the
latter case the password becomes known to the CMA. The CMA may decide to
re-encrypt the PKCS#12 data with a new password (like a master password used
for all ﬁles), or a public key, or archive the initial password. This password is
stored encrypted.
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8.2.3 Mail Notiﬁcation
Mail notiﬁcation can be used in various cases for transporting messages and
information from the trust center to the end-entities. The main function of this
service is to write an email to the end-users that informs them about their PKI
status.
The most typical case is to notify the end-users by an email about the is-
suance of their certiﬁcates. The users then, can download the certiﬁcate from
the directory or get it from the trust center by physical presence. Alternatively,
the certiﬁcate may be attached to the email. Other useful information may be
included in the email. This could be a list of possible applications for the cer-
tiﬁcate, usage instructions like limitations of its use (e.g. only for signature), or
what to do in case of revocation. The CA certiﬁcate may also be attached in the
email with installation instructions (ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation for example).
A second use of the mail notiﬁcation is to deliver software PSEs. The software
PSE (usually in the PKCS#12 format) is attached to an email with the certiﬁcate
and sent to the users. The users can save the PSE and install it at the client side.
In this case the mail is usually sent not encrypted since the users do not possess
any private key to decrypt it. Therefore, the password protection is enabled.
This password is already known to the user. The protocol described in Section
7.6 oﬀers a more usable alternative and extra security mechanisms.
A third type of mail notiﬁcations regards revocation. As soon as a certiﬁcate
is revoked, its user can be notiﬁed about the result of the revocation. In addition,
further information like a proposal for a new certiﬁcation may be accompanying
the email.
Mail notiﬁcations however, may not be suﬃcient. The intended recipient may
never be reached. This can happen due to wrongly conﬁgured ﬁlters that protect
against unsolicited bulk email or due to an email box that has reached its limited
capacity. In cases where this is unacceptable, a certiﬁed mail may have to be
sent to the user.
8.2.4 Delivery of PSEs
The CMA is responsible for the delivery of personal security environments to the
end-users. In case of a software PSE there is the possibility to send it with an
email. This is part of the mail notiﬁcation services. Another delivery possibility
is by using the protocol described in Section 7.6. A third possibility is by storing
the PSEs in the ﬁlesystem. Afterwards a human administrator can extract them
and deliver them by hand to the user, usually on a portable media like a ﬂoppy
disc.
The CMA administers also data related to the PSE. For example it prepares
accompanying letters that will be sent with the PSE. In addition, it prints PIN
letters that contain the PIN that protects the PSE. These features are most
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typically met in hardware based tokens.
8.2.5 Conﬁrmations
In many cases it is required that certain conditions must be met in order to
perform certain steps with the certiﬁcate and its processing inside the trust center.
An example for this is the certiﬁcate activation. A certiﬁcate may not become
known to the OCSP, published in a public directory and be accessible before its
user decides so. This has as consequence, that a complete certiﬁcation request
has to be suspended for a certain period of time. The term complete certiﬁcation
request denotes the full tasks that are planned to be performed with a certiﬁcation
request inside a trust center.
The CMA supports this kind of behaviour. In case of activation it publishes
the certiﬁcate only if this is allowed to. Whether a certiﬁcate is allowed to be
published is communicated from the RA or the CA within the request. If a
certiﬁcate is activated, it is not automatically published on any directory or the
OCSP server. A special trigger mechanism activates the certiﬁcate. This may
be performed by a human administrator for example. When the certiﬁcate is
activated, the CMA processes the request for this certiﬁcate further. Usually, the
only tasks that remain to be done is the certiﬁcate publication and the update
of the OCSP backend.
These conﬁrmation services are required when end-users must interact with
the trust center. This is often needed for example in order to acknowledge the
receipt of a PSE. In the installation of the RBG CA at the TUD, the end-users
authenticate against a web page in order to notify that they have received their
software PSE. The certiﬁcate will be published only after a successful authenti-
cation.
8.2.6 CRL Notiﬁcations
When a CRL or delta-CRL is about to expire, a notiﬁcation is needed to the CA in
order to produce a newer revocation list. This is required if the CA is not already
undertaking this task itself. This can be done by sending a mail notiﬁcation to the
trust center administrator for initiating a CRL renewal request. This is a request
for a newer CRL without including any new entry. If the CA is oﬄine and it
produces the new CRLs itself (without notiﬁcation), this notiﬁcation mechanism
can be used for informing the administrator to fetch the newer available CRL from
the oﬄine system. Alternatively, if the RA is responsible for issuing revocation
requests, this notiﬁcation could be sent to the RA system.
Moreover CRLs can be sent to the clients. The CRL push scheme described
in [MR00] is realised by the CMA. The CMA operates as the CRL Push server.
The CMA pushes the CRLs of the issuer that it is operating for, to diﬀerent
clients registered with the CRL push services.
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8.2.7 PKI Publishing
Various PKI data must be publicly available for diﬀerent clients. This is impor-
tant for the proper functioning of the infrastructure. For example there is the
need to locate a certiﬁcate in order to verify a signature or to encrypt a message.
In other cases revocation information must be available for determining whether
a certiﬁcate is valid or not. In [KLW04a] the PKCS#12 ﬁles are stored in a public
directory for delivery or key on demand purposes.
Plenty of mechanisms exist for publishing PKI information. In Chapter 6 we
have already seen these mechanisms. In most cases the LDAP based mechanism
is used. The CMA publishes certiﬁcates, CRLs, and other information like the
email address (for easier searching of certiﬁcates, see also 6.2.1) in an LDAP
directory using the LDAP protocol.
Among the various PKI installations diﬀerent considerations regarding the
publication of certiﬁcates and CRLs exist. These are inﬂuenced by various fac-
tors. One factor is whether the end-entity already has an entry on the LDAP
directory or not. Another is whether information that is not directly related to
PKI products should also be published. In some installations the communication
must be secured with TLS. LDAP directories may be used for supporting other
services like OCSP. The CMA deals with these factors. A general-purpose library
is needed. We see what are the features of this library and implementation details
in Section 8.7. This library has been designed and implemented and is used by
various PKI components for supporting PKI functions in LDAP.
The PKI publishing should also consider the public availability of some cer-
tiﬁcates. According to SigG some certiﬁcates may never be published on a public
directory. There is the need therefore to distinguish among certiﬁcates that are
public and those that are not.
CMA supports only LDAP based publishing mechanisms since the other mech-
anisms are rarely used. At the moment of this writing a new protocol is deﬁned in
the PKIX group of the IETF that allows retrieving and searching for certiﬁcates
over HTTP [Gut06]. In this scheme the backend used for the information can be
a database, or an LDAP directory, or any other persistent store. Therefore CMA
supports the new protocol, if the backend that is used is an LDAP directory. We
plan to implement this HTTP interface using LDAP and a relational database
as a backend.
8.2.8 OCSP Backend Support
CMA supports OCSP services by providing the necessary store from which an
OCSP server will get the necessary information it needs. This information is
about whether a certiﬁcate exists and whether it is revoked or not. The mecha-
nisms for providing this backend diﬀer.
The store that the CMA is using is an LDAP directory. The OCSP server is
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querying the LDAP directory for a certiﬁcate or a CRL in order to see whether
this certiﬁcate exists and is revoked. This can be done on demand when the
OCSP client sends a request about a certiﬁcate to the server. It can also be done
as soon as the certiﬁcate is published on the LDAP backend by notifying the
OCSP server.
Another store is a relational database. Certiﬁcates and CRLs are stored in
the database in two tables for example. The ﬁrst table regards certiﬁcates and
the second CRLs. The diﬀerence of this approach to the LDAP based one, is that
the information on the database does not have a standard naming mechanism like
in LDAP (schema) and therefore the OCSP server needs to be reconﬁgured for
every database.
A third mechanism is by sending direct notiﬁcations that contain certiﬁcates,
CRLs, or other information to the OCSP. Such notiﬁcations are special queries
to the server. For example when a certiﬁcate is issued, a special signed query
that contains the newly issued certiﬁcate is sent to the OCSP server. Another
possibility is to place such information in an ITP message which is then sent to the
OCSP server. The server must then store the new certiﬁcate for future queries.
This could be done by using its own database. Additionally revocations may
also be directly communicated to the server without any CRLs being involved.
The serial number and the issuer DN of the revoked certiﬁcate is sent to the
OCSP server which stores this information for example in a locally constructed
CRL. Alternatively it may store the revocation information in its database in a
special ﬁeld on the certiﬁcate table denoting whether this certiﬁcate is revoked
or not. In this case security considerations exist since this information is placed
unsigned in the database and it must be protected. Similar considerations exist
if the requests to the OCSP are also sent unprotected.
8.2.9 Other Services
The CMA may perform other tasks than the ones already mentioned. In some en-
vironments it may be responsible for issuing indirect CRLs and function therefore
as a revocation authority. It may be responsible for validation services. Further-
more it may be used for supporting the ”Key Information Service” mode of the
XKMS protocol that locates public keys (and other services) on behalf of clients
[W3C01, Sec. 1.4]. It may also be responsible for organising services required by
the trust center itself. For example this is the error handling for requests that
could not be processed (from the CMA or other trust center components).
8.3 Certiﬁcate Management Plugins
There are many tasks that the CMA performs. New tasks will occur. Current
tasks will be removed or substituted by others. The diﬀerent types of request
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need processing according to their nature. The various virtual hosted issuers
require diﬀerent handling of their products. The CMA addresses this situation
by deﬁning the certiﬁcate management plugins (CerMaP).
A certiﬁcate management plugin is responsible for realising exactly one CMA
task. For example the ArchiveCertiﬁcates CerMaP is the plugin that is used for
archiving certiﬁcates issued from the CA. A collection of these plugins is needed
for performing all necessary tasks for a CA product.
Every request that reaches the CMA is processed according to the desired
workﬂow of each virtual host. The possible requests that can appear have been
presented in Section 8.1.3. For the P11Request for example the set of the CMA
tasks is:
1. Archive certiﬁcate.
2. Send a notiﬁcation to the user.
3. Update the OCSP backend and notify the OCSP server.
4. Publish the certiﬁcate on the LDAP.
For each of these tasks a CerMaP exists. A CerMaP is a component that de-
livers a certain service and realises a special functionality upon an input request.
This input request is an ITP message. This ITP message contains certiﬁcates,
CRLs, and other products. Each plugin extracts the necessary data from the ITP
message and performs its tasks. The ArchiveCertiﬁcate plugin extracts a certiﬁ-
cate from the ITP message, writes it on the ﬁlesystem, and stores it additionally
in the database. A plugin may optionally add data to the input ﬁle.
If new functionality is needed, for example for realising a new protocol, only
a new plugin is implemented, tested, and integrated into the CMA.
The CerMaPs are designed according to the template design pattern described
in [GHJV95, Chap. 5] and [Met02, Chap. 21]. This allows the subclasses to realise
the tasks of each CerMaP while the superclass provides the implementation of
tasks that do not relate to the concrete services of each CerMaP. In Figure 8.2
the class diagram for the design of two CerMaPs can be found. The ﬁrst is the
UpdateLDAP plugin that is responsible for publishing certiﬁcates and CRLs to
an LDAP directory. The second is the ArchiveCertiﬁcate plugin that archives
certiﬁcates.
Each plugin implements the abstract methods process and verify. The process
method is the realisation of the services of the CerMaP. Its input is an ITP
message (encoded as a binary object) or a Java Wrapper for this message called
the Product. In this method all tasks that a plugin performs are realised. The
verify method checks whether this plugin has successfully performed its tasks.
This is a very important function in some environments. In Section 6.3 we saw
that when a certiﬁcate is published on the LDAP directory it must be checked
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CMPlugin
+init()
+init(oi : OperationInfo)
+process(byte[]): byte[]
+process(p : Product): byte[]
+verify(byte[])
+verify(p : Product)
UpdateLDAP
+init()
+init(oi : OperationInfo)
+process(byte[]): byte[]
+process(p : Product): byte[]
+verify(byte[])
+verify(p : Product)
ArchiveCertificate
+init()
+init(oi : OperationInfo)
+process(byte[]): byte[]
+process(p : Product): byte[]
+verify(byte[])
+verify(p : Product)
Figure 8.2: Class diagram for the certiﬁcate management plugins
whether the certiﬁcate has been published on the directory or not. While the
actual publication takes place in the process method, the checking whether the
publication was successful or not takes place in the verify method. The init
methods oﬀers a way to initialise each plugin. If initialisation is needed, then
each plugin overwrites this method according to its needs.
All services of the CMA, like archiving, delivery, or publication have been
implemented in Java as CerMaPs.
Planz has introduced the operators in [Pla02]. Operators function like the
CerMaPs. The diﬀerences are that the operators are not able to process ITP
messages and they do not specify the verify method. Moreover they are processing
products that contain information about how they are processed. The daemon
reads this information in order to steer the products.
8.3.1 Advantages
The use of ITP as the input of the certiﬁcate management plugins oﬀers certain
advantages. Since the input format is known to all applications, PKI developers
can build arbitrary plugins. The type of each plugin and the services that it oﬀers
may vary according to the concrete scenario. Plugins that have already been im-
plemented can be reused if they oﬀer services that are needed in an installation.
A library of interoperable plugins can be created that oﬀers certiﬁcate manage-
ment functionalities. Moreover, these plugins can be written in any programming
language.
The format of the ITP messages also has several advantages compared to other
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representations. For example one possible representation is by using Java objects.
The input data in this case is a serializable Java object. This object is used as
a container. All necessary data is placed in a Java object through set methods,
and it is accessible through get methods. An internal representation is used for
storing the data. Such inputs cannot be processed from another component that
is not aware of this representation. Other components, written in C for example,
are not able to process such representations and a converter must be written.
Furthermore deserialization problems may occur among diﬀerent Java versions.
ITP messages can be exchanged among diﬀerent trust centers or installations.
This allows that the CerMaP inputs messages can be easily transferred to another
instance and be further processed. Therefore some of the remaining processing
steps for a request may be delegated or ”outsourced”. This format also enables
the distribution of those requests among diﬀerent instances.
The ITP messages can be signed and encrypted. This will support signature
veriﬁcation of the message from a CerMaP. According to the policy, if the veriﬁ-
cation fails the CerMaP may not process this message. Additionally, if a CerMaP
inserts sensitive data in a message it may encrypt this part of the message. More-
over the messages exchanged among the CerMaPs are human readable. This eases
debugging, understanding errors that may happen, or the manual processing of
a product from a human administrator.
8.3.2 Workﬂow
Once a request reaches the CMA (in the PKCS#7 or ITP format) the importer
extracts the data and creates an ITP message that contains this data. The
ITP message roams from one CerMaP to another. Each CerMaP delivers its
services for this message. After a message has been processed by all necessary
CerMaPs it is stored in the database as a ﬁnished request. An activity diagram
of this behaviour is shown in Figure 8.3 for a P11Request. The ITP message is
unsigned.
Once a request reaches the CMA, the importer places every product in a
database. At this point the importer has completed its services. The workﬂow
for the product is controlled by the daemon. The ﬁrst task of the daemon is
to ﬁnd products in the database that must be processed. It then extracts the
product from the database. At this point it may additionally verify the signature
on the product if this is signed. It checks which is the next plugin that this
product should be inserted into and requests from this plugin to process this
product. As soon as the plugin has ﬁnished processing a product the daemon
may require that it also veriﬁes the result of the processing. That is to check
whether the task has been successfully performed or not. After that the product
is placed once again in the database and is ready to be processed again in the
next step. When all steps for this product are ﬁnished, this product is archived
in the database (see also Figure 8.3).
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Figure 8.3: Activity diagram of the processing of a P11Request
The ITP messages that serve the communication among the CerMaPs con-
tain only PKI related data. The daemon organises the workﬂow. This has the
advantage that these products can be processed in several ways. Their processing
can be parallelised for example. The products may be distributed among diﬀer-
ent computers. In addition, other applications do not need to be aware of the
processing representation contained in the products. Therefore the new type of
products can be used in general certiﬁcate management frameworks. If the mes-
sages among the CerMaPs contain information about how they must be processed
these advantages do not exist anymore. Such information is for example the next
operation for this product or the time that it must be processed.
This process allows to store the intermediate states of a request. Therefore if
the CMA application is stopped, an error takes place, or anything unusual that
will inﬂuence the application happens it is possible to continue the request from
this point of failure.
8.4 Virtual Hosting
The various virtual hosted issuers in a trust center installation have diﬀerent
requirements on how their products are processed. As soon as an issuer has
created a product, this is delivered to the CMA. Then the CMA processes this
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product according to the needs of each host. For addressing this situation the
CMA is able to process products for the various virtual hosts and realise the
desired certiﬁcate management workﬂow for each of them.
The realisation of the certiﬁcate management workﬂow of a product and the
fulﬁllment of the CMA tasks is done by a sequence of CerMaPs. This regards
one virtual host. This process is repeated for each host in order to achieve the
virtual hosting. Therefore two goals are accomplished. First to be able to realise
diﬀerent certiﬁcate management workﬂow processes and second that this is done
for every virtual host.
In Listing 8.1 an example of a conﬁguration ﬁle is found. For implementing
this scheme such a conﬁguration ﬁle is created for every host. This conﬁguration
ﬁle contains the types of request that every host is able to process, the CerMaPs
that are needed for each request, and conﬁguration parameters for each CerMaP.
<host>
<profile name="P12Request">
<operation type="ArchiveCertificates">
<param key="outputDirectory">filesystem path</param>
<param key="useDB">true</param>
<!-- other parameters -->
</operation >
<operation type="UpdateOCSPBackend">
<param key="host">LDAP URL</param>
<param key="port">389</param>
<!-- other parameters -->
</operation >
<operation type="KeyBackup">
<param key="useDB">true</param>
<!-- other parameters -->
</operation >
<operation type="UpdateLDAP">
<!-- parameters -->
</operation >
<operation type="DeliverPKCS12">
<!-- parameters -->
</operation >
</profile >
<profile name="P11Request">
<operation type="ArchiveCertificates">
<!-- parameters -->
</operation >
<operation type="MailNotification">
<!-- parameters -->
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</operation >
<operation type="UpdateOCSPBackend">
<!-- parameters -->
</operation >
<operation type="UpdateLDAP">
<param key="host">LDAP URL</param>
<param key="usePoP">true</param>
<!-- other parameters -->
</operation >
</profile >
</host>
Listing 8.1: Virtual host conﬁguration ﬁle
For example there are ﬁve CerMaPs for the P12Request. These will realise the
remaining tasks after the issuance of a certiﬁcate and a corresponding PKCS#12
ﬁle from a CA. Every operation, that denotes a CerMaP, has a set of parame-
ters for conﬁguring this CerMaP. In the case of UpdateLDAP CerMaP the host
and the port where the LDAP server is running can be conﬁgured. In the case
of P11Request the same CerMaP is used, but another parameter (the usePoP)
conﬁgures this CerMaP to use the PoP scheme described in [KLW04a].
Therefore, for one virtual host the type of requests that are supported, the
CerMaPs for each of them as well as speciﬁc parameters for each CerMaP can be
conﬁgured. By replications of these ﬁles many virtual hosts can be supported.
These ﬁles are conﬁgured and adjusted according to the certiﬁcate management
processes of each host.
Similar format for such conﬁguration ﬁles is used in [Pla02]. These conﬁgu-
ration ﬁles are issuer dependent instead of host dependent. Since they are issuer
dependent every instance that issues certiﬁcates or CRLs possesses such a conﬁg-
uration ﬁle. But one virtual host may have more than one issuer. This could be
for example one organisation with a CA that issues certiﬁcates and a revocation
authority that issues CRLs. In this case both conﬁgurations are identical provid-
ing redundancy and diﬃcult management and maintenance of the installation.
These drawbacks are not met in this design.
The situation becomes even more diﬃcult to manage if an organisation issues
cross certiﬁcates among internal CAs (intra-domain cross certiﬁcation). As soon
as the new CA starts to operate, a new conﬁguration ﬁle is created and placed
in the CMA conﬁguration for the certiﬁcate management purposes of this new
CA. Therefore, ﬁrst a unilateral cross certiﬁcation must be performed (the older
CA certiﬁes the new one). Afterwards the CMA is conﬁgured for the new host.
After this step the CMA can start operating for the new CA. This means that
the new CA cannot issue a cross certiﬁcate to the older one (bilateral cross
certiﬁcation) before the CMA is conﬁgured with the new CA. In addition as the
number of cross certiﬁed CAs increases, the number of virtual CAs increases,
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too. The administration of such a procedure is time and resources consuming
and contradicts the idea of ﬂexible certiﬁcate management.
In the design every host has its own conﬁguration ﬁle. This design does
not exclude the possibility of every issuer having its own conﬁguration ﬁle. If
every issuer inside an organisation has diﬀerent operational requirements, then
the CMA can be conﬁgured to operate for this issuer by assuming that it is a
virtual host. In this case a conﬁguration ﬁle for every issuer is present.
8.5 Importers
The input formats that trigger the CMA vary. Diﬀerent certiﬁcate manage-
ment formats exist. We have discussed them in Section 5.2. CMA supports the
PKCS#7 format and the ITP messages. When a PKCS#7 message enters the
CMA, it is imported from the importer responsible for the PKCS#7 format. We
will call this the PKCS7Importer. The case of ITP (ITPImporter) is similar.
The mentioned importers diﬀer. The PKCS7Importer is able to verify signa-
tures based on the PKCS#7 format, understand ASN.1 structures, and deserial-
ize Java objects. The ITPImporter is able to verify XML signatures, understand
and parse XML, and extract XML data. However they both implement the same
process. That is to import a certiﬁcate management message, check whether it
is valid, and export an ITP message that is used as the input to the CerMaPs.
In addition the importing mechanism is able to be extended. This is because
other formats exist (like CMP, which is rarely used however), existing formats
may be updated (for example ITP v2.0), and new protocols may appear.
In order to meet all these requirement we use the strategy design pattern
for the importers of the CMA. For more on this design pattern see [GHJV95,
Chap. 5] and [Met02, Chap. 23]. In Figure 8.4 the class diagram of the importing
part of the CMA can be found. This design allows the CMAImporter interface
to declare which methods must be implemented from each importer (since they
must implement the same process). The subordinate classes oﬀer the concrete
implementation. For every mechanism a class is needed. When new mechanisms
appear only a new class needs to be implemented.
One alternative is that every virtual host has its own importer. But then the
number of importers is increasing with the number of hosts. Every importer is
working independently trying to import a message headed for the corresponding
host. The drawback of this approach is in the case of a message containing
requests for more than one host. In order to import such requests complicated
logic is implemented. Moreover, the importing of requests is a process of the CMA
rather than of the various hosts. The approach of one importer for each message
format, that imports all requests for all hosts, does not have these drawbacks.
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Figure 8.4: Class diagram for the importers
8.6 Low Level Description
In this Section we describe the functioning of the CMA in a lower level. We
discuss the design and the classes that implement the functions of the CMA.
The CMA starts as a daemon. The class CMA is responsible for this. This
class possesses the init method for realising the initialisation tasks of the CMA.
In the initialisation phase the conﬁguration of the CMA is read. A helper class for
this purpose is the XMLConﬁgurationParser. This class reads the conﬁguration
ﬁle of the CMA. This ﬁle is in XML format. Also logging is initiated. The class
Logger resolves the logging. When initialisation is done the CMA starts by calling
the start method. From this moment the CMA is ready to deliver its services.
While the CMA runs it listens for incoming requests in order to further process
them. This is done by two importers. The ﬁrst one is the ITPImporter. It is
responsible for importing ITP messages. The second one is the PKCS7Importer.
It is assigned the task of importing PKCS#7 encoded requests. Both classes
implement the CMAImporter interface. When a request is imported by one of
the importers it is veriﬁed for its validity.
All requests that reach the CMA are signed from the PKI component that has
created the request. In order to verify the signature the CertiﬁcateValidator class
is used. There are two ways to create objects of this class. Either by providing
a ﬁlesystem directory on which all trusted certiﬁcates are found, or by setting
one KeyStore that contains all trusted certiﬁcates. Veriﬁcation of the incoming
requests is always performed. The requests are additionally archived by using
the archive method.
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In order to demonstrate the functioning of the CMA we suppose that a
P11Request (see Section 8.1.3) reaches the CMA. It is encoded as an ITP mes-
sage. In this case the ITPImporter imports the request by using the private
method importXMLFile. All data is extracted from the ITP encoded message
and is stored in a Java object of the type Product. The Product is the Java
representation of the ITP message that roams from one plugin to the next one.
It contains useful getters and setters method for the typical PKI products like
certiﬁcates, CRLs, software PSEs, or entity related data. The relevant data for
this request is: the certiﬁcate, the virtual host’s name that has produced the
request, the end user’s data like the email address, and the DN of the entry on
the LDAP server.
The product is written in the database. The responsible class for this task is
the DB. It contains methods for storing and retrieving the ITP message that is
represented as a Product. It further contains methods for storing and retrieving
other PKI objects like certiﬁcates, CRLs, or PSEs (X509Certiﬁcate, X509CRL,
and PFX respectively) from a database.
After all incoming requests have been imported by the CMA the products
are read from the database. Then they are processed according to the workﬂow
conﬁgured for the virtual host that has created the request. The class that holds
information about each virtual host is the Client.3 Each product, depending on
its virtual host and type of request, will be processed diﬀerently. The P11Request
goes through four plugins. The activity diagram of this behaviour for this request
is shown in Figure 8.3.
There are four CerMaPs involved in this request. Each implements the ab-
stract class CMPlugin. The ArchiveCertiﬁcate plugin processes the request. It
extracts the certiﬁcate from the ITP message and stores it in the database by
using the DB class. It further archives it in the ﬁlesystem. For this the standard
Java class FileOutputStream is used.
The MailNotiﬁcation plugin extracts the certiﬁcate from the ITP message. It
further extracts the email address of the certiﬁcate user. This parameter is set
from the RA into the initial request. It then sends an email to the user with the
certiﬁcate attached. The javax.mail Java classes are used for this purpose.4
The UpdateOCSPBackend plugin extracts the certiﬁcate and sends it to the
OCSP server for notifying it for the new certiﬁcate. The class OCSPClient is
used for realising the connection to the OCSP.
The UpdateLDAP plugin extracts the certiﬁcate and publishes it to the entry
of its user on the LDAP server. This parameter is set from the RA. The value of
this parameter is the DN of the entry. The LDAPConnection class is responsible
for realising the publication of the certiﬁcate. The functionality of the class is
3The name Client depicts each virtual host as a client, whom the CMA serves by delivering
certain services.
4Available at http://java.sun.com/products/javamail/ (date of access 14.01.2007).
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discussed in Section 8.7.
8.7 LDAP API for Supporting PKI
The publishing of PKI information is one of the CMA tasks. Depending on the in-
stallation the requirements related to PKI publishing change signiﬁcantly. Com-
pared to the other tasks of the CMA, the publishing tasks are more demanding
because they have to be customised in every installation. This is because diﬀerent
organisations use the directory for diﬀerent reasons. For example in [LKWB05]
the LDAP directories are used for registration and supporting PoP. Moreover,
the LDAP directories can be used for supporting other services like OCSP.
In order to address this situation, we have designed and implemented a li-
brary that realises diverse publishing functions. It is implemented in Java using
the JNDI technology [SUNa]. This library is used by the CMA for publishing
certiﬁcates, CRLs, and other data. It is possible to use diﬀerent authentication
mechanisms and connections secured with SSL. It has been tested with diverse
LDAP servers like OpenLDAP [Ope04], Novell NDS, or the SUN directory server.
It can be used as a general purpose API from diﬀerent trust centers for functions
that are related to LDAP publishing. It can also be used at the side of PKI
clients for retrieving CRLs and certiﬁcates. Therefore it covers almost all aspects
of LDAP based publishing of PKI information. In the following we see what are
the features of this library:
• Authentication:
– Simple Authentication.
– Simple Authentication over SSL/TLS.
– SASL based authentication.
• Secure communication over SSL/TLS.
• Virtual hosting.
• Conﬁgurable schemata.
• Support for organisational procedures that are not related to PKI informa-
tion.
• Support for the PoP scheme and the PSE software delivery scheme. These
schemes are described in [KLW04a].
• Support for registration of PKI users according to the scheme described in
[LKWB05].
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• Supports publication of:
– user and CA certiﬁcates.
– CRLs.
– delta-CRLs.
– ARLs.
– cross certiﬁcates.
• Diﬀerent publication possibilities based on existent entries, creating new
entries based on the certiﬁcate’s DN or according to the serial number
(each certiﬁcate is published in its own entry).
• User administration.
• Veriﬁcation of publication.
• Support for an LDAP based OCSP backend.
• Certiﬁcate removal on revocation.
• Client API for searching, locating, and retrieving certiﬁcates and CRLs.
8.8 Technologies Used
The CMA needs some tools for addressing certain technical requirements. These
requirements are for example the platform independency, the connection to data-
bases or LDAP directories, the logging, or the cryptographic algorithms. We
discuss the technologies that we have used for implementing the CMA.
8.8.1 Java
The CMA is implemented in Java. Java as a programming language oﬀers great
ﬂexibility due to its platform independency. The developed applications can be
run on diﬀerent operating systems without requiring that the code or parts of
it must be changed or be platform speciﬁc. This oﬀers an easy development of
applications. The CMA has been successfully installed and operated on Windows,
Linux, and Solaris operating systems.
Moreover security is a design goal of Java. Security issues are addressed
in Java in various ways. First on the platform itself. There are features like
bytecode veriﬁcation which checks for example type correctness or that no stack
overﬂows or underﬂows occur. Another feature is the secure class loading needed
for example in Java applets. But security in Java has other aspects, too. This is
the support of cryptographic operations.
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There is a framework in Java for supporting cryptographic functions called the
JCA/JCE (Java Cryptography Architecture/Extensions). Within this framework
various cryptographic algorithms can be implemented and be used by diﬀerent
applications. It oﬀers an API for using these algorithms as well as an SPI (service
provider interface) for implementing them. It is ﬂexible enough for allowing an
easy exchange of the cryptographic algorithms. The FlexiProvider implements
various cryptographic functions using the JCA/JCE framework.5 The CMA em-
ploys the FlexiProvider mostly for calculating hash functions and signature veri-
ﬁcations.
Java supports also data and functions related to PKI. It oﬀers classes for rep-
resenting X.509 certiﬁcates, X.509 CRLs, software PSEs in the PKCS#12 format
or in the JKS/JCEKS format. It enables veriﬁcation of certiﬁcates, construction
of certiﬁcation and validation paths, or parsing of CRLs and certiﬁcates for ex-
tracting data among other functions. These features are constantly used by the
CMA.
Moreover, security is addressed in Java on the network security layer by im-
plementing SSL/TLS. This implementation can be used with various protocols
like HTTP or LDAP. In addition Java oﬀers the JAAS (Java Authentication and
Authorization Service) framework for authentication and authorisation purposes.
Apart from the strong support for security services Java supports other im-
portant functions needed by the CMA. One is for example the access to relational
databases. The technology in Java for realising this is the JDBC (Java Database
Connectivity). It oﬀers a ﬂexible method for communicating with diﬀerent data-
bases. Moreover in Section 8.7 we saw that CMA is using the JNDI technology
of Java for accessing LDAP directories. Lastly, since version 1.4 of Java a logging
mechanism is also available that we employ for the logging purposes of the CMA.
Java is also XML aware. It has lots of diﬀerent frameworks for accessing and
parsing XML structures. This is needed for parsing XML ﬁles and being able to
process ITP messages.
8.8.2 XML
The use of XML in the CMA is needed for conﬁguration purposes. All conﬁgu-
ration ﬁles of the CMA are in the XML format. This enables a human readable
format of the conﬁguration which can also be structured in a hierarchical rep-
resentation. The parameters regarding the database access like the host IP, or
the port where the database is running are conﬁguration parameters that are
conﬁgured in such a ﬁle.
XML ﬁles can be processed with comfortable and easy to use editors and
therefore it is easy to create or update such a ﬁle. In addition the XML ﬁles can
5For more information see www.flexiprovider.de (date of access 30.11.2005). This software
is open source and available for download.
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be checked for syntactic correctness using DTD or XML schema. Moreover, the
conﬁguration ﬁles can be signed for providing authenticity and for identifying
changes in the conﬁguration, which may have security consequences. Further-
more, parameters like passwords or other sensitive data can be encrypted using
XML encryption.
The conﬁguration ﬁles for enabling virtual hosting are also in an XML format.
Such a ﬁle can be seen in Listing 8.1.
XML is also used by the CMA for importing ITP messages. The ITP messages
must be parsed, veriﬁed, and processed according to XML. The input requests
of the certiﬁcate management plugins are also ITP messages and therefore XML
is needed in this case, too. XML oﬀers a platform independent portable data
format. This is needed for the communication among various components of a
trust center and the CerMaPs.
8.9 Analysis
We see that the design and implementation of the CMA has met the requirements
listed in Section 4.2.2 as well as that it completes the core tasks assigned to it
that are listed in Section 4.2.3.
Tasks
The tasks of the CMA are realised as certiﬁcate management plugins. Detailed
description of those tasks can be found in Section 8.2. The minimum set of tasks
that the CMA performs has been realised.
Virtual Hosting
This requirement is addressed by the presence of a special conﬁguration ﬁle for
each of the virtual hosts. This ﬁle conﬁgures, independently for each host, which
plugins will be used for realising the certiﬁcate management functions of a host.
Lots of diﬀerent virtual hosts can be operated at the same time. New virtual
hosts can be added or older ones can be removed by this mechanism. In the
Technical University of Darmstadt a trust center with two virtual hosts has been
installed. For more on this installation see Section 10.3.1.
Conﬁgurability
Many of the CMA operating parameters can be conﬁgured. The number of virtual
hosts that the CMA is operating for, the types of request, as well as the necessary
tasks regarding certiﬁcate management are deﬁned as conﬁguration parameters
rather than components integrated in software.
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The number of virtual hosts is deﬁned by a conﬁguration ﬁle for each of them.
Inside this ﬁle the diﬀerent types of request that the CMA is able to process is
also determined. Moreover for each request it is possible to declare the required
steps for its processing. This is done by conﬁguring which certiﬁcate management
plugins are associated with this type of request.
Conﬁgurability of all these properties is important in case the CMA is evalu-
ated (according to CC for example). If the functionality of the CMA is conﬁgured
as described above and if changes are required, then the CMA avoids a new eval-
uation. For example, if a new virtual host is added, then there is no need to
re-evaluate the CMA. In addition if a new evaluation cannot be avoided, the
CMA core programm (the daemon and the organisation of the workﬂow) can be
evaluated once and only the new or updated plugins have to be (re)evaluated.
Flexibility
The CMA can be installed in many operating systems. This is due to its Java
based implementation. Java oﬀers platform independency and therefore ﬂexible
integration of the CMA in current operating systems. Moreover, Java provides
other advantages, too, like the JCA/JCE framework. This framework oﬀers
cryptographic services in a ﬂexible way since the same API can be used for
diﬀerent cryptographic algorithms.
The tasks and services of the CMA can be extended using the ﬂexible mech-
anism of the certiﬁcate management plugins. These plugins can be added, re-
moved, or updated for realising new functionality. This functionality will be
provided in the appropriate methods of every subclass, enabling an easy and
modular implementation of the plugins.
Moreover the plugin mechanism allows easy and ﬂexible integration of the
CMA to existent processes. The plugins should be implemented in a way that
ﬁts the current practice in an organisation. The beneﬁt of this is that the CMA
and the PKI will be not considered a new process but just an extension to the
current practice in an organisation. A good example of such integration is the
PKI installed at the Technical University of Darmstadt. We provide more details
in Section 10.3.1.
Scalability
The CMA design addresses the scalability problem by supporting distribution
of the tasks. This is due to the plugin design and the ITP messages. In order
to fully process a request, this is processed by various certiﬁcate management
plugins. These can be distributed among various resources. Diverse techniques
can be used for distributing the tasks like multi-threading, and network based
distributing techniques like RMI, CORBA, and Jini.
The messages exchanged among the distributed services are ITP messages.
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This format is portable among platforms and programming languages. Applica-
tions that are aware of this format can process such messages. This allows the
distributed services to be implemented independent of any speciﬁc technology
providing therefore a variety of possible implementations.
Availability
The availability of the CMA is achieved through data persistence and distrib-
utability. As soon as a request is imported it is stored in the database. Addition-
ally, it is archived in the ﬁlesystem. Therefore requests will be always available.
After being stored in the database the request is forwarded to the ﬁrst certiﬁcate
management plugin and after that it is stored again in the database. In case
of failure (for example the CMA application is stopped), the request remains in
the database and it can be further processed when the application starts over.
Alternatively, a second application may process the request if the services of the
CMA are distributed.
Standards Conformity
The CMA conforms to the PKIX speciﬁcations as far as certiﬁcates and CRLs
concerning [HPFS02]. It can only process such types of product on behalf of
an issuer. It further processes known formats of messages like the PKCS#7 for
certiﬁcate management purposes or PKCS#12 as a personal security environ-
ment. It further conforms to other speciﬁcations like the ISIS-MTT [TT] which
provides a proﬁle for certiﬁcates, CRLs, and PKI services. This speciﬁcation is
used mostly in Germany. Moreover, it uses standard techniques for publishing
certiﬁcates and CRLs on LDAP directories. The LDAP based publishing has
been already described in Section 6.2.
Security
The security of the CMA as a design goal of its speciﬁcation will be discussed in
Chapter 9.

Chapter 9
Security of the CMA
The CMA is part of a trust center software which has services like registration,
certiﬁcation, publication, and OCSP among others. It is important to evaluate
the security of the CMA since it is a component of the PKI. This is because for
evaluating the security of the infrastructure both the whole infrastructure and
its components are evaluated.
Security is a design goal for the CMA. If the CMA is secure, then its services
and tasks that support PKI functions are performed as desired. We see which
are the threats to the CMA. We describe its security requirements and security
functions. Further, we provide the design for realising these security functions.
9.1 CMA Security Functions
We present a security analysis for the CMA. In this analysis we describe the
security functions of the CMA. These security functions are properly addressed
and implemented. In one case we brieﬂy show the association of a security func-
tion to the security functional components deﬁned in the second document of the
Common Criteria [Cri05a].
The CMA has diﬀerent tasks in diﬀerent environments. These tasks also
have diﬀerent security requirements. For example, if the CMA is responsible
for issuing indirect CRLs for various issuers, then the creation of the signature
on the CRL sets new security requirements that do not appear when the CMA
is only managing certiﬁcates. In order to evaluate the security of the CMA one
concrete environment and context is chosen. We choose the SigG context because
a security evaluation of the technical components that are used is mandatory in
this context [Leg01b]. Moreover this context has strict requirements. Due to this
choice issues like the activation of certiﬁcates are addressed. Other issues, like
key backup, do not need to be addressed since they never appear in the SigG
context.
CMA has the lowest security requirements of all other trust center compo-
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nents. This is due to the CMA nature, that it is to process already signed
products. Therefore, attacks like existential forgery or unauthorised use of sig-
nature private keys do not threaten it and they are not addressed at all at the
security analysis.
We present the attackers and the threats of the CMA. We see its security
functions that protect it against these threats. We discuss the CMA modular
design for realising these functions. Parts of the description of the threats and
security functions are extracted from [Kar03] and [LLR+03].
9.1.1 Attackers and Threats
There are various attackers for the CMA. The ﬁrst group of attackers belongs
to the authorised users of the CMA. These are the CMA operators, the CMA
administrators, and the system administrators. They CMA operators are allowed
to start and stop the CMA. The CMA administrators are responsible for admin-
istrative tasks regarding the CMA (for example for evaluating the log ﬁles). The
system administrators are responsible for administrating the machines on which
the CMA runs or for conﬁguring its network connections. The second group of
attackers is the unauthorised users of the CMA. These are all the users that are
in no way authorised to interact with the CMA. The attackers perform attacks
intentionally or unintentionally.
The attackers pose diﬀerent threats to the CMA. These threats are listed
below. Threats related to the environment of the CMA (for example infection by
a virus) cannot be addressed by the CMA itself and therefore they are not listed.
Data Manipulation and Disclosure
The relevant to the CMA data is the data that reach the CMA and the data that
it processes. Such data is for example a certiﬁcate or a certiﬁcate revocation list.
This data can be manipulated. In this case the CMA processes invalid data.
For example it can publish an older CRL or notify the OCSP server with a wrong
certiﬁcate.
The data can be disclosed. Such data for example is the activation password
of a user. If this password is disclosed, then it is possible to activate the user’s
certiﬁcate. The passwords that the CMA uses for publishing the certiﬁcates and
the CRLs are also such data.
The security functions DP, IP, TCC, PV, OBP, OIBP, and TCI (see next
Sections) protect the CMA against this family of threats. The security functions
SL, OI, LMF, and LE support the above mentioned security functions.
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Revocation Threats
The revocation of one certiﬁcate may never reach the correct OCSP server. If
this happens then the correct OCSP server will provide wrong answers regarding
the status of a certiﬁcate. Likewise a CRL may never be published on the correct
public directory. Revocation information is in this case wrong.
The security functions DP, IP, TCC, PV, CA, OBP, OIBP, and TCI (see next
Sections) protect the CMA against this family of threats. The security functions
SL, OI, LMF, and LE support the above mentioned security functions.
Activation Threats
One threat for the CMA is to fail to notify the correct OCSP server for a new
certiﬁcate. If this happens the certiﬁcate will not be veriﬁable. Therefore, correct
information about its status cannot be obtained. If the CMA does not publish a
certiﬁcate on the correct public directory then a certiﬁcate will not be available
and cannot be used for verifying signatures.
An additional threat is to publish a certiﬁcate on the public directory and
make it available, although this certiﬁcate is only veriﬁable.
The security functions DP, IP, TCC, PV, CA, OBP, OIBP, and TCI (see next
Sections) protect the CMA against this family of threats. The security functions
SL, OI, LMF, and LE support the above mentioned security functions.
9.1.2 Data Protection (DP)
The data that is found in external resources like a database or a directory are
protected against manipulation. This will protect the data itself as well as other
operations or processes that rely on their integrity. These will prevent attacks
like the deleting of a CRL or its replacement for an older one in the directory.
For achieving this, only authorised users are able to establish a connection
to the database used in the system as a backend. Likewise, only authorised
users are able to modify and write data on the directory.1 Therefore, some
data is protected for conﬁdentiality. This is especially the passwords used for
authentication purposes. These could be the password for a directory user that
has write access to the directory or the password of a database user who is allowed
to connect to the database.
9.1.3 Input Protection (IP)
The data that is transported to the CMA are protected for integrity and authen-
ticity. This data can be the certiﬁcates and the CRLs that come from another
1The PKI clients on the contrary can search or read data. This is important for locating
certiﬁcates or CRLs and getting status information. This data will be used during a signature
veriﬁcation.
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trust center component, usually the CA. If this data is not protected or their pro-
tection fails validation, then the CMA does not process them. This will prevent
that the CMA processes invalid data.
9.1.4 Trusted Communication Channel to the Directory
(TCC)
A trusted channel is established between the CMA and the external publishing
directories like LDAP. This is a requirement for the secure transport of data like
certiﬁcates and CRLs. These could not then, for example, be substituted during
transport. The integrity and authenticity of this communication is important
and if this fails to be established the communication is aborted.
9.1.5 Publishing Veriﬁcation (PV)
The publishing of information to a directory external to the CMA, like the LDAP
directories used for publishing PKI information, is veriﬁed for success. This means
that when for example a certiﬁcate is published to the directory, the CMA checks
whether the published certiﬁcate is identical to the one that the CMA tried to
publish. This is performed also for other data like certiﬁcate revocation lists. If
an unsuccessful operation is detected, then appropriate messages are created that
will signalise this.
For this security function we provide a further analysis based on the original
CC security functional components. This security function addresses and ful-
ﬁls the FDP UIT.1.1 and FDP UIT.1.2 [Cri05a, Sec. 11.13]. The FDP UIT.1.1
suggests that user data during transmission or receival is protected from modiﬁ-
cation, deletion, insertion, or replay. If nevertheless such an action takes place,
FDP UIT.1.2 suggests that this has to be detected. These components have also
dependencies to other components. These are the FDP ACC.1 or FDP IFC.1
and the FTP ITC.1 or FTP TRP.1. These are also addressed for a complete
evaluation. FDP ACC.1 is fulﬁlled by the OBP, OIBP, and TCI (see Sections
9.1.7, 9.1.8, and 9.1.9). FTP TRP.1 is fulﬁlled from CA (Certiﬁcate Activation,
see Section 9.1.6).
9.1.6 Certiﬁcate Activation (CA)
When a certiﬁcate is activated, this becomes immediately veriﬁable (see Section
6.3). For making a certiﬁcate veriﬁable an OCSP server is used and therefore it is
notiﬁed about the new certiﬁcate. The notiﬁcation is done via a trusted channel
and the correctness of this operation is examined.
A certiﬁcate is published for becoming available (see Section 6.3) only after an
activation and only if it is already veriﬁable. Then, it is published on a directory
like LDAP. This is performed over a trusted channel. It is checked whether the
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publication was successful or not. That is, it is examined whether the correct
certiﬁcate has been published and is available for standard PKI clients.
9.1.7 OCSP Backend Protection (OBP)
The backend of the OCSP is a directory. From this trusted directory the OCSP
gets all the information it needs in order to give signed answers to certiﬁcate status
queries. Therefore this information is protected. Otherwise, the answers of the
OCSP server may be wrong (if certiﬁcates or CRLs are deleted for example).
The connection to the directory is performed over a trusted channel. For
providing answers to client queries, the OCSP server checks the directory for
determining whether a certiﬁcate has been issued or not. In addition, it checks
the directory for deciding whether a certiﬁcate is revoked or not from the most
recent CRL. The status of the data is continuous, therefore only new information
may be added to the directory. For example new certiﬁcates can be stored but
it is not allowed to delete any certiﬁcates. Likewise, newer CRLs that substitute
the older ones contain all previously revoked certiﬁcates.
9.1.8 Other Instances Backend Protection (OIBP)
Other instances may need data located in a directory in order to perform their
services and tasks. Such instance for example is a revocation authority. In this
case the access of data from the directory is performed over a trusted channel.
The status of the data is continuous. The correct and secure functioning of the
various instances will be achieved by protecting the data on the directory.
9.1.9 Trusted Channel Input (TCI)
The input data that trigger the CMA is delivered over a trusted channel. Only
if such a channel exists the CMA accepts this data and processes them further.
Thus, the CMA never processes data from a source that is not trusted. Such
a source could compromise the CMA. Depending on the kind of data diﬀerent
actions are performed.
CRLs are published as soon as they become available to the CMA without
any delay. It is checked whether their publication was successful or not. This
includes both the updating of the OCSP backend and that of the external publish-
ing directories. Therefore, clients are provided with the most recent revocation
information. All of the above is performed over a trusted channel. The activation
of certiﬁcates is done over a trusted channel, too. After activation all certiﬁcates
become veriﬁable and some of them available. The information regarding the
availability of a certiﬁcate is also protected.
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9.1.10 Start of Logging (SL)
When CMA starts up, logging is initiated. It is not possible to operate without
the logging mechanism. This means that if the CMA is unable to log it terminates
and if the CMA runs it is able to log. This will ensure the monitoring and auditing
of the application.
9.1.11 Operators Identiﬁcation (OI)
The identities of the operators that start the CMA are logged. In addition,
both the successful and the unsuccessful trials to authenticate as an operator
and start the system are logged. The CMA veriﬁes the identities of the operators
and checks their authorisation. Only authorised operators are allowed to start the
CMA. Therefore, the CMA cannot be started and provide services if unauthorised
persons want to use it.
9.1.12 Log Messages Format (LMF)
For achieving auditing and monitoring, all log messages have a special format.
A special process identity (PID) is given to the CMA. This is logged with every
message. Other information that is logged is the date and time of an event,
and the identity of the operators. In addition, the type of the event is logged.
This means that a statement whether the message is for example informational,
warning, or fatal is present. Lastly, the success or failure of this event is also
logged.
9.1.13 Loggable Events (LE)
There is a family of events that are logged. All these events are logged with the
appropriate format. For example in the case of publishing to the directory it
is logged that the CMA tries to publish a certiﬁcate to the directory as well as
whether this publication was successful or not. Thereby monitoring and auditing
of the application is enabled.
9.2 CMA Modules
In order to eﬀectively evaluate the security of the CMA, it is divided into modular
parts. This is also a requirement from the Common Criteria methodology, for
the low level description of a component [Cri05b, Sec. 15.5]. These modular parts
may or may not be used for enforcing security functions. The CMA is divided
into eight modules. These are the:
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1. Daemon The Daemon is the software daemon of the CMA. It starts and
stops the CMA. It also organises the workﬂow of the requests that the CMA
processes.
2. Importer The Importer imports the input ﬁles that trigger the CMA. These
are created by the CA. It reads them from the ﬁlesystem, veriﬁes the sig-
nature calculated over this data and extracts all necessary information.
3. Product Delivery This module delivers the products of a CA. Such products
are the certiﬁcates and the revocation lists. In case other products exist
this module is also responsible for delivering them.
4. Directory This module resolves the necessary communication with a direc-
tory which is an LDAP server. This module can be used by various trust
center components for realising their required functions that are related to
LDAP.
5. OCSP Client This client sends special queries to an OCSP server in order
to update its internal store with new certiﬁcates or new revocation infor-
mation.
6. RA Communicator This module resolves the communication with an RA.
There are diﬀerent possibilities for realising this communication depending
on the installation. These could be direct messages over a network like
HTTP requests, or communication over a database, an LDAP directory, or
the ﬁlesystem.
7. Pass Sharing This module is responsible for retrieving shared secrets. These
secrets are shared among two or more participants. In a trust center instal-
lation these could be the administrators or the operators of the software.
A secret could be a password for accessing certain resources (like an LDAP
server or a relational database). Since a secret is shared, it is more diﬃcult
to extract it because at least two persons must collude. Therefore dual
control is enabled.
8. Logger The Logger is responsible for logging all events and necessary data
to the ﬁlesystem.
9.3 Security Design
9.3.1 Daemon
While the Daemon runs the logging is enabled. This is to meet SL. As soon as
the daemon starts up it tries to write some information into the appropriate log
ﬁle. If this is not possible the Java virtual machine (JVM) exits. Otherwise the
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Daemon continues with its start up phase. The Logger supports this function
and the Daemon is using this module.
Immediately after logging is enabled the Daemon requires that two operators
decrypt the secrets that are needed for the correct functioning of the application.
These are the passwords for connecting to the directory or the database. These
secrets are stored encrypted and they cannot be disclosed without possession
of the private keys involved in the secret sharing process. These passwords are
known only to the CMA which can connect to the external sources that require
the password based authentication. This meets DP. The decryption based on
secret sharing is supported by the Pass Sharing module.
If the connection to the database is possible, this means that the password
has been successfully decrypted. From this we can derive that the operators
have successfully provided their own secrets (like password, or PIN, or biometric
characteristics) and the logging of their identities is possible. If the connection to
the database is impossible due to bad credentials, this means that decryption was
wrong and therefore no trusted operators are found. Thereby OI is supported.
Furthermore, as long as the Daemon runs logging is enabled. When the
application starts, the logging starts also. During the time the application runs,
all loggable events can be logged. If this is impossible the application exits.
Thus, LE is supported. This module is using the Logger module for realising
these functions.
All messages have a special format as this is required by LMF. This will there-
fore meet LMF. The special format is supported by the Logger. The identities of
the operators are provided by the Pass Sharing module and are logged, too.
9.3.2 Importer
The Importer reads ﬁles that are placed in a ﬁlesystem directory. These ﬁles
conform either to the PKCS#7 or ITP format. All data from the CA is placed in
a PKCS#7 container or an ITP message and is protected with a digital signature.
The certiﬁcate that is used to verify the signature is a known trusted certiﬁcate
to the CMA. If the signature is invalid this data is discarded, it is not further
processed and a special alarm message is given. The CMA supports therefore the
TCI and IP.
If the signature over the data is valid, the Importer extracts it. This data is
serializable Java objects or XML data. From these objects other data is extracted
like certiﬁcates or CRLs.
In the following cases the CMA does not process the ﬁles: a correct ﬁle is
placed in a wrong directory. A wrong ﬁle, which does not conform to one of the
expected formats, is placed in the correct directory. A correct ﬁle is placed in the
correct directory but the signature is invalid.
For the importing procedures logging is enabled for supporting LE.
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9.3.3 Product Delivery
Product Delivery writes the CA products on the disc. These are the certiﬁcates,
CRLs, and other products that the CA produces. The attempt to write a product
on the disc and the result of this attempt are logged. LE is supported.
9.3.4 Directory
The Directory module realises all necessary interfaces and connections to a di-
rectory. It is divided into two submodules. The Authorised and the Anonymous.
The Authorised module is responsible for connecting to the directory with per-
mission to alter its content. This means that this module has write access. The
Anonymous module is used for connections that are not allowed to change the di-
rectory’s content, namely it has only read access. In both modules all connections
are secured with SSL. Thereby CA, OBP, OIBP, TCI, and TCC is supported.
Both the server and the client require that an SSL secure connection is estab-
lished between them. Failing to establish such a connection results to special
log messages (LE) and termination of the CMA operation. At a minimum the
directory server authenticates itself using public key techniques.
The Authorised Directory is used exclusively by the CMA since it is the only
component allowed to alter data on the directory. In this module a directory user
is required to authenticate to the directory. There are several authentication
mechanisms to achieve this like password based or SSL client authentication.
All these mechanisms rely on secrets like the password itself or the password
protecting the keys for the client authentication. These secrets are protected as
described in the Pass Sharing module.
The certiﬁcates and CRLs are published on the directory to support TCI.
Publishing of a certiﬁcate takes place only after its activation. The Directory
module publishes the activated certiﬁcate immediately on the directory to make
it veriﬁable (since the directory is used as the OCSP backend). This is to support
CA. The correctness of this action is examined through a special request to the
OCSP server. This is described in the OCSP Client module. OBP and TCI
is supported. The RA Communicator provides information about whether the
certiﬁcate will be available or not. If the certiﬁcate must be available, it is
published immediately on a directory that PKI clients can query for information.
This is done only after a successful update of the OCSP server. This supports
TCI and CA. The procedure for the CRL is similar. The diﬀerence is that the
CRL is immediately published without any activation and without distinguishing
between available CRLs or not. All CRLs are available.
The Anonymous Directory is the submodule that is responsible for reading
data from the directory. It is used for checking whether a publication from the
Authorised module has been successful or not. It fetches the newly published
certiﬁcate or CRL from the directory and compares it with the one that the
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Authorised module has published. If they do not match, it provides special
notiﬁcations. Thereby PV is supported. This submodule can be used from any
other instance that uses the same operations. An example for this is an OCSP
server that uses a directory as its backend. It can use the existing functions of
this submodule to get data from the directory.
9.3.5 OCSP Client
The OCSP Client sends special requests to a standard OCSP server for informing
it for new certiﬁcates or revocations. After a certiﬁcate is activated this becomes
immediately veriﬁable. An OCSP server is used for this purpose. For providing
the server with the new information, the OCSP Client sends a query to the
OCSP server that contains the activated certiﬁcate. Upon this request the server
searches the backend for this certiﬁcate. If the certiﬁcate is found, it becomes a
known certiﬁcate to the server. It then answers back to the OCSP Client. If the
server’s answer is ”good” it denotes that the OCSP server has been successfully
updated with the new information. In the case of CRL the query is about the
last revoked certiﬁcate. The expected answer is ”revoked”. The result of these
actions is logged by the Daemon (LE). With the above OBP and TCI is met.
9.3.6 RA Communicator
The RA Communicator is responsible for providing the activation of certiﬁcates.
A special message is sent from the RA signalising which certiﬁcate is activated.
The RA Communicator accepts this message and initiates the remaining tasks
that are performed with the certiﬁcate. These are to enable the certiﬁcate to be
veriﬁable and if it is desired also available. If the initiation does not take place
this is logged (LE). This behaviour meets the CA. The messages from the RA
are sent in a PKCS#7 or ITP format and they are protected for authenticity and
integrity in order to meet TCI.
9.3.7 Pass Sharing
The Pass Sharing module uses the secret sharing technique proposed by Shamir
[Sha79]. Particularly it uses a (k, n) threshold scheme. In this scheme at least k
participants are required in order to reveal a secret. These participants are the
operators.
The passwords of the directory and the database that the CMA is using are
shared. The operators decrypt their shared secrets, in order to retrieve the pass-
words. The private keys and the corresponding certiﬁcates are located in a smart
card. From these certiﬁcates the identities of the operators will be extracted.
The passwords and identities are forwarded to the CMA. Thereby DP, OI, and
LMF is met.
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The Pass Sharing module is based on another module that is provided as an
external library. The security properties of this library is also addressed in a
similar approach as this of the CMA.
9.3.8 Logger
The Logger is logging events in a log ﬁle. These events are logged sequentially.
If at any point logging is impossible the Logger stops the application that uses
it. This also happens if the log ﬁle is deleted. Thus, SL is met. This module is
required for logging an event, in a special format, and with the identity of the
operators present. Therefore it supports OI, LMF, and LE.
9.3.9 Overview
In Table 9.1 we see an overview of the security functions of the CMA and which
of its modules enforces them.
Security Function Enforcing Module(s)
DP Daemon, Pass Sharing
IP Importer
TCC Directory
PV Directory
CA Directory, RA Communicator
OBP Directory, OCSP Client
OIBP Directory
TCI Directory, Importer, RA Communicator, OCSP Client
SL Daemon, Logger
OI Daemon, Logger, Pass Sharing
LMF Daemon, Logger, Pass Sharing
LE
Daemon, Logger, Product Delivery, Importer, RA
Communicator, Directory, OCSP Client
Table 9.1: SF enforcing modules

Chapter 10
CMA in a PKI Environment
The CMA oﬀers solutions to the certiﬁcate management problems in a PKI. This
authority is only a part of the whole PKI. We see its interaction with the other
trust center components and its role inside the PKI. This Chapter shows the use
of CMA in the PKI environment and examines its integration into it.
The CMA has already been used in many PKI installations. It is part of a
trust center software called FlexiTrust. We introduce the FlexiTrust software.
We see which are the goals of this software and present its architecture. We
allocate the tasks of a trust center among the various components. We visit
existent projects in which the software has been installed and see what are the
services of the CMA in the PKI installed at the University of Darmstadt
10.1 FlexiTrust
FlexiTrust is a ﬂexible trust center software developed at the Technical Univer-
sity of Darmstadt (TUD). Up to now there are several installations of FlexiTrust.
Most prominent among them is the one at the German national root CA. Using
the FlexiTrust software the root CA certiﬁcates as well as accredited certiﬁcates
for certiﬁcation service providers (CSP) are issued. FlexiTrust has been success-
fully evaluated in November 2003 according to CC. This was the version 3.0 of
the software. It fulﬁls the SigG and SigV requirements [Zer03]. For more on this
evaluation process see [WLK+05].
The goal of FlexiTrust is to achieve ﬂexibility. This has two aspects. The ﬁrst
one is the ﬂexibility of the cryptographic primitives. The underlying algorithms
that are used can be easily exchanged following the newest developments in cryp-
tography and cryptanalysis. The second one is ﬂexibility in the installation. This
regards the software itself which is not diﬃcult to install across diﬀerent plat-
forms. Moreover the integration in existent and already established workﬂows in
an organisation is possible. In addition, if new developments are necessary, then
their integration in FlexiTrust is easily achieved. The major eﬀort therefore is
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to implement the new features and not their integration in the software. Lastly,
FlexiTrust is easy to operate. A rather complex installation at the TUD required
less than a day training for the operators of the trust center. In Section 10.3.1
we will see in more details what are the tasks of the CMA in this installation.
10.1.1 The RA-KA-CMA model
FlexiTrust consists of three entities. The RA, the Key Authority (KA), and the
CMA. A forth PKI entity is the end-entity. This does not resemble the design
of a typical PKI as we saw it in Section 3.2.7. Reasoning for the presence of a
KA is found in [WLK04]. The design and technical realisation of this authority
is discussed in [WKLB05]. We have already seen which considerations and needs
are present for the CMA.
This design has been proven in practice to have very good properties. Firstly,
it addresses the three main diﬀerent tasks of a trust center. That is the registra-
tion, certiﬁcation with optional key generation, and certiﬁcate workﬂow manage-
ment. Secondly, it is modular enough to enable an easy installation. For example
the RA can be installed in a diﬀerent computer than the KA. Thirdly, it provides
security enhancements by enabling the KA to be oﬄine.
In Figure 10.1 the design of the whole FlexiTrust infrastructure can be seen.
The RA, KA, and CMA are inside the trust center. Messages can be exchanged
between them (for example with ITP or PKCS#7). Under these components the
cryptographic provider is found. This is the FlexiProvider. It is based on the
JCA/JCE technology of Java and provides implementations of diﬀerent cryp-
tosystems. This is the basis for the ﬂexibility of FlexiTrust in exchanging the
cryptographic primitives.
10.2 Task Allocation
10.2.1 Registration Authority
The registration is located at the RA. It is the entrance of the end-entities to
the trust center. The RA is responsible for verifying the data of the entity and
initiating a request to the KA.
This request to the KA is digitally signed for providing authenticity of the
data. The format that is used for this purpose is the PKCS#7 and ITP. Addi-
tionally, some data may be encrypted. In other cases it may just be obfuscated.
An obfuscation example is the hash of a password. The password cannot be re-
trieved from the hash value, but it can be checked against it. This is done by
hashing the password and comparing the two values.
There are various ways to collect registration data in the RA. One is by the
physical presence of a human entity or a representative for technical entities (for
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Figure 10.1: The FlexiTrust architecture
example the machine administrator). The collected data is checked for validity.
After that a form is ﬁlled with this data. This is a web based form in the
FlexiTrust RA. Another way is to use existent data from a secure store. Such a
registration procedure, that reads data from an LDAP directory for registering
the entities, is described in [LKWB05].
The set of collected data in the RA is important for the further functioning
of a certiﬁcation or revocation request. The DN of the owner of the certiﬁcate
is determined in the RA. This is not done in the KA because it is accessible
only to the trust center operators. Also, in case the end-entity already possesses
a key pair, the public key of the end-entity is delivered to the RA that further
delivers this to the KA. Other data that needs to be collected is the issuer of
the certiﬁcate. The KA does not know which issuer should issue a certiﬁcate.
Therefore, the RA deﬁnes the issuer or virtual host for whom the certiﬁcation
or revocation request is addressed. In case of revocation the RA also sends the
serial number of the certiﬁcate that must be revoked from the KA.
The RA also makes some recommendations for parts of the data. Such data
is special extensions in the certiﬁcate or CRL. Depending on the KA policy and
certiﬁcate proﬁle the KA may choose to accept or reject the recommendations.
For example the RA may propose to set the keyUsage extension for the public
key to encryption and digital signature. But the KA may decide to remove the
encryption option if it is not possible to perform any key backup or realise another
mechanism (like encryption of the certiﬁcate).
Another example is the validity period of the certiﬁcate. While the RA may
propose that the certiﬁcate should be valid from the moment the data is collected,
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the KA may decide to set the notBefore date of the certiﬁcate exactly at the time
of the signature creation. In another case, if the RA proposes that a certiﬁcate
should be valid for a certain period of time, the KA may alter this time. If a
certiﬁcation request reaches the KA with a proposal for a validity period of one
year, but the CA certiﬁcate is valid only for the next three months, the KA may
decide to limit the notAfter date of the certiﬁcate to the notAfter date of the CA
certiﬁcate. That is to ignore the one year proposal and alter it to three months.
The rules about the processing of the products are described in the policy of the
KA.
10.2.2 Key Authority
The KA is responsible for the certiﬁcation, revocation, and generation of key
pairs. It is triggered by a signed request coming from the RA. It ﬁrst veriﬁes the
signature on the request. If the request is authentic (it comes from a known RA)
it extracts the necessary data in order to perform a certiﬁcation or a revocation.
This depends on the type of request.
The KA then chooses the correct issuer for signing the certiﬁcates or CRLs.
This is speciﬁed by the RA. Depending on the policy of the KA the contents of
the certiﬁcate may diﬀer from the ones proposed by the RA. The main task of
the KA is to sign certiﬁcates and CRLs. In addition it produces key pairs and
stores them in a PSE. The security of those processes is very important. For this
reason the KA is usually oﬄine.
The keys of the issuer are carefully protected in the KA. If these keys are
compromised then an attacker may produce certiﬁcates in the name of this issuer.
The keys may be found in hardware based PSEs. These are usually either HSMs
or smart cards. In other cases they may also be stored in software for more
ﬂexibility and less costs. In both cases the passwords or PINs used for protecting
the token may be shared among users. This is necessary if dual control is a
requirement. In many cases the KA is also physically oﬄine. This means that
there is no network connection to the KA computer. The consequence of this is
that the requests are transferred to and from the KA with an oﬄine transport
medium (like a CD, or a ﬂoppy disc, or a USB device).
When the KA has processed a request, it stores all information in a new
request that is headed towards the CMA. This request contains new certiﬁcates,
CRLs, PSEs, and data related to them.
10.2.3 Certiﬁcate Management Authority
The CMA receives requests from issuers like the KA. When a known issuer sends
a request, this is processed according to the workﬂow deﬁned for this issuer. First,
the CMA veriﬁes the authenticity of the request. It then extracts the information
about the issuer. Afterwards it performs all necessary and predeﬁned processing
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steps. This is the delivery of certiﬁcates and PSEs, publishing of the information
on a public server, mail notiﬁcations to the users, and other tasks. The details of
the CMA tasks have been discussed in Chapter 8. In Section 10.3.1 we will see
the concrete tasks of the CMA in a PKI installation at the TUD.
10.2.4 Overview
In Table 10.1 we see a list of tasks in a trust center and the component that
realises them. This list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. Some of them
are implemented in the one or the other component. In other cases one task is
performed by more than one component.
Task RA KA CMA
Registration •
Data Collection •
Identiﬁcation •
Set Issuer •
Set Subject DN •
Set Validity • •
Set Extensions • •
Sign Certiﬁcate •
Sign CRL •
Publish PKI Information •
Mail Notiﬁcations •
Deliver PSEs •
Archiving • •
OCSP Backend •
CRL Renewal Notiﬁcation • •
Table 10.1: Task allocation overview
This trust center conﬁguration enables a clear separation of the tasks that
every component has to perform. Therefore, these tasks have been optimised for
eﬃciency and security in each component. Moreover, the modular design has
enabled us to eﬀectively evaluate the software according to CC. Modularity is
desired for such an evaluation.
This design addresses the central KA conﬁguration. In most cases this KA
is also oﬄine. Therefore identiﬁcation, registration, and data collection are done
in a diﬀerent component that in addition can be easily distributed. This is the
RA or diﬀerent LRAs. They cannot operate as KAs since this is too dangerous.
The keys must be well protected. Storing and protecting the keys may be very
expensive. In addition, the issuer is not usually distributed but it is just one
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instance because one key pair exists. Therefore, the tasks associated with signing
and key generation are assigned to the KA.
The KA has extra security mechanisms enabled. It is one authority with
strictly deﬁned tasks that are not subject to frequent changes. This allows a
careful design and auditing as far as the security properties concerning. Moreover,
it is easier to enforce security mechanisms in one central instance. This applies
to the implementation and organisational issues related to its installation.
The role of CMA in the trust center is to manage and administer the PKI
products like certiﬁcates and CRLs for diﬀerent issuers. It has diﬀerent mech-
anisms for supporting core PKI services like dissemination of the information,
delivery, or archiving. It enables diﬀerent business logic and PKI information
workﬂows. It can operate for more than one issuer and thus it can globally
deliver its services to many PKI environments.
The virtual hosting design is found in all FlexiTrust components. In each
of them it is realised with a diﬀerent mechanism. This is due to the diﬀerent
requirements and design criteria of every component. It is a very ﬂexible design
principle, since it enables one installation to function for many issuers. This has
great organisational and ﬁnancial advantages. New issuers can be easily plugged
in, with tasks that can be customised according to their business logic.
10.3 Current CMA Installations
FlexiTrust has already been installed as a trust center for supporting PKI in many
diﬀerent organisations and companies. Especially the CMA has delivered special
services for each installation in order to support diﬀerent business logic and infor-
mation workﬂow. We will see some of those installations and the solutions that
the CMA provides in the TUD PKI.
10.3.1 TU Darmstadt PKI
In the Technical University of Darmstadt a PKI has been installed. The purpose
of this PKI is to provide all students of the university with a smart card containing
a certiﬁcate and a key pair in order to use diﬀerent applications. Some of them
are: signing up for the examinations, courses enrolment, secure download of the
lecture notes, secure connection through VPN, Windows Logon, secure email, and
other. Parallel to this, the servers (web, email, etc.) of the university also receive
a certiﬁcate in order to be able to use TLS. For realising the above mentioned
tasks two virtual CAs are hosted in the computer center of the university.
Figure 10.2 shows the CA hierarchy. The root CA is the DFN-CA.1 This
is operated from the German research net, a well known and acknowledged or-
ganisation in Germany. It is responsible for connecting diﬀerent universities in
1DFN stands for Deutsche Forschungsnetz.
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Germany. This CA has cross-certiﬁed the TUD CA. This is a unilateral, inter-
domain cross certiﬁcate. The TUD CA is responsible for issuing cross certiﬁcates
for other CAs in the university. There are two subordinate CAs. The ﬁrst one
is the CCA (Chipcard CA) and the second one is the SCA (Server CA). These
certiﬁcates are unilateral, intra-domain cross certiﬁcates.
DFN-CA
TUD-CA
TUD-CCA TUD-SCA
Figure 10.2: The TUD CA hierarchy
The CCA is the responsible CA for issuing the certiﬁcates to the students.
All corresponding keys are located inside a smart card and they are created by
the card distributor. The SCA is responsible for issuing the certiﬁcates to the
university’s servers. The keys can be located in software and they are created
from the administrators of the servers.
We see which challenges the CMA has met in this project, its speciﬁcation,
and how it has realised the special business logic and workﬂow required.
One requirement is the virtual hosting. Two diﬀerent CAs coexist in the
system. These are the CCA and the SCA. The system is able to accept more
CAs.2 The two CAs have diﬀerent processes and therefore conﬁgurations. We see
the details of each conﬁguration. Another requirement is the integration of the
software in existent workﬂows. Since the entire user management of the univer-
sity is based on an LDAP directory, the CMA supports the already established
processes.
From the server CA only servers of the university are certiﬁed. The machine
administrator creates keys for a server, sends a signed PKCS#10 request to the
RA oﬃce, and receives the certiﬁcate per email or physical presence. The delivery
2For example a CA that certiﬁes keys that the students create themselves or a CA for the
university employees.
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does not need to be done automatically since the numbers of the certiﬁcates issued
is relatively small (30-40 certiﬁcates per year). The trust center administrator
extracts the certiﬁcate and delivers it to the server administrator. For the SCA
issuer two types of request exist. One is a certiﬁcation request (without key
creation) and revocation. The tasks of the CMA for this virtual CA are listed
below with a small description where this is necessary.
1. Extract and archive certiﬁcates.
2. Notify the trust center administrator in case of failure.
3. Send mail notiﬁcations in case of revocation.
Sends an email to the responsible administrator of the server whose certiﬁ-
cate has been successfully revoked. A variety of information is contained in
the email like the name of the server and the serial number of the certiﬁcate.
4. Publish LDAP information.
(a) Secure communication with SSL.
(b) Publish CRLs in a deﬁned DN on the LDAP. This is part of the CMA
conﬁguration.
(c) Remove the complete entry from the directory in case of revocation.
That is to meet special administrative procedures in the computer
center of the university.
(d) Publish the certiﬁcate in a deﬁned DN on the LDAP. This information
is communicated to the CMA by the RA.
(e) Remove any older information on the entry before publishing a certiﬁ-
cate.
(f) Publish the certiﬁcate with some meta-data like the serial number, the
validity period, etc.
(g) Organise the data on the directory similar to the scheme described in
[LKWB05] for supporting revocation and other administrative tasks.
The Chipcard CA (CCA) issues certiﬁcates only to the students of the uni-
versity. The key pair is located in a smart card. This smart card is sent to the
students by post. A key pair is found in the card when it reaches the students.
This has been created by the card distributor. The card distributor delivers all
necessary data of the cards to the university computer center. Speciﬁcally a map-
ping between the serial number of the card and the public key located in the card
is needed. The computer center knows which students received which card and
therefore it can assign the correct public key to the correct student. This data is
stored in an LDAP directory. The scheme is described in details in [LKWB05].
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Moreover, a proof-of-possession is required when the students try to download
their certiﬁcate, after receiving their card. This scheme is described in [KLW04a].
The application that helps the students to download their certiﬁcates is called
the Card Manager and it has been developed in the TUD.3
The number of certiﬁcates issued is about 20.000 every year. During the initial
registration of all students more than 4.000 requests were processed by the trust
center in a working day. For this virtually hosted CA, the duties of the CMA are
the following.
1. Extract and archive certiﬁcates.
2. Notify the trust center administrator in case of failure.
3. Send mail notiﬁcations for a successful certiﬁcation.
Sends an email to the students (at their university email address). This
notiﬁes them that the certiﬁcate is ready to be downloaded. After that
notiﬁcation, the students can use the Card Manager in order to download
their certiﬁcate in the card.
4. Send mail notiﬁcations in case of revocation.
Sends an email to the students (at their university email address), notifying
them that their certiﬁcate has been successfully revoked. A variety of other
information is contained in the email like the subject and serial number of
the certiﬁcate.
5. Renew certiﬁcates automatically and send mail notiﬁcations.
Searches for certiﬁcates that expire soon. Then it initiates a certiﬁcate
renewal request that is sent to the CA. It then notiﬁes the students (at
their university email address), that their certiﬁcate expires soon.
6. Publish LDAP information.
(a) Secure communication with SSL.
(b) Publish CRLs in a deﬁned DN on the LDAP. This is part of the CMA
conﬁguration.
(c) Remove the encrypted certiﬁcate from the student’s entry in the di-
rectory in case of revocation. This will ensure that the user will not
try to re-write his old certiﬁcate in the card.
3It is a WebStart application. It can be downloaded from http://www.tu-darmstadt.de/
hrz/chipkarte/CardManager/ (date of access 10.12.2005). In order to fully use the application
someone must be registered as a student in the university and in addition possess a TUD card.
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(d) Initiate a new certiﬁcation request in case of revocation. This is per-
formed in order to enforce the scheme described in [LKWB05]. This
is an automatic re-certiﬁcation.
(e) Examine whether the public key on the certiﬁcate and the public key
in the student card (it is also stored in LDAP) match. If they match
proceed, otherwise do not.
(f) Encrypt the certiﬁcate and publish its encrypted value in a deﬁned DN
on the LDAP. This information is communicated to the CMA by the
RA. This will enforce PoP according to [KLW04a]. This also ensures
that the students can only use their correct cards since these are sent
with the post and mistakes may take place.
(g) Organise the data on the directory similar to the scheme described in
[LKWB05] for supporting revocation and other administrative tasks.
10.3.2 Other Installations
There are several other installations of the CMA at companies, organisations, or
institutions. We will brieﬂy list them.
One of them is at the German Root CA system. The issuer that the CMA is
working for is the root CA of Germany. This CA issues qualiﬁed certiﬁcates ac-
cording to the SigG for the root certiﬁcates or other certiﬁcation service providers.
An evaluation of the software based on CC was necessary in order to realise the
trust center.
The computer center of the computer science department of the TUD operates
a PKI. This PKI is a software based infrastructure that uses PKCS#12 ﬁles. It
distinguishes between certiﬁcates for students and scientiﬁc staﬀ. The certiﬁcates
for the scientiﬁc staﬀ are the basis of many functions. Two of these functions are
room reservations and online administration of the courses. Tasks of the CMA
in this installation are the mail notiﬁcations, printing of the personalisation data
(PKCS#12 password), publishing, and waiting for acceptance acknowledgements.
At the Justus Liebig University of Giessen (Justus Liebig Universita¨t Gießen)
a smart card based PKI is installed. The card is used for online enrolment for
courses and signing up for examinations among other applications. It is also used
as a student identity card having printed data on the card body.
A variety of other current CMA installations exist. These are either in small
or big companies and institutions. The goal of the CMA is to support a useful
and secure PKI.
The continuous feedback from real life needs is integrated in the CMA, which
grows according to those needs. It is a living part of a ﬂexible trust center
software. More developments and enhancements will be applied to the CMA in
order to meet state of the art requirements.
Chapter 11
Future Work
This work proposed the certiﬁcate management authority or CMA as a new trust
center component. We designed and implemented this authority and employed
it in existing PKI projects with diﬀerent requirements. This new authority is
responsible for the certiﬁcate management tasks within a PKI. It speciﬁes these
tasks, how they are performed, and examines their requirements. The decen-
tralised RAs and the oﬄine issuers pose special challenges. The virtual hosting
enables a ﬂexible and eﬃcient certiﬁcate management. Revocation and certiﬁcate
status information is supported. Moreover, diﬀerent workﬂows and business logic
are realised.
The PKI installed at the TUD has special certiﬁcate management processes.
A PoP is needed in order to prove that the correct student holds the correct
card. The new scheme developed in the context of this work was integrated for
providing these services. Further, a new software PSE delivery mechanism was
proposed that is secure and easy to use.
The directory services inside a PKI were rigorously investigated. A library
was implemented in Java that allows various schemes and cases to be realised.
Especially, the special requirements of the SigG were addressed and their techni-
cal realisation was provided. The communication of the CMA with other trust
center components was addressed. The properties and requirements for this type
of communication were discussed. A new protocol based on XML was designed
and implemented in order to meet the requirements of intra-trustcenter commu-
nication.
The security properties of the CMA were examined. We showed which are
the security requirements for such an authority and how these can be fulﬁlled
and implemented. In order to ease the evaluation process of the CMA according
to Common Criteria, a protection proﬁle (PP) can be established. This will lead
to shorter evaluation time as well as lower costs. A future work is to create a
protection proﬁle for the CMA for a CC based evaluation.
The needs of a PKI change constantly. New protocols will appear that ad-
dress various problems. New processes and services will become available. Vari-
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ous organisations operate a PKI for diﬀerent reasons. Algorithms, schemes, and
workﬂows may become insecure. These will be redesigned or refactored in order
to overcome problems. The CMA is prepared to meet these new developments.
These will be implemented in the CMA. Its ﬂexible design enables an easy inte-
gration of the new developments.
A few new protocol proposals exist at the PKIX group [IET]. Some of them
fall into the CMA’s area of responsibility. These are mostly the ones related
to repository protocols. These new features will be addressed and where this
is necessary implemented or extended by the CMA. In speciﬁc environments, in
which new requirements regarding certiﬁcate management occur, new solutions
will be designed and integrated in the CMA.
Further, it can be investigated what are the tasks and services that the CMA
can oﬀer in several other infrastructures. Such an infrastructure is a PMI based
on attribute certiﬁcates. It can be examined whether the presence of a CMA is
meaningful in a PMI or not and what are the tasks related to attribute certiﬁcate
management. The design and implementation of a CMA for a PMI is still open.
Practical identity based cryptosystems were proposed in [BF01]. Very few
identity based infrastructures exist at the moment. The applications based on
these infrastructures are still limited. The speciﬁcations of such an infrastructure
is currently work in progress. Although most variants of those infrastructures
do not employ certiﬁcates (but some do), it is still an open question whether a
CMA is needed or not. In this case an issuer exists, that creates private keys
for the infrastructure participants. The administration of those products may be
delegated to the CMA. The certiﬁcate based variants, may proﬁt even more from
the presence of a CMA.
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